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SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE IN THE "URBAN LITORAL" OF ARGENTINA
Accelerated by an increasing industrialization-urbanization trend, 
new social and institutional forms are emerging in Latin America, in' 
which new social classes and interest groups are achieving and consoli­
dating an expanding share, of political power. This phenomenon of socio­
political change is the subject of inquiry to which this study is dedicated.
The Problem
An increased interest in the "chemistry" and process of political
1
and social change on the part of Latin Americanists is noted. In viewing
^A. Cuftis Wilgus, "The Chemistry of Political Change in Latin 
America." The Annals. CC%LII (July, 1962), pp. 42-51; Claudio Veliz (ed.). 
Obstacles to Change in Latin America (London: Oxford University, 1965);
Kalman H. Silvert, "Political Change in Latin America," The United States 
and Latin America. The American Assembly (New York: Columbia University,
1959), pp. 59-79; _________________ , The Conflict Society. Reaction and
Revolution in Latin America (New York: American Universities'Field Staff,
Inc., 1966 edition), chapter 2; George I. Blanksten, "The Politics of 
Latin America," The Politics of the Developing Areas, Gabriel A. Almond 
and James S. Coleman (eds.), (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1960), pp. 455-531; Council on Foreign Relations, Social Change 
in Latin America Today (New York: . Harper, 1960); William V. D'Antonio 
and Fredrick B. Pike (eds.). Religion. Revolution, and Reform; New Forces 
for Change in Latin America (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964);
John V. D. Saunders, Social Factors in Latin American Modernization 
(Nashville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University, 1965); J. B. Jlaier and
R. W. Weatherhead (eds.). Politics of Change in Latin America (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); John D. Habron, Crisis and Change in Latin 
America (Toronto, Canada: Canadian Institute of International Affairs,
2
this growing collection of research and publications on social and
political change in Latin America, it is evident that many significant
2factors have been discovered and elaborated. But, to the knowledge 
of the researcher, no satisfactory diagrammatic model has yet been
1960); Mildred Adams (ed.), Latin America; Evolution or Explosion?
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1963); etc.
^Review the bibliography cited by Merle Kling, "The State of 
Research on Latin America; Political Science," Social Science Research 
in Latin America, ed. Charles Wagley (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1964), pp. 168-213. See particularly the various writings of 
Kenneth F. Johnson: "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political
Alienation in Mexico," The American Political Science Review. LIX 
(September, 1965), pp. 656-664; "Political Alienation in Mexico: A
Preliminary Examination of UNS and PAN," The Rocky Mountain Social 
Science Journal. II (May, 1965), pp. 155-165; "Causal Factors in Latin 
American Political Instability," The Western Political Quarterly. XVII 
(September, 1964), pp. 432-446, and see also Russell H. Fitzgibbon and 
Kenneth F. Johnson, "Measurement of Latin American Political Change,"
The American Political Science Review. LV (September, 1961), pp. 515- 
526; Alan Angell, "Party Systems in Latin America," The Political
Quarterly, XXXVII (July-September, 1966), pp. 309-323; ________________ ,
"The Study of Latin American Politics," Political Studies. XII (October, 
1964), pp. 389-394; Robert L. Peterson, "Social Structure and the Poli­
tical Process in Latin America: A Methodological Re-examination," The
Western Political Quarterly. XVI (December, 1963), pp. 885-896; Peter 
Heintz, "Research Models for Latin America," International Social Science 
Journal. XV (Nov. 4, 1963), pp. 528-541; John D. Martz, "Dilemmas in the 
Study of Latin American Political Parties," The Journal of Politics. XXVI 
(August, 1964), pp. 509-531; Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Systems and 
Political Change," The American Behavioral Scientist. VI (June, 1963), 
pp. 3-10; Merle Kling, "Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instabi­
lity in Latin America," The Western Political Quarterly. IX (March, 1956), 
pp. 21-35; Kalman H. Silvert, "National Values, Development, and Leaders 
and Followers: A Summary Statement of Theory, Some Research, and Some
Implications." International Social Science Journal XV (Nov. 4, 1963), 
pp. 560-570; Irving Louis Horowitz, Three Worlds of Development: The
Theory and Practice of International Stratification (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), chapter 14; German Arciniegas, "Twentieth- 
Century Political Trends in Latin America," Cahiers d*Histoire Mondiale. 
VIII (Nov. 2, 1964), pp. 5-16; Paul H. Deutschmann and John T. McNelly, 
"Characteristics of Latin American Countries," The American Behavioral 
Scientist. VIII (September, 1964), pp. 25-29; and Norman E. Whitten, Jr., 
"Power Structure and Socio-cultural Change in Latin American Communities," 
Social Forces. XLII (March, 1965), pp. 320-329.
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contrived for the total analysis of sociopolitical change in a Latin 
American context. Nor has any such visual model been coordinated with 
a set of quantitative measurements.
Objectives of the Study
It will be the over-all objective of this study to develop an 
organizational framework, with complementary methods of measurement, for 
describing, recording, testing, and theorizing about sociopolitical 
change in one specific country and region of Latin America, viz., in 
the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.^ To this end, the entire work is 
directed. Hence, a preliminary model, with a complementary set of 
measures, is given at the outset and is explained in Chapter II, "The 
Framework and Procedures for Analysis." Then, toward the end of this 
study, in the concluding chapter, the original framework and its 
methodological correlates will be criticized and revised to fit the 
needs of a more realistic and appropriate approach to the study of 
the problem.
Apart from this over-all objective, the study has five other 
objectives: 1) to describe the basic structures and issues involved
in sociopolitical change for the chief social classes, political- 
influence groups, and governments (national, provincial, and municipal) 
of the country, with special focus on the "urban Litoral"; 2) to test 
for social participation, anomie, and alienation among selected groups
The meaning and usage of the geographical designation, "urban 
Litoral," is discussed in the next section of this chapter, page 6.
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of Argentine subjects in order to determine a) the degree of partici­
pation, anomie, and alienation which the subjects exemplify and b) 
the effectiveness of North American measures when used in a Latin 
American cultural setting; 3) to identify and measure some of the 
major belief systems and attitudes that influence social and poli­
tical relations in Argentina; 4) to categorize and elaborate upon 
the various stabilizers (inputs of support or stability) and pressures 
(inputs of stress or demands) that either advance or threaten the 
stable continuation of the Argentine political system; and 5) to 
recommend new measures and approaches that will more effectively 
achieve all the antecedent objectives.
Hypotheses of the Study
One of the major emphases of this study is on the attitudes 
a^d participation of three different Argentine socioeconomic classes: 
the lower, lower middle, and upper middle classes. In measuring the 
attitudes and participation of these three classes, it is theorized 
that the key variables are socioeconomic status, anomie, political 
alienation, and social participation, and that these four variables 
are all interrelated. Accordingly, it is hypothesized that a low socio­
economic status, especially the environmental influences which such 
status entails, is likely to produce anomie and political alienation, 
which bear negatively on social participation and stifle social acti­
vity. In the study of socioeconomic groups in the "urban Litoral" of 
Argentina, anomie and political alienation are assumed to be related to.
or, positioned as two intervening variables between, socioeconomic status
4and social participation.
To carry this hypothesis one step further, it can be theorized 
that the socioeconomic status and the levels of alienation, anomie, and 
participation of a person, especially of a resident of Argentina's 
"urban Litoral," will chiefly influence or determine his political 
participation and attitudes. However, because the number of subjects 
in this study is relatively small, no attempt will be made to establish 
statistically the relationship between the four measured variables—  
socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, and social partici­
pation— and political participation and attitudes.
Returning to the "two intervening variablesT” anomie and politi­
cal alienation, it is observed that these two variables influence indi­
vidual and group behavior in both political and social spheres. Hence 
it is hypothesized that anomic and politically alienated persons will 
not be participating much socially, in either formal or informal associ­
ations; in either society or politics. In this respect it is hypothesized 
that "persons of low socioeconomic activity are prone to withdraw from 
political activity." Next, it is held that political alienation, as 
measured in this study, is the reflection of a more general kind of 
alienation or anomie. This means that a correlation is expected to exist
Wayne E. Thompson and John E. Horton, "Political Alienation as 
a Force in Political Action," Social Forces. XXXVIII (March, 1960), pp. 
190-195; Edward L. McDill and Jeanne Clare Ridley, "Status, Anomie, 
Political Alienation, and Political Participation," The American Journal 
of Sociology. LXVII (September, 1962), pp. 205-213; Frederic Templeton, 
"Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research Findings," The
Public Opinion Quarterly. XXX (Summer, 1966), pp. 249-261.
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between anomie and political alienation and that each individual, having 
been tested as being anomic will similarly test as being politically 
alienated. Finally, following the logic that "political alienation 
involves not only apathy as a response to political powerlessness but 
also a general distrust of political leaders who are the wielders of 
this p o w e r , i t  can be assumed that alienated respondents will react 
negatively toward the local and national governments and all identifiable 
holders of political and economic power.
The Focus of the Study
To study more effectively and concretely the problem of socio­
political change, it is advantageous to focus upon the regions of greatest 
demographic concentration wherein increasing urbanization has raised 
social, economic, and political activity to ever greater levels of criti- 
cality. One of the most important economic and political regions in all 
Latin America is certainly the "Litoral" of Argentina, historically com­
prising the present-day provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, Entre Rios, 
and Corrientes.^ While some academicians view the "Litoral" region even 
more restrictively,^ this study will compromise between the two views 
and consider the three provinces of Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre 
Rios as comprising the "Litoral" and the four cities of Buenos Aires 
(Buenos Aires province), Rosario (Santa Fe province), Santa Fe (Santa
^McDill and Ridley, ibid.. pp. 206-207.
_  &Aldo Ferrer, La economia argentine, las etapas de su desarrollo 
V problemas actuales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Culture Economica, 1965),
p. 40.
^Marcelo Isacovich, Argentina, economica y social (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Quipo, 1965), pp. 272-273, designates only the two provinces 
of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe as comprising the "Litoral" region.
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Fe province), and Parana (Entre Rîos province) as the "urban" focus 
within the "Litoral" region. These four cities border on the Plate 
River, referred to in Spanish as the Rio de la Plata, and constitute 
the greatest urban concentration in all Latin America. Map 1 shows the 
geographical location of the three provinces and their cities which 
constitute, for this study, the "urban Litoral."
Apart from its geographical focus, the study has a time-space 
focus. Its beginning is pinpointed precisely on June 28, 1966, the day 
of the military coup which ousted President Arturo Illia. Its date of 
termination is just as precise: December 14, 1966, date of the general
labor strike called by the Confederacion General de Trabajo (General 
Labor Confederation), which event was, up to that time, the most seriously 
and generally manifested opposition directed at the new national govern­
ment. That the study concentrates on this six-month period (June 28- 
December 14, 1966) is quite significant. Foremost, it is a period which 
represents a clear separation from the social and political past and 
which establishes a definite orientation toward future sociopolitical 
phenomena. In this period every significant segment of society expresses 
dissatisfaction with the sociopolitical past and pronounces in favor of 
revolution and reform. Furthermore, during most of this period, little 
if any dissatisfaction is expressed or demonstrated against the deposing 
of President Illia and the suppressing of the political parties. Even 
toward the end of the period (in December of 1966), the opposition which 
is expressed against the national government is not over the ideas—  
progress, modernization, and change— of the Revolution but over the means 
by which these ideas are to be achieved. But perhaps most important of
6
all is that the time-space focus of this study proves particularly rele­
vant in the application of the methodology outlined in the next chapter.
Limitations of the Study
This proposed research may suffer from but should not be too
seriously hampered by, in the words of Kenneth F. Johnson, "the problem
8of instrument construction in the Spanish vernacular." While difficulties 
in translation and meaning normally exist in any study of this type there
are also problems related to whether this particular schema will be
9sufficiently "culture free" to be valid for cross-national use. This 
latter problem will necessitate some changes in the original scale items 
destined for use in the research.
The focus of this study, as already noted, covers a large area 
of investigation but its methodological parameters are rather narrow. 
Ideally, a whole team of researchers could have been engaged for a con­
siderably longer period of time than for the three-month period during 
which just the researcher gathered material. Too, it must be admitted 
that, although this approach claims to be a comprehensive one, the 
limitations imposed by time ahd lack of personal resources ensure that 
not all the important variables were tested and not all the relevant 
issues were explored.
O
Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political 
Alienation in Mexico," op. cit.. p. 661.
gArnold M. Rose, "Prejudice, Anomie, and the Authoritarian 
Personality," Sociology and Social Research. L (January, 1966), pp.
141-147, in testing T. W. Adorno’s "authoritarian personality" scale 
and Leo Srole’s "anomia" scale among lower-class workers in Italy, found 
that the former scale was "practically useless for making international 
comparisons" and noted certain other problems, too, in applying the 
latter scale, except for comparing in-groups.
Definitions of Terms Used
It is deemed advisable at this point to define the meaning and 
usage of the key terms that will be used extensively throughout this 
paper.
Sociopolitical change. As the key term in the title of this 
work and as the most commonly used term throughout this study, "socio­
political change" deserves some kind of definition. "Sociopolitical" 
is a compound word that combines "social" and "political" and describes 
or refers to both the "Litoral" society and the political system of 
Argentina. But the use of this term in describing the political and 
social orders of the country will not be restricted in this study to 
political and social phenomena exclusively, rather a wide number of 
changes, e.g.. changes in the national economy, will be examined if 
these changes influence in any way the political system (the decision­
makers and national authorities) or the social system (the commonly 
viewed social classes in their stratified distributions). Thus, any 
change which affects the political authorities or the social classes 
of Argentina's "urban Litoral" will be regarded as a "sociopolitical 
change,"
The political system. Another key term in this study of 
sociopolitical change is the "political system." In this study, the 
term, "political system," will be used rather narrowly to denote only 
the persons who are or who could be called the "decisionmaking 
authorities" and the procedures and processes of decisionmaking them­
selves. All other elements— the political-influence groups, including 
the political parties; the national, provincial, and municipal
10
administrations which perform public functions and execute the policies 
decided upon by the decisionmaking authorities; and all the variables 
proceeding from "the total environment," including juridical and 
legalistic factors-^-will be considered as lying outside the "political 
system." In the '-Hirban Litoral" three levels of political systems exist 
(national, provincial, and municipal) and each one is composed of top- 
ranking government officials who sit in policy meetings and determine 
what actions if any should be taken in the geographic jurisdiction over 
which they rule.
Anomie. Another widely used term in this study is "anomie," 
which is French and means the same as the English "anomy" and the Spanish 
"anomia." It first appeared in English in 1591 and was in frequent use 
during the seventeenth century, particularly in its French spelling. It 
was introduced into the social sciences and popularized by Durkheim, the 
French sociologist, in his study on suicide. In general usage it has 
three meanings: 1) personal disorganization and disorientation, 2) a
social situation in which norms are in conflict, and 3) a social situation 
in which no norms exist— a state of " a n a r c h y . I n  more recent usage 
it has acquired the dimensions of isolation (self-estrangement), norm- 
lessness, and powerlessness (system dissociation).^^ However, some
^^Julius Gould and William L. Kolb (eds.), A Dictionary of the 
Social Sciences (New York: The Free Press, 1965 edition), p. 29.
l^Rose, loc. cit.; Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and 
the Class Structure," Sociometry. XX (June, 1957), pp. 105-106; Elwin H. 
Powell, "The Evolution of the American City and the Emergence of Anomie," 
The British Journal of Sociology. XIII (June, 1962), pp. 156-162. The 
different dimensions of "anomie" are shown diagrammatically in F. B. 
Waisanen, "Stability, Alienation, and Change," The Sociological Quarterly. 
IX (Winter, 1963), pp. 24-25.
11
12scholars in the social sciences use another term, "anomia," which in 
any event is not significantly different.
For this study, "anomie" will be used in referring to any or all 
of the preceding social situations, namely, ones in which there exist 
1) a personal disorganization or disorientation, 2) a self-estrangement 
or isolation, 3) a sense of normlessness, 4) a feeling of powerlessness 
or system dissociation, and 5) a conflict of norms. The term will 
describe individual attitudes toward life in general but not toward any 
one person or entity in particular. An individual who is said to be 
anomic will have a general feeling of despair, estrangement, and power­
lessness; and his own values will either not exist or will be in con­
flict with the ones that are commonly accepted by his society.
Political alienation. Whereas the term "anomie" describes a 
state of general feelings, the term "alienation" refers to a more spe­
cific "estrangement or separation between parts or the whole of the 
personality and significant aspects of the world experience." Its 
usage in the social sciences was most notably established by the socialist 
theory of Karl Marx and the sociology of Sigmund Freud. In Marxian 
theory, an individual is alienated from his work by the systems of eco­
nomic production and class domination. This alienation or separation 
from his work and the products of his work results also in the indi­
vidual's being alienated from nature and himself. "Freud was aware
12Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries:
An Exploratory Study," American Sociological Review. XXI (December,
1956), pp. 709-716; Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell, "Anomie and 
Differential Access to the Achievement of Life's Goals," American 
Sociological Review XXIV (April, 1959), pp. 190-191; McDill and Ridley, 
loc. cit.
12
that the demands of social structure hostile to the core of the self
13could be made worse by the existence of class domination." Thus, in 
the broadest sense, "political alienation" can mean the separation or 
estrangement between an individual and his objective political world 
or between the individual and aspects of his political self. An indi­
vidual who is alienated from his political environment, then, is 
separated or estranged from it.
The measurement of the level of "political alienation" of certain
groups and classes of individuals is presently the object of a number of
. 14studies.
For this study, "political alienation" will have three meanings.
It will be used in the first sense to designate the disaffection, negative 
feelings, or dissatisfactions that an individual or an entire socio­
economic class may express with regard to local municipal government and 
the public employes with whom the mass population of the region locally 
deals. A special scale will be used to measure the level of this sum of
l^Gould and Kolb, op. cit.. p. 19.
^4gee Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political In­
stability," op. cit.. p. 435; Marvin E. Olsen, "Alienation and Political 
Opinions," The Public Opinion Quarterly. XXIX (Summer, 1965), pp. 201-202; 
Thompson and Horton, op. cit.. p. 195; Dwight 6. Dean, "Alienation and 
Political Apathy," Social Forces. XXXVIII (March, 1960), pp. 185-186; 
Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological 
Review. XXIV (December, 1959), pp. 784-791; Arthur G. Neal and Salomon 
Rettig, "Dimensions of Alienation among Manual and Non-manual Workers," 
American Sociological Review. XXVIII (August, 1963), pp. 599-608; Louis 
A. Zucher, Jr., Arnold Meadows, and Susan Lee Zurcher, "Value Orientation, 
Role Conflict, and Alienation from Work: A Cross-Cultural Study," Amer­
ican Sociological Review. XXX (August, 1965), pp. 539-548; Johnson, 
"Political Alienation in Mexico: A Preliminary Examination of UNS and
PAN," loc. cit.; Melvin Seeman^ "Alienation, Membership, and Political 
Knowledge: A Comparative Study," Public Opinion Quarterly. XXX (Fall,
1966), pp. 353-367.
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dissatisfactions and negative feelings concerning the local bureaucracy. 
In the second and more ordinary sense, "political alienation" will mean 
political estrangement, separation, or isolation. In the third and 
less usual sense, "political alienation" will mean either "political 
extremism" or a predisposition that may lead to political extremism. 
Political extremism is found in both the attitudes and acts of indi­
viduals or groups who advocate and use violence in disseminating their 
ideologies, in effecting disruptive changes in national life and in 
implementing revolutionary p r o g r a m s . T h e  predisposition toward 
political extremism lies in the expression and demonstration of per­
sonal dissatisfaction with or displeasure at certain acts of government 
and forms of national life on the one hand and the realization on the 
other hand that constitutional and other less-violent means will not 
achieve the changes in government or national life that are desired.
To describe a condition short of political extremism or near political 
extremism (a predisposition toward political extremism), the term 
"political disaffection" will be used.^^
^^This third meaning of "political alienation" is essentially 
given in Johnson, "Ideological Correlates of Right-Wing Political Alien­
ation in Mexico," op. cit.. p. 657.
^^So long as an individual or group believes that his or its 
goals can be achieved through constitutional and legitimate means, 
neither is considered to be "politically alienated." A state of "poli­
tical alienation" exists once it is determined that violent or sedi­
tious behavior must be used. The individual or group that uses violence 
and tension is definitely considered to be "politically alienated."
l^"Political disaffection" will refer to any kind of individual 
or collective dissatisfactions which criticize the government, the eco­
nomy, the society, and the specific actors and forces within the same.
To the knowledge of the researcher there is no precedent to justify 
adoption of the term. Professor Johnson uses disaffection synonymously
14
Other Terms
Other terms which need definition are "total environment"; the 
new social-group designations: "elite society," "mass society," and
"marginal society"; the political-group designations: "interest groups,"
"pressure groups," and "tension groups"; and, the terms, "stabilizers" 
and "pressures." These terms will be defined as they each appear in 
the text of the study.
Organization of the Dissertation
In approaching the problem, conducting the research, and 
reporting the results of this study, ten chapters will follow: Chapter
II, "The Framework and Procedures for Analysis"; Chapter III, "The Total 
Environment"; Chapter IV, "The Funnel of Social-Class Interests";
Chapter V, "The Funnel of Political-Group Interests"; Chapter VI, "The 
Funnel of Governing Interests"; Chapter VII, "Alienation and Participation"; 
Chapter VIII, "Attitudes and Belief Systems"; Chapter IX, "The Receiving 
Political System"; Chapter X, "The Responding Political System"; and 
Chapter XI, "The Changing Society and Political System: Conclusion."
with alienation in "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Insta­
bility," loc. cit.; but, its use in this paper will be to specify con­
ditions of dissatisfaction which are non-violent and non-seditious.
Its dimensions embrace, in addition to personal dissatisfaction and 
displeasure, unfriendliness and disloyalty toward and discontent and 
unhappiness with certain persons and aspects of national life.
CHAPTER II
THE FRAMEWORK AND PROCEDURES FOR ANALYSIS
The "Old School" Latin Americanists employ three principal 
approaches— descriptive, institutional, and foreign-policy— to the 
study of Latin American phenomena, none of which, in the estimation 
of one "New School" Latin Americanist, "has proved adequate for a full 
and sophisticated comprehension of Latin American politics."^ In the 
wake of this apparent dissatisfaction with the' traditional approaches, 
there is a new behavioral and sociological approach to the study of 
Latin America, emerging for the first time among the comparative 
government specialists on Latin America. This new empirically oriented, 
behavioral school is tending to adapt a variety of approaches to the 
study of Latin American politics and to reject the historical-institu­
tional-legal approach. In opposition to thit tendency. Professor Merle
3Kling warns against the wholesale adoption of "a variety of approaches" 
and another Latin Americanist urges the retention Of the more traditional
^Robert L. Peterson, op. cit.. pp. 885-886.
2See Merle Kling, "The State of Research on Latin America: 
Political Science," Social Science Research on Latin America. Charles 
Wagley, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 168-213,
especially p. 207.
3
Merle Kling, "Area Studies and Comparative Politics," The 
American Behavioral Scientist. VIII (September, 1964), p. 11.
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approach because it provides "a frame of reference of great value for
4
further investigation."
While the researcher classifies himself among the behavioralists 
and agrees with the critics of the traditional methods, he is disen­
chanted with the group with which he identifies because it has not yet, 
to his knowledge, produced anything. In effect, it appears from the 
perspective of the researcher that neither traditional nor behavioral 
methods can yield by themselves "a full and sophisticated comprehension 
of Latin American politics" and that what is needed is to achieve some 
sort of balance between the two approaches. Accordingly, it will be the 
approach of this study to use behavioral measures and to complement these 
measures with an adequate amount of historical and descriptive data.^
The Model of Sociopolitical Change
The outline or framework of this study is summarized in the 
diagrammatic model of sociopolitical change on the next page. This so- 
called model of sociopolitical change combines five conceptions in its 
structural appearance: 1) Samuel H. Beer's identification of the four
variables— political culture, the pattern of power, the pattern of 
interests, and the pattern of policy— of a political system;^ 2) David
4
Frank Jay Moreno, "The Traditional and the Behavioral," The 
American Behavioral Scientist. VIII (September, 1964), p. 5.
^"An adequate amount of historical and descriptive data" will be 
that amount needed to complete a meaningfull discussion of all the prob­
lems appearing in the succeeding chapters.
^Samuel H. Beer, "The Four Variables of a Political System" in 
Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam (eds.) Patterns of Government: the 
Major Political Systems of Europe (New York: Random House, 1962 edition),
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MODEL OF SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE
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Easton's conceptualization of political life as a system of activity 
which is maintained by inputs Of demands and supports that are converted 
into outputs by the political system;^ 3) "the need to describe what it 
is that lies outside of a system," viz.» the total environment lying 
outside the structural order of a political system, as exemplified in 
Easton's model and in several area studies that have been done by native
Q
Argentine researchers; 4) Torcuato S. Di Telia's models of social and
pp. 32-63. The two funnels (the Funnel of Political-Group Interests and 
the Funnel of Governing Interests), the political-culture chamber (atti­
tudes and belief systems), and the responding chamber for the political 
system, all pictured in Diagram 1, represent the four variables that 
Professor Beer discusses.
^David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"
World Politics. IX (April, 1957), pp. 383-400; ____________ , A Framework
for Political Analysis, loc. cit.; ______________, A Systems Analysis of
Political Life, loc. cit.
®Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems,"
World Politics, ibid.; ______________, A Framework for Political Analysis.
i b i d . T  pp. i-xiv, 57, 59-76; ______________, A Systems Analysis of Political
Life, ibid.. pp. 21-33, 54-56. Also see Albert Miester, Susana Petruzzi, 
and Elda Sonzogni, Tradicionalismo v cambio social. Estudio de area en 
el valle de Santa Maria (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Filosofîa y
Letras, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1963), pp. 77-86, 55-72; In-? 
stituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, Plan director de Parana. Anâ- 
lisis sub regional. 3 volumes (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Ciencias
Matematicas, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1963), I, pp. 1-67, II;
______________, Analisis sectoral de la provincia de Entre Rios. 3 volumes
(Rosario, Argentina:  , 1964), II, "Infraestructura"; Jose
Luis de Imaz, Estructura social de una ciudad pampena. 2 volumes (La 
Plata, Argentina: Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educacion,
Universidad Nacional de la Plata, 1965), I, II; Delbert C. Miller, Eva 
Chamorro Greca, and Juan Carlos Agulla, De la industria al poder (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1966), pp. 9-53; Alejandro Rofman et. al..
Bases para un estudio sobre la estructura economica de Rosario v su zona 
de influencia (Rosario, Argentina: Facultad de Ciencias Economicas,
Comerciales y Politicas, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp.
28-33 (Mimeographed); Clara E. Badler et. al.. Determinacion de regiones 
homogeneas v areas de abastecimiento de productos perecederos mediante
mëtodos de analisis multivariados (Rosario, Argentina: ______________,
1966), pp. 4-8 (Mimeographed); Nestor J. Castagnola and Arnoldo R. Rosen- 
feld, Estudio sobre la diversificacion industrial en très departamentos
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political processes during the industrialization process for different 
Latin American countries;^ and 5) Irving Louis Horowitz's view of 
processes and structures in which "that portion of social facts con­
cerned with processes refers to changes in class, power, occupation, and
„10prestige."
There are two aspects concerning the model or sociopolitical 
change that should be discussed: the structural and functional aspects
of the model.
de la provincia de Santa Fe (Rosario, Argentina: ______________ , 1966),
pp. 1-4. (Mimeographed.); Ana Rosa Centeno, "Los partidos politicos en 
la provincia de Santa.Fe" (unpublished manuscript. Institute de Derecho 
Publico y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), 
pp. 1-32. All these studies, although reporting on specific aspects of 
so&ial and political change, devote a modest portion of their space to 
elaborate ecological, demographical, and economic data, as well as data 
about religious institutions, public health, hygiene, foodstuffs, agri­
culture, industry, transportation, income, land ownership, etc. These 
environmental factors are condensed into eight groups of so-called 
"environmental components" and are dispersed around the outer perimeter 
in Diagram 1.
^Torcuato S. Di Telia, "Los procesos politicos y sociales de la 
industrializacion," Desarrollo Economico. II (October-December, 1962), 
pp. 19-48, 38-40. In his study of the social and political processes of 
industrialization, Torcuato S. Di Telia used a model in the form of a 
pyramid in order to illustrate in graphic form the major different types 
of sociological structures that are possible at various stages of indus­
trialization. Countries at the same industrial level as Argentina were 
shown with a 60 per cent base of workers and peasantry and progressing 
upward to'a 30 per cent middle class and a ten per cent apex of bourgeoisie, 
with the principal line of tension fixed between the proletariat-peasantry 
and middle class and with greatest mobility occurring between the middle 
class and the bourgeoisie element. The three principal funnels in Diagram 
1 are in the shape of pyramids and can be made to reflect changes in 
relative sizes of the various groups that constitute each funnel structure.
^^Horowitz, op. cit.. pp. 431-432. Professor Horowitz recognizes 
that social and political changes occur in class, power, occupation, and 
prestige at either individual, group, or societal levels. The diagram or 
research model recognizes that such changes,as Horowitz specifies, do 
occur through a shifting struggle of various interests that are vying for 
wealth, status, and mobility.
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The Structural Model
It is relevant to note that Diagram 1 concerns "the total envir­
onment" of the "urban Litoral" of Argentina. From the three funnels—  
social-group interests, political-group interests, and governing interests- 
each with its own peculiar structure, flow various inputs of pressures
and stabilizers (demands and support, in the terminology of David Easton)
11into the "chamber of political culture" and into the "political system."
These two kinds of inputs (pressures and stabilizers) are received 
by the system authorities and then acted upon. This process of receiving 
inputs of pressures and stabilizers and reacting to the same is charac­
terized by the terms: "receiving political system" and "responding poli­
tical system." The political system (i.e.. the authorities or decision­
makers in the political system), as well as the three funnels of interests
depicted in Diagram 1, are affected by conditions and developments that
12occur in and emanate from the "total environment." As these conditions 
and developments pass through the three funnels (social group, political 
group, and governing interests), they are converted into inputs of pres­
sures and stabilizers that will either pressure or strengthen the 
decisionmaking position of the system authorities.
l^The relative sizes of the different groups within each structure 
or funnel of interests will have some bearing upon the rate and volume of 
the flow of inputs of pressures and stabilizers into the political system. 
This point will be elaborated in Chapters IV, V, and VI.
The "total environment" is a term that will be used to refer 
to the aggregate of environmental influences which impinge on the "poli­
tical system." A topical listing of the total environmental components, 
factors, or criteria for studying sociopolitical change from outside "the 
political system" and the interest groups will be found in Appendix A, 
pages 317-321, of this study.
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The Functional Model
The model of sociopolitical change is simply diagrammatic, and 
no mathematical values will be given to any of the visual elements in the 
diagram. If such a mathematical equation had been devised for use in 
this study, it is speculated that the whole procedure would have been 
reduced to a mere statistical exercise bearing little similitude to 
reality. The model represents only a graphic format for showing the 
structures and processes involved in sociopolitical change. It does not 
promise to measure nor to predict change within any of the structures 
or processes which it identifies. But it does offer a framework and 
several evaluative criteria which give it a small yet definite degree 
of precision when its guidelines are followed.
Evaluative Criteria of the Model
The evaluative criteria on which the model rests establish, first, 
that a study concerning social and political change should take into 
account the following kinds of factors: ecological, historical-evolutionary,
ethnic^demographical, psychological-cultural, socio-urban, political-legal, 
food supply and consumption, and economic. These eight kinds of factors 
form the basis for sociopolitical change through the activity of social- 
group interests, political-group interests, and governing interests. In 
viewing social-group interests, it is r^evant to know the percentages 
of individuals who show marginal, mass, or elite patterns. In viewing 
political-group interests, it is relevant to know the numbers and kinds 
of influence groups that are "interest groups," "pressure groups," or 
"tension groups." In viewing governing interests, it is relevant to know
22
the relative command of each governing force: national, provincial,
and municipal.
Struggle of the Interest Groups
The. emphasis in this study will be upon the three kinds of 
interests (social-group, political-group, and governing) generally 
and upon the social-group interests specifically. Each group of inter­
ests has a definite structure which is subject to change through time. 
Since this promises to be a study of sociopolitical change, then, any 
changes which occur in any of the structures of the three groups of 
interests will be significant. Irving Louis Horowitz has commented not 
only on changes in structures but on changes in processes, too. There 
are two dimensions to the study of changing processes. One dimension is 
to view the "absolute" growth in power, wealth, status, or mobility at 
individual, group, or societal levels. This process of "shifting" 
hegemony of different interests among the major areas of national life 
and human existence (power, wealth, status, and mobility) is referred 
to in this study as the struggle of interest groups. In chapters IV 
through VI, each set of interests will be examined as to its structure 
and its objects of struggle. No precise measurements will be used to
l^The measures of socioeconomic status, anomie, political 
alienation, and social participation will be used to determine whether 
any given individual shows marginal, mass, or elite patterns. No statis­
tical measures will be used for determining the numbers, kinds, and 
effectiveness of both the political-group interests and the governing 
interests; rather, the researcher will make rough estimations of each 
political-group interest and each governing interest based upon the 
material available to him.
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determine which interests command which areas of conflict or struggle, 
but whenever possible quantitative data will be used in describing more 
fully the changes in national processes, as seen particularly in the 
"urban Litoral." Another dimension, described by Horowitz, concerns 
"how a person, group, or society is viewed by other persons, groups, and 
societies."1^ As Jacques Lambert is wont to point out, it is not impor­
tant whether a public administration is corrupt or not, but whether the 
people think that public officials are d i s h o n e s t . O n e  of the major 
objectives in this study will be to measure individual attitudes toward 
other governments in the world and other groups in politics, in society, 
and in the economy.
The Complementary Methodology
Now, in order to complement and lend more empirical credence to 
the so-called "model of sociopolitical change," the following subjective 
and quantitative measurements will be employed and their results reported; 
socioeconomic status, anomie, political alienation, social participation, 
and political attitudes.
Socioeconomic Status
While a more complex and sophisticated measurement of social 
class will be proposed in the final chapter of this study, in practice
14Horowitz, op. cit.. p. 432.
Jacques Lambert, America Latina. Estructuras sociales e insti- 
tuciones politicas. trans. Pablo Bordonaba (Spain: Ediciones Ariel, S. A.,
1964), p. 233.
24
only four criteria were used: occupation and education of subject, or
husband of the subject, in the case of female interviewees, and occu­
pation and education of the father of the s u b j e c t . F o r  each one of 
the occupational and educational indicators a score range from one to 
seven was constructed after the previously validated typology of 
Eichelbaum de Babini in her study^^ and after Dorothy L. Meier and
IQWendell Bell in their study. Tables 1 and 2 list seven categories 
each of occupations and education levels, with a possible maximum of 
28 points, for given responses by interviewed subjects. Ranking was 
done on the basis of the following summations: 0-12, the lowest socio­
economic group; 12-20, the intermediate group; and 20-28, the superior 
or highest group.
^^It may be argued that the use of occupation and education of 
father of subject as part of the criteria for gauging socioeconomic 
status will yield a distorted socioeconomic profile for each subject. 
However, it should be noted that the indicators of education and occu­
pation of father have consistently achieved high-correlation scores in 
the Germani tests, using nearly all existent statistical measures of 
correlation. Furthemore, given the extra-familial pattern which 
characterizes Argentine society— the long period of time in which children 
are kept under the tutelage of and dependency on their parents, even well 
into adulthood, and the fact that the subject may well have lived for a 
considerable period under conditions commensurate with the education and 
occupational levels of his parent— all would seem to justify using these 
as socioeconomic indicators, as well as measures of social mobility 
between the two represented generations.
^^Ana Maria Eichelbaum de Babini, Educacion familiar y status 
socioeconomico ("Trabajos e Investigaciones de Sociologie, Colecciôn 
Estructura: No. 2"; Buenos Aires: Institute de Sociologie, Universidad
de Buenos Aires, 1965), pp. 13-17.
18Meier and Bell, op. cit.. p. 202.
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TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONS OF SUBJECT (OR HUSBAND OF SUBJECT) 
AND FATHER OF SUBJECT
Occupation Point Total
Blue-collar worker (dependent and unskilled) . 
Blue-collar worker (independent and skilled) . 
Small-scale white-collar worker (or small-
public employewithout specifying) ........
Small-scale businessman, medium white-collar
worker ............. .......................
Professional university employe, medium
businessman, lower-ranking military officer 
University professor or administrator, high- 
ranking employe, high-ranking military officer 









LEVELS OF INSTRUCTION OF SUBJECT (OR HUSBAND OF SUBJECT) 
AND FATHER OF SUBJECT
Highest Education Attained Point Total
No School ...........
Some Elementary . . . 
Elementary Completed 
Some High School . . 
Completed High School 
Some College . . . .  









Political Alienation and Anomie
The previously tested and validated scales of Leo Srole^^ and
Basil G. Zimmer^*^ will be used in this study to measure the levels of
"anomie" and "political alienation" in Argentine subjects tested in the
"urban Litoral" region. Each scale has five items and five response
categories. The five response categories for both scales are: estoy
muy de acuerdo. estoy algo de acuerdo. no tengo opinion, estoy en desa-
21cuerdo, and estoy completamente en desacuerdo.
The Srole Scale
As noted above, the Srole "anomia" scale is a five-item scale.
This study will use a translated adaptation of the Ephraim Harold Mizruchi
version of Srole's original five items and will include five other items
interspersed among the "anomia" items in order "to reduce the possibility
22of the respondent operating under or developing an aquiescence set."
The Mizruchi version of the original Srole "anomia" scale items 
is as follows :
1. Most public officials are not really interested in the 
problems of the common man.
2. These days a person doesn't really know on whom he can 
count.
^'Srole, op. cit.. pp. 712-713.
^^Cited in McDill and Ridley, op. cit.. p. 208.
21 In English; completely agree, agree, undecided, disagree, 
and completely disagree.
22Ephraim Harold Mizruchi, "Social Structure and Anomia in a 
Small City," American Sociological Review. XXV (October, 1960), 
p. 646.
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3. Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and 
let tomorrow take care of itself.
4. In spite of what some people say, the lot of the common 
man is getting worse, not better.
5. Most people don't care what happens to the next fellow.
The translated revision^^ of Mizruchi's version of Srole's
"anomia" scale is as follows:
1. La mayorîa de la gente se interesa poco en su projimo.
2. En los tiempos actuales no se cuenta con personas dispuestas 
a ayudar— no hay persona que no le falle.
3. Dadas las condiciones actuales de vida, no es posible que 
proyectemos para el futuro; se tiene que vivir solamente 
para hoy y dejar el manana para manana.
4. Nunca habra solucion de las dificultades economicas de que 
se ve rodeado este pais.
5. El hombre no quiere que haya tanta miseria en el mundo, 
pero la permite Bios para castigar al hombre.
The Zimmer Scale
Like the Srole "anomia" scale, the Zimmer scale of "local poli­
tical alienation" is a five-item scale with five similar response cate­
gories. This scale is designed to measure political alienation from 
local urban government and its items are as follow:
23The five items read in English: 1) The majority of persons are
not much interested in their fellow man; 2) Nowadays you can't find 
people who will help— there isn't a person who won't let you down; 3) 
Given the present conditions of life, it is not possible to plan for the 
future— one has to live just for today and leave tomorrow for tomorrow;
4) There can never be any solution to the economic difficulties which 
engulf this country; and 5) Man does not wish for there to be so much 
misery in the world, but God allows it in order to punish man. Items 
1, 2, and 3 measure both a person's sense of isolation and his norm­
lessness; and items 4 and 5 measure his powerlessness, the belief that 
living conditions and events in his life are not within his reach and 
are directed entirely by outside forces over whom he personally has no 
control.
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1. The government of a big city like Nashville doesn't take 
much interest in a person’s neighborhood,
2. The government of a big city like Nashville is too costly 
to the average taxpayer.
3. The average person can’t get any satisfaction out of 
talking to the officials of a big city government like 
Nashville.
4. The government of a big city like Nashville is controlled 
too much by machine politics.
5. The average person doesn’t have much to say about the 
running of a big city like Nashville.
The translated revision^^ is as follows:
1. La administracion de esta municipalidad no se interesa en 
nuestros barrios.
2. El gobierno de esta ciudad tiene la culpa por los problemas 
economicos y sociales de nuestras vidas.
3. Los funcionarios pûblicos son sordos y no nos hacen caso 
cuando nos dirigimos a ellos con un problems publico, 
como la falta de pavimentacion de algunas calles.
4. Los partidos politicos se meten demasiado en los asuntos
que corresponden a la administracion publies de esta y
otras ciudades.
5. Unicamente el gobierno nacional es capaz de cumplir con 
proyectos para la gente de los barrios particulares.
Social Participation
The method for studying social participation will consist of three
^^These items are in English: 1) The administration of this
municipality is not interested in our neighborhood; 2) The city government 
is responsible for the economic and social problems in our lives; 3) The 
public officials are deaf and pay us no heed when we approach them with 
an urban problem, like the need to pave more streets; 4) The political 
parties interfere too much in the affairs of the public administration 
of this and other cities; and 5) Only the national government is capable 
of finishing projects for the people of a particular neighborhood.
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measures of the frequency and quality of formal and informal social 
participation of the type used by Professor Wendell Bell. The measures 
of social participation are the frequency of participation in certain
n cinformal groups, formal group membership, and formal group attendance.
To solicit data respecting the first measure of social partici­
pation (frequency of participation in certain informal groups), the 
individual was asked how frequently he participated in each informal 
group to which he belonged. The informal groups were: relatives,
friends, neighbors, and co-workers. The individual responses were then
each put into correspoding categories: at least twice a week, once a
26week, less frequently, and never.
Formal group membership was measured by the number of groups to 
which each respondent belonged, e.g.. seven or more, six, five, four, 
three, two, one, none, or not ascertained. Formal group attendance, as 
in the measurement of informal group participation, was calculated by 
the frequency of attendance, e.g.. more than once a week, about once a
25For a look at measures of social participation which are simi­
lar to the ones adopted for this study, see Wendell Bell, "Anomiej Social 
Isolation, and the Class Structure," Sociometry. XX (June, 1957), pp.
105-111; ______________, "Urban Neighborhood Types and Participation in
Formal Associations," American Sociological Review. XXI (February, 1956), 
pp. 25-35; ______________ and M. Force, "Social Structure and Partici­
pation in Different Types of Formal Associations," Social Forces, XXXIV
(May, 1956), pp. 345-350;  and Marion D. Boat, "Urban
Neighborhoods and Informal Social Relations," The American Journal of 
Sociology. LXII (January, 1957), pp. 391-398; Morris Axelrod, "Urban 
Structure and Social Participation," American Sociological Review. XXI 
(February, 1956), pp. 13-18; Scott Greer, "Urbanization Reconsidered:
A Comparative Study of Local Areas in a Metropolis," American Socio­
logical Review. XXI (February, 1956), pp. 19-25.
26Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," 
ibid-5 p. 109; Meier and Bell, op. cit.. p. 202.
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week, a few times a month, about once a month, a few times a year, about
27once a year, never, or not ascertained.
The following is the format of questions used in the interview 
schedule for measuring social participation in the "urban Litoral" of
noArgentina.^
1. iGon cuanta frequencia tiene usted encuentros y citas 
sociales con sus pariantes?
  dos veces por sémana como mînimo
una vez por semana 
menos frecuentement 
nunca
2. iCon sus amigos?
  dos veces por semana como mînimo
  una vez por semana
  menos frecuentemente
nunca
3. iCon sus vecinos? (sin considerar los encuentros ocasionales)
  dos veces por semana como mînimo
  una vez por semana
  menos frecuentemente
  nunca
^^Bell, "Urban Neighborhood Types and Participation in Formai 
Associations." op. cit.. pp. 27-29.
^®In English the format reads: 1) How often do you visit or have 
social contact with your relatives (at least twice a week, once a week,
less frequently, and never); 2) with your friends? ( ) ; 3) with your
neighbor^ (_____ ) ; 4) with your co-workers? (_____ ); 5) Do you belong
to a club or to a civic, social, professional or other kind of organization? 
(number of times you attend the meetings of your organization— more than 
once a week, once a week, two or three times a month, once a month, a few 
times a year, once a year, never, and cannot ascertain).
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4. iCon sus companeros del trabajo? (fuera del trabajô)
  dos veces por semana como mînimo
  una vez por semana
  menos frecuentemente
nunca
5. iPertenece usted a algun club, organizacion civica, 
social, profesional u otra clase de organizacion? _







(a) mas de una vez por semana (b) una vez por semana 
(c) do* o tres veces por mes (d) una vez por mes 
(e) algunas veces al ano (f) una vez al ano (g) nunca 
(h) no puedo decir
Political Attitudes
Since its development and application,^^ the Semantic Differ­
ential has been variously used to measure the attitudes of subjects con­
cerning the particular objects which they are requested to rate according 
to some specified point scale with antithetical polarities. Its use is
29Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenhaum,
The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois
Press, 1957).
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30particularly well established in mass communications research, and it
31has been used to predict voting behavior and to evaluate certain Latin
32American governments and political groups.
In this study, basically the same factors (force, activity, and 
evaluation), scale positions (very strong - somewhat strong - not very 
strong - weak; very active - somewhat active - not very active - passive; 
and excellent - good - not very good - bad), and items (the present 
governments of the United States, this country, Cuba, the Soviet Union,
Red China, and France, plus the Aprismo movement in Peru, the peronist 
movement in Argentina, the FALN in Venezuela, and the National Front in 
Colombia) will be included that appeared in the study of "Conservative 
Guatemalans in 1965" by Professor Kenneth F. Johnson. But, in addition 
the rating schedule that will be used in this study includes the following 
significant groups: the political parties (UCRP, UCRI, UDELPA, Socialist,
30Percy H. Tannenhaum and Mervin D. Lynch, "Sensationalism: the 
Concept and Its Measurement," Journalism Quarterly. XXXVII (Summer, 1960), 
pp. 381-392; Leslie W. Sargent, "Communicator Image and News Reception," 
Journalism Quarterly. XLII (Winter, 1965), pp. 35-42; Wayne A. Danielson, 
"Eisenhower's February Decision: A Study of News Impact," Journalism
Quarterly. XXXVII (Autumn, 1956), pp. 433-441; and read the survey of 
studies to measure attitude in Jack Lyle, "Attitude Measurement in Com­
munication Research," Journalism Quarterly. XLII (Autumn, 1965), pp. 6Q6-614.
^^George Strieker, "The Use of the Semantic Differential to Pre­
dict Voting Behavior," The Journal of Social Psychology. LIX (February,
1963), pp. 159-167.
^^Kenneth F. Johnson, Encuesta entre ciudadanos hispanoamericanos 
(interview schedule printed by the School of Social Sciences at Colorado 
State University, 1965).
33The original interview schedule had four scale positions, as 
indicated above. But it was discovered in administering the test to 
Argentine subjects that a middle position was needed, so that respondents 
were offered five scale positions instead of the original four. The fifth 
position was an intermediary one, meaning "neither strong, nor weak"; 
"neither active, nor passive"; "neither good, nor bad"— to express "in 
the middle of" or "in between" the other four positions.
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Communist, and Peronist); the Roman Catholic Church; the bureaucracy or 
middle-class public service workers; the working classes or "have-not" 
masses; the aristocracy (agrarian) or the large landowners; the General 
Labor Confederation; the local trade unions ; the professionals (lawyers,
doctors, engineers, etc.); the university students; the peasantry; and
34the industrialists or financiers.
Format of Attitude Measurements
The precise structural presentation of this material to groups 
of subjects by the researcher was one which replicated the previously 
referred-to Johnson encuesta (interview schedule). Its format in this 
study follows on the next page.
Application of the Methodology
In order to describe the procedures for putting the preceding 
research methods into effect in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, it 
is now appropriate to look at how the subjects were selected, how they 
were tested, and how the test results have been handled.
Selection of Respondents
Social science research has uncovered significant correlations 
between socioeconomic class on the one hand and political attitudes and
^^All these national groupings, apart from the specific political 
parties, were esteemed to be politically significant ones in Wilgus, loc. 
cit.. and Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin America," loc. cit. The 
format or precise structural presentation of this material to groups of 
subjects by the researcher is found in Appendix B.
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Evaluation Personal
En esta pagina se encuentran veintisêis oraciones relaclonadas 
con diferentes gobiernos, con movimientos politicos y con algunos grupos 
sociales, politicos y economicos. Se ruega que clasifique estas ora­
ciones en las categorîas de fuerza, actividad y évaluation, colocando una 
equis (X) bajo la frase que sera la mas apropriada. Ninguna oracion 





























































1. El gobierno actual de los EE. UU.
2. El gobierno actual de este pais
3. El gobierno actual de Cuba
4. El gobierno de la Uni6n Sovietica
5. El gobierno actual de China Roia
6. El aprismo del Perd
7. El gobierno actual de Francia
8. La FALN de Venezuela :
9. El Peronismo en la Argentina
10. El Frente Nacional de Colombia .
11. La UCRP de este pais
12. La UCRI de este pais
13. El partido socialista de aqui
14. Los comunistas de este pais
15. La Iglesia Catolica Apostolica Rmna
16. Los militâtes de este pais
17. La burocracia o los empleados pubis
18. El proletariado o la clase traba.iado
19. La Confederacion General de Traba.io
20. Los gremios locales
21. Los grandes estancieros de aqui
22. Los industriales y los financieros
23. Los profesionales (doctores, etc.)
24. Los estudiantes universitarios
25. Los campesinos y los colonos
26. UDELPA
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behavior on the o t h e r . I t  is the purpose of this study to seek out 
different socioeconomic groups with a view toward testing the attitudes 
and participation of each group. In this regard, it is the contention 
of this study that three broad socioeconomic groups are specially 
important in a political sense in urban Argentina; the lower class, the 
lower middle class, and the upper middle class. The important consider­
ation here is to view these socioeconomic groups, existent in Argentina, 
in a meaningful context for purposes of sampling.
In selecting the respondents to be interviewed several objectives 
were kept in mind. First, it was hoped to obtain through sampling pro­
cedure a representative group of subjects to respond to a structured- 
interview schedule testing for levels of socioeconomic status, anomie, 
political alienation, and social participation and for intensity of 
political attitudes. Second, such sampling should conform to the present- 
day substantive social realities in Argentina; that is, the different 
groups to be interviewed should represent an approximation of or have 
their counterpart in the actual social structure of Argentina. Third,
the sampling procedure itself should fulfill the principles of sampling
36as set forth by Mildred Parten, or at least to comply with some
35Murray B. Levin and Murray Eden, "Political Strategy for the 
Alienated Voter," Public Opinion Quarterly. XXVI (Winter, 1962), pp. 47- 
63; Thompson and Horton, loc. cit.; J. H. Lindquist, "Socioeconomic.Status 
and Political Participation," The Western Political Quarterly. XVII 
(December, 1964), pp. 608-614; McDill and Ridley, loc. cit.; Templeton, 
loc. cit.
36These principles are enumerated in Mildred Parten, Surveys. 
Polls, and Samples: Practices and Procedures (New York: Harpers and
Brothers, Publishers, 1950), pp. 221-224.
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similarly rigorous standards. Finally, the sampling procedure should 
coincide with the objective limitations of time and resources under 
which the researcher was operating.
The Sampling Procedure
In practice, however, the sampling procedure deviated somewhat
from its objectives in that subjects were not selected randomly. The
procedure by which the subjects used in this study were sampled was
. 3 7the "quota sample," a modified form of stratified sampling. Both the
advantages and drawbacks of the "quota sample" are discussed quite
38cogently by Linton C. Freeman. By this method, various quotas are 
set up and subjects are interviewed on contact until each quota within 
predetermined categories is filled. Table 3 gives the quotas which
37Originally it was planned todraw a "random sample" of the 
universe to be studied. However, in view of the nearly insurmountable 
difficulties in cataloging the universe and the high cost and great 
amount of time required by such elaborate procedure, the "quota sample" 
approach was suggested to the researcher by one of Argentina's most 
respected sociologists. Interview with Professor Torcuato S. Di Telia, 
Centro de Sociologie Comparada del Institute Torcuato Di Telia, Buenos 
Aires, September 26, 1966.
O Q Elementary Applied Statistics: For Students in Behavioral
Science (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 144. Professor
Freeman notes: "Investigators have used a modified form of stratified
sampling called the quota sample. Quotas are determined according to 
the relative proportion of each subgroup in the universe and interviewers 
are assigned to fill these quotas. An interviewer may be instructed to 
select five males under 25 years of age, all in the highest socioeconomic 
class, ten females over 60 years, in the lowest class, and so on, depending 
on the relevant proportions in the universe. Thus the interviewer con­
trols the actual sampling. This is usually an economical technique, and 
sometimes a successful one, but there is a chance of bias. Too much is 
left to the interviewers . . . Quota sampling, then, may be an effective 
low-budget method, but great care must be taken in its use. The universe 
must be properly stratified and the selection and training of interviewers 
must be carefully performed."
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were used and filled in this study. As can be seen, the three main
39categories of quotas are socioeconomic status, sex, and age.
The Testing of Respondents
After determining the quotas that are to be filled, the next 
problem is to locate the individuals who will satisfy the established 
quotas and to administer the various scheduled tests to them.
Originally it was planned to test several hundred subjects in 
much the same percentages as shown in Table 3 for the universe of 
ninety subjects. In practice, however, there were too many demands 
made upon the time of the researcher to have allowed him to conduct 
any more than ninety interviews. Under the original plan, the largest 
number of subjects would have been sampled in the city of Buenos Aires, 
with progressively smaller numbers of subjects being sampled in the 
cities of Rosario, Santa Fe, and Parana. In practice, however, no 
subjects were interviewed in Parana and only 18 subjects were interviewed 
in Buenos Aires, the bulk of the interviews being made in Santa Fe and 
Rosario. The reason for this was to take advantage of the official 
permission which the researcher obtained from provincial and municipal
O Q The quotas of 18, 36, and 36 subjects for the three socio­
economic classes, as shown, are approximately in proportion to what this 
distribution is in actuality. The greater number of male subjects inter­
viewed in the lower middle and working classes agrees with the greater 
political, economic, and social prominence of male subjects in these two 
classes. The distribution of ages in the sample of subjects coincides 
with objective reality, since recent statistics for urban Argentina show 
that persons in the 20-35 age group comprise very close to 22 per cent 
of the entire age population, those 35-50 years of about 22 per cent of 
the population, and persons 50-65 nearly 18 per cent. See Argentina, 
Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Programs coniunto para el desarrollo 
agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires: Institute de Investigaciones
Economicas, 1964), p. 79.
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TABLE 3
QUOTAS ADHERED TO IN SAMPLING ARGENTINE SUBJECTS FOR 
INTERVIEWING PURPOSES, SEPTEMBER 14 - DECEMBER 14, 1966
No. of Respondents
Quota to be Filled In Each Category
Socioeconomic Status '
Upper middle class (20-28) . . . . . . . . . . .  18
Lower middle class (12-20) .....................  36
Working class (0-12) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  36
Total . . . . . . . . . . . .  ...............  90
Sex
Upper middle class
m a l e ..........................................   9
female  ............    9
Lower middle class
m a l e ........................................... 21
female......................................... 15
Lower class
m a l e ............   21
female  ............    15
Total m a l e .......... ...........................  51
Total female....................................  39
Age
Upper middle class
male (20-35)..................................  5
male (35-50) . . . . . . .  ...................  4
female (20-35) ...............    5
female (35-50) ................................  4
Lower middle class
male (20-35)..................................  9
male (35-50)..................................  9
male (50-65)........ .........................  3
female (20-35) . . . . . . .  ........... . . .  6
female (35-50)  ...................  6
female (50-65)  ........................ 3
Lower class
male (20-35)..................................  9
male 0 5 - 5 0 ) ...................  9
male (50-65).............................. .. . 3
female (20-35).....................    6
female (35-50) ...........   6
female (50-65) ................................  3
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authorities to conduct interviews in Santa Fe and Rosario. Table 4 con­
tains a listing of the subjects used in the sample by city and socio­
economic status.
TABLE 4
NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS USED IN THIS STUDY BY 











Buenos Aires ........... 8 7 18
Rosario ............... 17 5 38
Santa Fe ............... . . 17 11 6 34
Parana ................. — — - — —
Number of Cases . . . 36 18 90
All interviews were made in appropriate neighborhoods for locating 
persons who might exemplify the desired kind of socioeconomic character­
istics. The subjects were approached at the door of their dwellings by 
the researcher— and, there, after a brief presentation, the prospective 
respondent was invited to participate in an academic study which would 
not be used for national political ends and the content of which would 
become collective data and would not identify the participant in any way. 
Although not rigidly adhered to in every case, the researcher tried to 
call on every fifth dwelling unit.
Handling of Test Results
The basic handling of the data obtained from the some ninety 
interviews that were realized in this study presents little problem.
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The previously cited studies on which each of the measures in this study 
is based contain rather clear instructions on research procedures and 
the presentation of results. But some elaboration on interpreting and 
determining the significance of the study data is now in order.
Tests for Significance
In some cases, it has been determined that certain results are
too obviously significant to require further statistical testing beyond
the percentages and numbers of subjects that are already shown. Thus,
no tests for significance have been run on test results concerning social
participation and the total socioeconomic levels of anomie and political
alienation of the "urban Litoral" society. But, to test data concerning
anomie and political alienation by socioeconomic status and percentages
of subjects having high scores of anomie and political alienation by both
socioeconomic status and social isolation, Pearson's chi-square test has
been applied to determine the levels of significance.^® For determining
the extent and direction of correlation between anomie and political
alienation for the entire sample and then for each socioeconomic group,
41Pearson's coefficient of correlation (r) has been used. For inter­
preting and presenting the results of the Semantic Differential test, an 
average rating has been obtainedL for each socioeconomic group (in each 
factor and for each item). Then, the standard error of the difference 
between two means has been computed to test the significance of the 
variance between the extreme ratings.
40Freeman, op. cit.. pp. 215-226.
^^Ibid.. pp. 89-106.
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Indicias for Testing for Correlation
Four indicias— socioeconomic status, social-participation, anomie, 
and political-alienation— for each of the major behavioral variables are 
used later on in this study for testing for correlation. The socio­
economic index employed has already been described on pages 24-25. The 
social-participation index is also derived from the questionnaire data. 
Participation in informal associations has been weighted 0-6 and formal 
association 0-4, making a possible total of ten points, with 0-5 being 
a low social-participation score and 6-10 a high social-participation 
s c o r e . T h e  index for anomie was obtained by relaxing the five response 
categories to yield just three categories (agree, disagree, and unde­
cided), to which corresponding point totals of 2, 0, and 1 were given.
The score range on the five items of anomie, then, is from 0 to 10, with 
0-5 being a low anomie score and 6-10 a high anomie score. Similarly, 
the political-alienation index was obtained by relaxing the response 
categories and using a point total, which in this case is 0-6,^^ 0-3 
being a low political-alienption score and 4-6 a high political aliena­
tion score.
^^The social-participation index was calculated thusly: 0-6 for
informal participation (0-none; 1-association with one or two of four 
informal groups less frequently; 2-association with three or four informal 
groups less frequently; 3-association once a week or more often with one 
informal group; 4-association once a week or more often with two informal 
groups; 5-association once a week or more often with three informal groups; 
6-association once a week or more often with all four informal groups) and 
0-4 for formal participation (0-none; 1-membership in one formal association 
and attendance once a month or less frequently; 2-membership in one formal 
association and weekly attendance, at least; 3-membership in two formal 
associations and attendance once or a few times a month; 4-membership in 
two or more organizations and weekly attendance, at least, of the meetings 
of at least two, of those organizations).
43The reason for a lower point range in this case is that items 4 
and 5 on the adapted version of the Zimmer political-alienation scale gave 
results which could not be trusted. As will be pointed out in the evalu­
ation of the Zimmer scale as a tool for research in Latin America, the 
subjects misunderstood both the wording and meaning of these two items.
CHAPTER III
THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT
The graphic imagery of this chapter consists of a half-circle 
periphery of eight "environmental components" which constitute "the 
total environment." These eight total environmental components are: 
the ecological, the historical-evolutionary, the ethnic-demographical, 
the psychological-cultural, the political-legal, the socio-urban, food 
supply and consumption, and the economic. The practice of considering 
the processes or systems that lie outside the structures of government 
and society, as described in Chapter II, will be followed in this chapter, 
which will deal with but a few of the more politically relevant items 
within the total environment of the "urban Litoral."
The Ecological Components
Since the appearance of De l ’esprit des lois in which Montesquieu 
theorized about the bearing that such physical factors as climate and 
topography might have on political life,^ only a few serious studies have 
attempted specifically to correlate ecological variables with political
^For a cogent synthesis of the conceptions held by Montesquieu 
on the political relevancy of climatic and topographical factors see 
Lawrence Meyer Levin, The Political Doctrine of Montesquieu's Esprit 
des Lois: Its Classical Background ("Publications of the Institute




2variables and to trace through the effects of the former on the latter. 
However, a growing number of studies by Argentine researchers, which are 
intended to treat rather specific non-ecological topics, still devote a 
small amount of space to identifying and describing some of the ecological
Qfactors. In Appendix A, various ecological topics are listed as being 
relevant to sociopolitical change. But, again, in the interest of 
brevity, this section of the chapter will consider just the physical 
characteristics of the region under study: topography, climate, and
resources.
Physical Characteristics
The republic of Argentina has a land surface area of some 4,055,775 
square kilometers, extending in length from Bolivia to Cape Horn, 3,700 
kilometers, and in breadth from the Andean chain to the South Atlantic 
ocean, 1,420 kilometers. The axis for this vast region is the metropolis 
of Buenos Aires, the dominant intermediary between the national provinces 
and the overseas nations, from which the great Rio de la Plata network 
of rivers extends northward for thousands of kilometers and from which 
the Argentine pampa— a flat, naturally vegetated area of some 450,000 
square kilometers— spreads out like an open fan with a radial distance
4of 580 kilometers. The vastness and fertility of the pampa region and
^F. Glenn Abney and Larry B. Hill, "Natural Disasters as a Poli­
tical Variable: The Effect of a Hurricane on Urban Elections," The
American Political Science Review. LX (December, 1966), pp. 974-980.
^The reader is referred to footnote "6" in the preceding chapter.
^Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 9-10; E. W. Shanahan, South America:
An Economic and Regional Geography with an Historical Chapter (London: 
Meuthen and Company, Ltd., 1959), p. 170.
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the extensiveness of the network of Argentine rivers that are suitable 
for navigation give Argentina a great productive potentiality in both 
agriculture and industry. That these rich natural endowments are not 
more fully exploited is an important fact to bear in mind when assessing 
sociopolitical change in this particular region.
The focus of this study will be directed at the four urban 
centers and their hinterlands situated along the Plata and Parana rivers; 
the Federal Capital district (with 2,966,811 inhabitants in a surface 
area of 199.5 square kilometers) within the city of Buenos Aires,^
Rosario (652,843 persons in 171.73 square kilometers),^ Santa Fe (208,350
7 ' . . 8in 77-80 square kilometers), and Parana (98,318 in 24 square kilometers).
Topography. The humid pampa (which takes in central and eastern 
Buenos Aires province, central and southern Santa Fe province, and all 
Entre Rios province) and the Rio de la Plata drainage basin are the two 
dominant topographical features within the "urban Litoral".region. There 
is a marked difference, however, in the topography of Entre Rios province
^Argentina, Presidencia de la Nacion, Consejo Nacional de Desar­
rollo, Mapas V estadisticas de la republica de Argentina (Buenos Aires: 
el Poder Ejecutivo, 1962), p. 11 ; Eduardo S. Calamaro, La comunidad 
argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, S.A., 1963), p. 279.
^Most recent estimation in Clarin. June 18, 1966, p. 15; 
Municipalidad de Rosario, Boletin estadistica de la ciudad de Rosario 
("Publication Trimestral," Vol. XXVII, No. 4; Rosario, Argentina:
Direction General de Estadistica del Municipio, 1960), p. 1.
^Felipe Justo Cervera, Estudio de la poblacion de Santa Fe.
Relation con factores economicos ("Extension Universitaria," No. 101;
Santa Fe, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), p. 53;
estimation by the researcher from recent map "Ciudad de Santa Fe,"
(Santa Fe, Argentina: Libreria y Editorial Colmegna, no date given).
p. 12.
g
Institute de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. Vol. Ill,
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on the east side of the Parana river. There, the earth is no longer 
flat but has small rolling hills, whose heights never exceed 100 meters 
above sea level. And while the right margin of the river banks in 
Santa Fe province is flat, the left margin in Entre Rios rises 80 meters
gin height.
These topographical differences have been immensely influential 
in shaping the social, economic, and political destiny of this region.
The elevated topography and natural circumscription of Entre Rios pro­
vince have made of this area and of all of Argentina's northeast a less 
productive and more retarded region. The isolated northeast of Argentina 
could very well achieve a greater development if these topographical 
barriers could be overcome through improved communications.
Climate. The climate in the "Litoral" is temperate to sub­
tropical, the temperature rarely falling below 0 degrees centigrade and 
not often rising above 26 degrees centigrade. The average rainfall is 
between 700 and 1000 millimeters, being heaviest in January (80-100 
millimeters) and lightest in June (20-40 millimeters).^® Primarily the 
climatic factor offers added support to the already ideal agricultural 
environment which the region enjoys. Its temperate quality is appre­
ciated by most of the inhabitants, who for the most part find it exhil­
arating and conducive to work and diversion. However, the Indians or
^Ibid.. Vol I, 1-3, 174.
^®Ibid.. pp. 173-174; Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 13; Aldo Ferrer,
La economia argentine, las etapas de su desarrollo v problèmes actuales 
(Buenos Aires: Fondo de Culture Economics, 1965 edition), p. 40.
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"darker" Argentines find the climate more stimulating to sleep; and, 
in the more interior cities, the afternoon siesta is a long-standing 
ritual. Thus, the inhabitants of Santa Fe and Entre Rios are more 
sleepy and indolent than are those of Rosario and Buenos Aires.
Natural resources. The Litoral region produces no large quantity 
of m i n e r a l s ; i t s  greatest natural wealth reposes in the fertility of 
its soil, in the navigability of its rivers, and in the exploitation of 
its fish and forest products. With more than 35,000,000 hectares of
12pampa land receiving an annual precipitation upwards of 800 millimeters
and able to grow more than 23 million hectares of grains and seed crops
10without suffering any loss of fertility, the rural Litoral adequately 
supports the urban Litoral and is without doubt the richest agrarian 
region of its size anywhere in the world. With respect to forest wealth, 
the upper Litoral has timber reserves of quebracho colorado^^ which total
80,000 square kilometers, and it can tap another 95,000 kilometers of 
quebracho which lie in contiguous p r o v i n c e s . W h i l e  nearly all fresh­
water fish taken in Argentine waters are from Litoral rivers, the total
l^For example, it is reported that in 1956 the province of Entre 
Rios produced only 1,500,000 tons of minerals which were used chiefly in 
construction and were valued at just 44,700,000 pesos in national currency. 
Institute de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. I, p. 6.
12perrer, loc. cit.
13Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 15.
^^Gaston Gori, La Forestal. La tragedia del quebracho Colorado 
(Buenos Aires: Editoriales Platina/Stilcograf, 1965), in a carefully
documented study, describes the deleterious effects of monopoly and vested 
interests in a once-thriving industry, the extraction of the red quebracho 
(a hardwood used in tanning) in the northern Litoral forests.
^^Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 71; some 70,000 kilometers are in Chaco 
province and 25,000 in Misiones province.
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yearly catch has shown a marked decline in recent years. The 1964 
production of 14,762.4 tons decreased to 13,029.7 tons in 1965; whereas 
the salt-water fish catch increased from 143,587 to 172,107 tons in 
the same period.
Historical Evolutionary Components
The region under study evolved from the most neglected of all 
Spanish new-world areas of settlement to notable prominence in four 
centuries.
Settlement and Early Growth
The precarious village that was first erected on about the 
site of present-day Buenos Aires in 1536 by Don Pedro de Mendoza was 
soon destroyed, and it was not until 1580 that the spot was resettled 
under the direction of Juan de Garay. In 1573, the same Hispanic 
explorer founded the village of Santa Fe, near the present-day city 
of the same name, which was transferred, between 1651 and 1660, from 
its then to its present site. The Indians of the region were nomadic, 
and warlike, so that early settlers contended with them constantly.
But, until its decadence after Philip III, Asuncion, the present 
capital of Paraguay, remained the center of exploitation and received 
the greater emphasis in colonization and development.^^ It is recorded 
that in 1652 Santa Fe was "a village of about 35 huts, with neither
^^Direction Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Secretaria de 
Estado de Hacienda, Boletin de estadistica 1966 ("Boletin de Estadis­
tica," III trimestre; Buenos Aires: Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, July-
September, 1966), pp. 69-70.
^^Centeno, op. cit.. p. 7; Calamaro, op. cit.. p. 191.
48
walls nor fortifications, nor garrison, the smallest of all Spanish
IRcities of governments of La Plata and Tucuman." Rosario did not
exist then, and Buenos Aires remained poor and small through the
colonial period to the establishment of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la
Plata in 1776.^^
The impetus that governmental decrees gave to urban growth was
exemplified in the administrative directive of 1662 which made the port
of Santa Fe a "Puerto Preciso," meaning that every ship traveling up
the Parana river had to register and weigh in at Santa Fe. From then
20on the city realized a spectacular growth. While two spurts of
colonization— under.Juan de Garay in 1573 and Gasper de Godoy from
Buenos Aires in 1618— served to populate and develop the area of the
actual province of Entre Rios, it was not until 1730 that the city of
21Parana was founded. Rosario had no founder nor founding date but
grew "spontaneously by spiritual rather than material or political
motivations" through the grouping of ranches of early settlers around
22the chapel erected by Domingo Gomez Recio in 1731.
1 Q
Leoncio Gianello, Historia de Santa Fe (Santa Fe, Argentina:
El Litoral, 1955), p. 61.
^^Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1956), section on history
of Buenos Aires, unnumbered pages.
20Gianello, loc. cit.; see also Jose Carmelo Busaniche. Hombres 
y hechos de Santa Fe (Santa Fe, Argentina: El Litoral, 1955), pp. 63-75.
21 Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, Vol. I, op. cit..
p. 7.
^^Juan Alvarez, Historia de Rosario: 1689-1939 (Buenos Aires:
Imprenta Lopez, 1943), p. 76; Augusto Fernandez Diaz, Rosario desde lo 
mas remoto de su historia: 1650 a 1750 (Rosario, Argentina: Talleres
Graficos Pomponio, 1941), pp. 24-25; Mario C. Gomez, Rosario biografico 
(Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Tradiciones, 1955), pp. 27-29; Felix
A. Chaparro, Los origenes de Rosario (Rosario, Argentina: Talleres
Graficos Pomponio, 1942), pp. 16-17, 22-23.
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In the early national period, as in the colonial period, cattle
was the base of the Argentine economy. Rosario with a population of 763
23inhabitants in 1815 grew to have 22,492 inhabitants in 1853; the Federal
24Capital could register 187,126 persons by 1869. It was not until after
the downfall of Rosas and the second half of the nineteenth century, 
however, that the area began to develop its administrative structures 
and to acquire its present urban character.
Development of Transportation
During the Rosas regime (1835-1852) the Argentine rivers were 
closed to navigation for the purpose of concentrating all fiscal control 
and wealth in Buenos Aires. But with the overthrow of Rosas and the
enactment of free navigation of the Paranâ river, the port of Rosario
25received a great influx of international trade. On January 8, 1854,
the Federal government granted a private company the concession to 
transport passengers by ship between Buenos Aires and Rosario. Before
26that time the trip between Buenos Aires and Rosario was made by wagon.
In order to construct and exploit a single-track railroad from Rosario 
to Cordoba over the route proposed by North American engineer Allan 
Campbell, the Ferrocarril Central Argentine was instituted in 1863 with
1,600,000 pounds sterling of capital. The Ferrocarril Oeste Santafesino
^^Gomez, ibid.. p. 35; Alvarez, ibid.. p. 343.
24Pio Isaac Monteagudo, Migraciones internas en la Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Catedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1956), p. 39.
25Juan Jorge Gschwind, El puerto de Rosario: su evolucion
histories: factores de su progreso (Rosario, Argentina: Academia
Nacional de la Historia, 1942), pp. 5, 7-8.
Z^Gomez, op. cit., p. 39.
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was approved in 1881 and was inaugurated on November 4, 1883. Rosario
subsequently, in January of 1886, lost itg advantage of being the
terminal point in the FCA line when it was linked by rail to Buenos
Aires. In 1884 some 27,246 passengers were transported by railroad,
27which figure increased to 131,432 in 1889. Tables 5 and 6 give the 
cumulative kilometers of track laid down through thirteen presidential 
administrations and the comparative ranking of other Latin American 
countries in kilometers of track.
Political Development
The political development of Argentina has been centered mainly 
in the "urban Litoral," except for the sporadic influence exerted by 
Cordoba and the Cuyo provinces. After the establishment of the Consti­
tution of 1853, the "benevolent" leaders of the paternalistic oligarchy 
rule with varying success until the turn of the century. In the waning 
years of the nineteenth century, two charismatic political leaders,
Leandro Alem and Hipolito Yrigoyen, fused together a political movement 
that was known as the Union Cîvica Radical (UCR), based on popular appeal, 
to oppose the conservative oligarchy. But the aristocratic origin, in­
spiration, and tendency of the UCR leaders, who rose to challenge the 
conservatives and win in 1916, is one political reality that has always 
characterized UCR leadership.^® While the UCR presumably represented
27 ^Juan Jorge Gschwind, Antecedentes para la historia economics
de Rosario (Rosario, Argentina: Romano Knos., S.R. Ltd., 1948), pp. 7-8.
28Data in Jose Luis de Imaz, Los que mandan (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966 edition), pp. 192-203.
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TABLE 5
CUMULATIVE AMOUNTS OF TRACK LAID IN ARGENTINA (1862-1916) 
THROUGH VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS*





1886-1892 Juarez - Pellegrini 13,682
1892-1898 Luis Saenz Pena - Uriburu 15,451
1898-1904 Roca 19,428
1904-1910 Quintana-Figueroa Alcorta 27,993
1910-1916 Roque Saenz Pena - Plaza 33,995
TABLE 6
COMPARATIVE FIGURES ON KILOMETERS OF TRACK FOR TWELVE














*Source: Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferrocarriles argentinos
("Cuaderno del Institute de Derecho Publico y Ciencias Sociales";
Santa Fe, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 14,
16.
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the middle class, its programs were vague and its appeal unpredictably 
tied to the fortunes and follies of national life. Its too close identi­
fication with its leader, Hipolito Yrigoyen, spelled its immediate collapse 
upon his fall in 1930.
Another political movement, the Argentine Socialist party, began 
in the same period as did the Radical movement. It began embryonically 
in 1890; and, in 1896, with Juan B. Justo as its leader, it was formally 
organized as the Socialist party of Argentina.^0 It was hoped that the 
party would personify "the true reflection of Echeverrian thought"; that 
is, that the party would represent "the idea of human redemption and
oi
social interest— the interest of the working class." But the Socialist
party never seemed to impress the working-class masses for whom it was
intended. And while it failed to obtain sufficient numerical strength
so that it could effectively challenge its opposition, it did win elections
at the municipal level and its leaders in Congress, in the legislatures,
and in the Deliberating Council were among the most prominent politicians 
32in the country.
In the decade, 1920-1930, the following political currents existed: 
Alvear-brand Radicalism, Yrigoyen^type Radicalism, disorganized conservatism,
29Rodolfo Puiggros, El Yrigoyenismo, Vol. II: Historia critica
de los partidos politicos argentinos (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor,
1965), pp. 74-82.
onDardo Cuneo, Juan B. Justo y las luchas sociales en la Argentina 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Alpe, 1956), pp. 73-137, chronicles the founding
and development of the Argentine socialist party during the years 1890-1896.
31Jacinto Oddone, jQue es el partido socialista? (Buenos Aires:
Comité Ejecutivo Nacional, 1956), p. 7.
^^Centeno, op. cit.. p. 35.
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Progressive Democracy of Lisandro de la Torre, socialism of Juan B. Justo, 
and a weak, poorly organized c o m m u n i s m . T h e  military coup of 1930 deposed 
the national, provincial, and local government officials and brought to­
gether army officers, antipersonalistas. conservatives, and independent 
socialists to govern a country whose structures were shattered and dis­
organized. The military and conservatives ruled in uneasy coalitions 
until the political advent of Peron. The world-wide depression and dis­
persion of political power had paralyzing repercussions on the national 
economy and stability of Argentina.
The economic and political forms constructed during the 1930's 
proved too fragile to resist the accelerated pace of World War II politics. 
The National Congress and all political parties were dissolved and martial 
law declared throughout the republic when a fascist-styled clique of army
Q C
officers effected the second twentieth-century coup d'etat on June 3, 1943.
In the Peron era which followed, the personalism of Colonel Juan 
D. Peron earned him the allegiance of the nation's masses and his personal 
popularity far outstripped the meager public support that the political 
parties had been obtaining up to that time. But the initially strong
33Jose s. Campobassi, "Historia de los partidos politicos argen­
tinos (1810-1943)," Los partidos politicos: estructura v vigencia en la
Argentina (Buenos Aires: Cooperadora de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales,
1963), p. 28.
^^The instability of this period is expressly exemplified in the 
great turnover of city administrations in Rosario: 18 during the 1930's
and 20 during the 1940's. Albert Montes, Plan Rosario. Ley nacional no.
16052 V BUS antecedentes (Rosario, Argentina: Centro de Estudios Nacionales,
Provinciales y Municipales, 1964), p. 66.
35Alberto Ciria, Partidos v poder en la Argentina modema (Buenos 
Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1964), p. 98; Americo Ghioldi: De la tirania
a la democracia social (Buenos Aires; Editiones Cure, 1956), pp. 147,161- 
164; Julio A. Fernandez, "The Nationalism Syndrome in Argentina," Journal
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allegiance to Peron gradually weakened and the opposition steadily grew 
until the Peron government fell in 1955. The subsequent military govern­
ments and interventions, interrupted by two Radical administrations, all 
serve to highlight what one author calls "confusion in Argentina."^6
Agricultural Development
The Litoral provinces enjoyed an unprecedented agricultural 
development in the second half of the 1800's based upon an unprecedented
growth in population from 100,000 to 850,000 between 1800 and 1869 and
representing a growth rate of 3 per cent per annum. About three-fourths 
of that population was rural. More precisely, the figures show that the 
rural population of Buenos Aires province grew from 253,938 inhabitants 
in 1869 to 596,398 in 1895; the rural population of Santa Fe province in 
the same period from 55^278 to 67,212.^^
One manifestation of the development of "Litoral" agriculture
during this period can be seen in Table 7. The three provinces sub­
stantially increased their cultivated land areas between 1872 and 1895. 
During this period Santa Fe province was first in the production of wheat. 
Of the 3,300,000 immigrants entering Argentina between 1857 and 1914, more
of Inter-American Studies. VIII (October, 1966), p. 559;"Historia del 
Peronismo: el apoyo eclesiastico," Primera Plana. IV (October 24, 1966),
pp. 36-38; "Historia del Peronismo: clero y gobierno," Primera Plana.
IV (November 7, 1966), pp. 34-39; Julio Irazusta, Peron v la grj,sj,§ 
argentina (Buenos Aires: Heumul S.A., 1966 edition), pp. 39-45, 127-133.
36Estanislao del Campo Wilson, Confusion en la Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Guillermo Kraft, Ltd., 1964).
37perrer, op. cit., pp. 67, 70; Jaime Fuchs, Argentina: su
desarrollo capitalists (Buenos Aires: Editorial Cartago, S.R.L., 1965),
pp. 67-68; Gaston Gori, Inmigracion y colonizacion en la Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), chapters V and VI,
pp. 49-87, plus p. 88.
3®Fuchs, ibid.. pp. 51, 59.
38
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39than 90 per cent located in the Litoral provinces. Of the working 
population classified in 1895, some 394,000 workers were employed in 
cattle and agriculture, another 565,000 were described as unskilled 
laborers (or peones), 366,000 were registered under industry, 143,000 
in commerce, and 63,000 in transportation.^^ According to Horacio 
C. Ei Giberti, the cultivation of grain and the raising of cattle were 
mutually stimulating, productivity in the one serving to motivate pro- 
ductiv it y in the other. The spectacular rise in grain production was 
maintained by the steady growth of the meat i n d u s t r y . A n d  it is well 
to add that the agricultural development achieved during this period was 
also fomented by a comparable development in transportation, especially 
railroads.
Industrial Development
The rudiments of Argentine industry were evident as early as 1853; 
in that year there were 2,000 workers employed in 106 factories and 746 
small shops. By 1895 the number of industrial establishments had increased 
to 22,204 in Buenos Aires, Santa Fe, and Entre Rios provinces. Between 1887 
and 1895 Buenos Aires doubled in the number of industrial establishments 
and the amount of capital invested in them. By the time that the industrial
39Ferrer, op. cit.. p. 107.
^^Ricardo M. Ortiz, Historia economica de la Argentina. 1850-1930 
(Buenos Aires, Plus Ultra, 1964), II, p. 211.
41Horacio C. E. Giberti, Historia economica de la ganaderîa 
argentina (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Solar/Hachette, 1961), pp. 181-186.
^^Santa Cruz, op. cit.. Chapter I, pp. 11-16.
56 
TABLE 7
SURFACE CULTIVATED IN HECTARES FOR THREE PROVINCES 
1872, 1888, and 1895*
Province 1872 1888 1895
Buenos Aires 177,000 951,377 1,395,129
Santa Fe 62,548 598,568 1,684,937
Entre Rios 34,000 138,651 430,593
*Source: Fuchs, op. cit.. pp. 37, 51, 53.
census was taken in 1914, there were a total of 48,779 industrial 
establishments employing 410,000 workers. The 1935 census showed 
544,017 workers employed: in 40,606 establishments; the 1943 census 
showed 997,652 workers in some 65,801 establishments. Industry con­
tinued to grow, registering some 81,000 establishments in 1948. But, 
from the postwar years forward total production has increased only 
slightly and per-capita production has steadily declined.
The Ethnic-Demographical Components
It is still firmly believed by many Argentines that their country
is one of the most richly endowed countries in the entire world with
respect to natural resources and is actually the number one power in all
44Latin America and potential' à first-rate world power. Argentina's
^^Samuel Gorban, PlantificaciSn industrial (Rosario, Argentina; 
Editorial Rosario, S.A., 1947, pp. 14-24; Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 141- 
147.
^^See Roberto Noble, Argentina; A World Power, trans. J. J. 
Britos (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Arayû, 1961), entire book, for a
scholarly and systematic development of Argentine greatness.
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inability to realize more fully its imputed greatness is often blamed
45on its having "a scarcity and not an excess of population. To ex­
plore the implications of this and other ideas related to population, 
this section of the chapter will look at total population, population 
growth trends, distribution and density of population, ethnic groups 
and nationalities, mobility of population, and economic aspects of 
population.
Total Population
The census of 1960 shows Argentina having a population of 20,008,945 
inhabitants. This figure is presently approaching 24 million. The 
greatest demographic concentration is in Buenos Aires province, which has
9.702.000 persons, nearly half the national total. The Greater Buenos 
Aires area lists some 6,763,000 persons and the Federal Capital about
2.967.000 p e r s o n s . S a n t a  Fe province ranks second with 1,889,533
inhabitants in the 1960 census. Within Santa Fe province, the largest
city, Rosario, is listed at 594,063 inhabitants, according to the 1960
provincial census, at 596,253 persons in the municipal census of late
471960; and at 652,843 persons in an estimate made in mid 1966. The 
second largest city in Santa Fe province, the city of Santa Fe, has 208,350
^^The researcher was told by one second-generation Argentine in 
Rosario, Argentina, "Los males de la Argentina se deben no al exceso de 
poblacion sino a la carestia de la misma." Conversations with hundreds 
of other Argentines at all societal levels elicited similar responses.
^^Presidencia de la Nacion, loc. cit.
^^Clarin. op. cit.. p. 15; Municipalidad de Rosario, op. cit..
p. 2.
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persons, according to the 1960 c e n s u s . Entre Rios province has an 
estimated population of 803,505, according to the I960 census, with 
projections of 812,197 persons for 1967 and 817,166 persons for 1970. 
Parana city has 98,318 inhabitants, according to an academic study of 
1963.**
Growth Trends of Population
Within each census period (1869-1895, 1895-1914, and 1914-1947) 
the total population of Argentina doubled. Since the natural growth 
was relatively small during this period, the explanation for such rapid 
growth lies in the large number of immigrants, totaling 6,609,186 persons, 
with a positive increment of 3,473,281 persons, who arrived by ship 
between 1857 and 1946. The greatest increment of immigration was between 
1901 and 1910, in which a net favorable total of 1,120,179 immigrants 
remained in the country. Of the total immigrants who have remained in 
Argentina during its national history, 42.5 per cent originated from 
Italy and 33.5 per cent from Spain.
In recent years, however, the immigration wave proceeding from 
Europe has all but stopped. In some cases, the net population movements 
between Argentina and other countries are reversed in favor of the other 
countries, e.g.. as between Argentina and the European countries, the
48Justo Cervera, op. cit.. p. 53.
49Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. Ill,
pp. 12, 15. 
50Summarized in Monteagudo, op. cit.. pp. 31-34.
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United States, and U r u g u a y . T h e  trend of declining immigration from 
Europe is made even more significant by the almost stagnated natural 
increase in population, with the provinces of Entre Rios and Santa Fe
52having shown hardly any net growth in population in the past two decades.
Distribution and Density of the Population
Not only do the Litoral provinces account for 61.8 per cent of 
the total population of Argentina, but they have the highest numbers of 
inhabitants per square kilometer. Of course, the greatest concentration 
of people is in Buenos Aires. The Federal Capital in Buenos Aires pro­
vince has 14,871 persons per square kilometer while Greater Buenos Aires
53has 1,854 persons per square kilometers. The cities of Rosario and
Santa Fe have roughly about 3,799 and 2,670 inhabitants per square kilo-
54meter and contain 49.5 per cent of the population of their province.
The city of Parana has roughly a density of 3,400 inhabitants per square 
kilometer.
Data is also available on the rural-urban distribution of the 
Litoral population. Considering as urban those centers of population
^^Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Boletin de Estadis­
tica. Ill trimestre (July/September, 1966), pp. 15-21.
52Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. I, 
pp. 11-18, 189-228; II, pp. 90-112.
53National Census of 1960.
54Municipalidad de Rosario, op. cit.. p. 1; Justo Cervera,
OP. cit.. p. 15.
p. 15.
^^Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. Ill,
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greater than 2,000, the urban trend for the three Litoral provinces is 
quite notable. Table 8 gives the number of urban centers exceeding 2,000 
inhabitants and the total population in these centers for the four census 
periods: 1869, 1895, 1914, and 1947. The urban trend, evident in this
table, continues at an even greater rate after 1947. Buenos Aires pro­
vince, which had but one-tenth of the national population in 1869, ac­
quired one-fifth in 1895, one-fourth in 1914, and about one-third in 1947. 
The 1960 census reveals that Buenos Aires province contains almost one- 
half of the national total. Somewhat less intense is the trend in Santa 
Fe province, where the urban population has been at least doubling between 
periods. Urban growth is less spectacular, however, in Entre Rios province, 
never quite doubling between censuses and being surpassed by Santa Fe pro­
vince in the 1869-1895 period. In just the past decade, 1950 to 1960, 
the percentage of urban population in Argentina shows an increase from 
64 to 68 per cent and the most recent estimation places the urban figure 
at 75 per cent.^^
Not only does Argentina have a much lower birth rate than do its 
Latin American neighbors, but the distribution of its population is eco­
nomically more favorable. The wide-based population pyramid, common to 
other Latin American countries, is not at all pertinent to Argentina.
That Argentina has lower percentages of its people between 0 and 4 and 5
^^Demographic data on the Argentine urban trend are to be found 
in Gustavo Adolfo Nores, "La poblacion y el desarrollo economico, con 
referenda a la Republica Argentina," Revista de Economia. XIII (Nov.
19, 1963), pp. 75-120; Dora Beatriz Ventura de Rimino in Conferencia 
Nacional Sobre Urbanismo (Boletin No. 2, 1966), p. 16.
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and 14 years of age, meaning a less parasitic and potentially more eco­
nomically active population, is readily seen in Table 9.
TABLE 8
NUMBER AND POPULATION OF THE URBAN CENTERS IN THE LITORAL 
PROVINCES WITH MORE THAN 2000 INHABITANTS*
Buenos Aires Santa Fe Entre Rios
No. Pop. No. Pop. No. Pop.
1869 census 16 53,823 2 33,839 8 49,326
1895 census 61 324,770 7 129,976 12 91,843
1914 census 121 1,124,049 41 425,484 18 159,879
1947 census 146 3,049,182 69 984,599 32 421,314
*Source: Monteagudo, loc. cit.
TABLE 9
COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION BETWEEN 0-4 AND











*Source: Nores, op. cit., p. 102.
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Ethnie Groups and Nationalities
Professor Gino Germani, the Argentine sociologist, attributes
singular importance to the study of the past immigratory waves into
Argentina in understanding contemporary A r g e n t i n a . D a t a  for Argentina
assembled by Professor Ana Rosa Centeno from 1947 national census figures
puts into relief the impact made by immigrants on the composition of the
58Argentine population.
It will be observed in Table 10 that immigrants have represented 
and continue to represent a significant percentage of the total Argentine 
population. The high percentage of foreigners in Argentina over the 
years has substantially transformed the ethnic composition of Argentina’s 
population in making it predominantly European. Thus, until recently the 
two most represented nationalities in the Argentine population have been 
the Italian and Spanish nationalities, aa seen in Table 11. The newest 
ethnic trends in the composition of the Argentine population, however, 
are ones that will be discussed in the next section of this chapter.
Mobility of the Population
Four aspects of population mobility will be considered under the 
following headings: births, deaths, external migrations, and internal
migrations.
^^Gino Germani, Politics v sociedad en una epoca de transicion.
De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de masas (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Paidos, 1966), p. 179, writes: "La Argentina contemporanea no podrla ser
comprendida sin un analisis detenido de la inmigracion masiva." (Con­
temporary Argentina cannot be understood without a careful analysis of 
the immigration factor.)
SBcenteno, op. cit.. pp. 3-4. See the complete listing on 
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1869 (Census I) 1,737 12.1
1895 (Census II) 3,955 25.5
1914 (Census III) 7,885 30.3
1920 (estimate) 8,754 24.0
1930 (estimate) 11,746 23,5
1940 (estimate) 14,055 18.4
1947 (Census IV) 15,894 15.3
1950 (estimate) 16,061 15.7
1959 (estimate) 20,438 14.1
*Source; Germani, Politics v sociedad . . . op. cit.. p. 185.
TABLE 11
PRINCIPAL NATIONALITIES PER EVERY 100 IMMIGRANTS 
(NET IMMIGRATION ARRIVING BY SHIP: 1857-1958)*
Periods Italians Spaniards Poles Others
1857-1860 . . . 21
1861-1870 . . . 21 14
1871-1880 . . . 29 27
1881-1890 . . . 21 22
1891-1900 . . . 18 20
1901-1910 . . . 45 10
1911-1920 . . . 68 20
1921-1930 . . . 26 13 19
1931-1940 . . . -- 58 8
1941-1950 . . . 29 4 1
1951-1958 . . . 34 - 8
Average numbers (1857-1958 . . .  46 33 4 17
*Source: Germani, Politics y sociedad . . . op. cit.. p. 184.
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Births. The yearly total of Infants born in Argentina has shown 
a marked and progressive decline from 490,414 in 1962 to 487,883 in 1963, 
to 481,639 in 1964, and to 480,585 in 1965. A decline in the total number 
of births can be an indicator of economic and social development charac­
teristic of an acquisitive and industrialized country. Of the total births 
in 1965, the Federal Capital records 68,251; the entire province of Buenos 
Aires 115,299; Entre Rios province 21,696; and Santa Fe province 39,809—  
which is to say that the Litoral provinces with almost two-thirds of the
national population account for little more than one-third of the births 
59in the country.
Deaths. Total deaths in Argentina in 1965 ware 182,412, of which 
107,392 were males and 75,020 females. The Federal Capital had 35,767 
deaths; Buenos Aires province 52,482; Entre Rios province 6,581; and 
Santa Fe province 16,885.^^ Since 1914 the death rate has been dropping. 
Infant mortality is closely correlated with the level of urbanization in 
the different regions. Accordingly, the Federal Capital, the most ur­
banized area in the country, has the lowest rate, 32.3 infant deaths per 
thousand births; Buenos Aires province, the most urban populated, is 
49.9 per thousand; Santa Fe province, second in urban population, also 
has the second lowest rate of infant mortality; and Entre Rios, the 
least urbanized of the three provinces, is 56.8 infant deaths per thousand.
External migrations. There were 966,100 persons who entered 
Argentina in 1965, 457,700 of which were Argentines and 508,400 of other
59Direccion Nacional de Estadîstica y Censos, op. cit.. pp. 8-12.
*°Ibid.
^^Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 271.
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nationalities. In the same period, some 939,600 persons left Argentina,
466.300 being Argentines and 473,300 foreigners. This represented a 
gain of 26,500 persons over losses of 2,900 Argentine males and 5,700 
Argentine females and gains of 21,800 foreign males and 13,300 foreign 
females. Without checking gains against losses and ignoring the category 
labeled "others," the following nationalities entered Argentina in 1965; 
13,800 Germans, 33,300 Bolivians, 28,100 Brazilians, 58,700 Chileans, 
29,200 Spaniards, 32,800 Italians, 49,400 Paraguayans, and 156,800 Uru­
guayans. Figures for those leaving Argentina during the same period 
were: 14,100 Germans, 16,500 Bolivians, 27,300 Brazilians, 53,000
Chileans, 30,700 Spaniards, 34,400 Italians, 24,600 Paraguayans, and
62157.300 Uruguayans.
Internal migrations. The ambitious six-volume study of Entre 
RÎOS province and Parana reveals significant depopulating movements away
from rural life along the seaward course of the Parana to the urban
63centers of Parana, Santa Fe, Rosario, and Buenos Aires. The movement 
of Bolivians and Paraguayans into bordering Argentine provinces is but 
part of the same movement that these Argentine provinces have registered 
toward Greater Buenos Aires. This urbanization trend from the northern 
regions of Argentina and neighboring countries southward to metropolitan 
Buenos Aires is a phenomenon that will be explored at greater length in 
pages 100-101.
Direction Nacional de Estadîstica y Censos, op. cit.. p. 15-
21 .
63Institute de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. Vol. I, 
pp. 11-18, 189-228; Vol. II, pp. 90-112.
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Economie Aspects of the Population
Of an estimated population of 21,000,000 in 1963, some 9,450,000 
Argentines were esteemed to be "economically a c t i v e . T a b l e  12 gives 
the economically active population and economically inactive population 
by age groups. According to the data presented in the table, the most 
economically active years are 20 through 40. Table 13, using a smaller 
base of economically actives (8,220,000 persons), shows the numbers and 
percentages of working personnel by branch of economic activity. This 
table shows that agriculture and industry employ the two largest blocs 
of workers.
TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE OF ECONOMICALLY AND NOT ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE 
IN ARGENTINA IN 1963 BY AGE GROUPS*
Age Groups






41.2 3.8 55.0 100.0
0-13 0.8 0.1 99.1 100.0
14-19 39.1 7.9 53.0 100.0
20-29 66.7 6.0 27.3 100.0
30-39 64.0 4.2 31.8 100.0
40-49 59.5 4.4 36.1 100.0
50-59 48.5 4.3 47.2 100.0
60-69 27.5 3.0 69.5 100.0
70 plus 8.6 0.5 90.9 100.0
*Source; Consejo Federal de Inversiones, op. cit., p. 78.
^^Consejo Federal de Inversiones, Institute de Investigaciones 
Economicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., Programa con.junto para el desarrollo 
agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires: Confederacion General Economica,
1964), I, p. 75.
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TABLE 13
THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION IN 1961 IN NUMBERS 







Agriculture ......................... 2,100,000 25.5%
Mining and fishing ................. 55,000 0.7
Manufacturing ...................  . . 1,800,000 21.8
Construction ....................... 350,000 4.3
Transportation and communications . . 565,000 6.9
Commerce ............................ 1,265,000 15.4
Banks and other financial businesses 75,000 0.9
Government employes ................. 1,060,000 12.9
Independent professionals .......... 145,000 1.8
Entertainment . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,000 0.7
Lodging and accommodations ........ 140,000 1.7
Public Health and hygiene ........... 160,000 1.9
Domestic service ................... 350,000 4.3
O t h e r ............................... 100.000 1.2
Total ................................ 8,220,000 100.0%
*Source; Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 281.
The Psychological-Cultural Components 
It is neither the gaucho of the pampa, nor the Indian of the North, 
but the European immigrant who is the representative inhabitant of the 
"urban Litoral." In arriving in Argentina, the immigrant adapts readily 
to his new surroundings^^ and is soon influenced by three psychological- 
cultural patterns, namely; the pattern of individualism, the pattern of 
masculine predominance, and the pattern, or cult, of friendship. These 
psychological-cultural patterns are important to know because they pre- 
vade all social and political relations.
^^Jose M. Ramos Mejia, Las multitudes argentinas (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Guillermo Kraft, Ltda., 1952), pp. 298-300, 306,308, discusses 
the rapidity with which the immigrant to Argentina adapts to his new 
surroundings.
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The Pattern of Individualism
In Argentina, "the institutions.and national problems never had 
organic life, even in their origin." Man was absolute and absolutely 
everything. "There were man-institutions not institutions of man."
Hence, "all attitudes and opinions lived and died in man. They were 
almost man." Thus, "Sarmiento was education; Alberdi, constitution; San 
Martin, renouncement; Rosas, despotism." Today, it is noted that "the 
Argentine inhabitant never identifies with society nor institutions, but 
with man. He is never a citizen but ever remains an individual" and 
that "every time Argentine life assumes a manifestation it will be es­
poused and elaborated by some man."^^
The Pattern of Masculine Predominance
It is a well-established male conception that marriage gives 
the Argentine man the possibility of fulfilling his role of father and 
producer and that within the framework of raising his children and pro­
viding and caring for his wife it is not incompatible for him to spend 
much of his time outside the home. This conception alone is the basis 
of many of the existing social standards in Argentina. Under the principle 
of "the woman at home and the man in the street and at work," there are 
many public places- and functions attended almost exclusively by men; 
soccer games, the horse races, the bars and cafes, the billiards and 
pool halls, sports and other chiefly male clubs, conventions and business
Julio Mafud, Psicologia de la viveza criolla (Buenos Aires:
Editorial Americalee S.R.L., 1965), pp. 55-57; ______________ , El desar-
raigo argentine (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americalee S.R.L., 1959),
pp. 57-59.
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meetings, the movie houses during mid-afternoon, etc.^^ This sexual
differentiation is sedulously maintained by the Argentine man who tends
68to resent the present trend of female emancipation, for "the man does
not marry for any particular woman but only to acquire his matrimonial
,,,69 'status.'
The Cult of Friendship
Argentine life is greatly influenced by what Julio Mafud calls 
"the cult of friendship." The particular trait developed in the Indian
^^A noteworthy social institution is the predominantly male 
theater. One particular such movie house, the Cine "Sol de Mayo" in 
Rosario, Argentina is worth describing. The billing is generally three 
features, beginning at 1 p.m., with the last series of film showings at 
7:50 p.m. The main floor is occupied exclusively by the men. Any women 
or children who arrive are forbidden entrance except to two narrow-spaced 
upper balconies with just one row of chairs each. On the main floor there 
are no fixed rows of seats, but hard wooden chairs arranged in rows.
The attractions are a triple billing, a relatively cheap entrance charge 
(80 pesos, roughly 30 cents), and the prerogative to smoke, drink, boo, 
hiss, etc., inside with no managerial interference. The vast majority 
of the audience consists of salaried and day laborers, with only a hand­
ful of men seen wearing suits. This contrasts with another movie house, 
the Cine San Martin, located farther into town from the "Sol de Mayo," 
frequented chiefly by men in suits and ties. The charge is 100 pesos 
and films prohibited to minors under 18 and 21 are featured. For some 
specially adult film showings, the age requirement is raised even higher 
and patrons are requested to present documents to prove their ages.
68The male resentment toward female self-assertion in national 
life is humorously exemplified by the brief scene which was witnessed 
by an acquaintance of the researcher on one of Buenos Aires' public 
busses. One elderly Argentine lady standing up and seemingly quite 
irritated that none of the males seated near her would give up his seat, 
finally asked one of them: "Sir, don't you think that a lady should have 
your seat?" "NoI" the man snapped, "You ladies fought for your emanci­
pation and got it. Now take your own chances!"
Julio Mafud, La revolucion sexual argentine (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Americalee S.R.L., 1966), pp. 58-59.
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male upon having his woman taken by the conquistador, in the gaucho upon 
being expelled to the pampa almost womanless and without shelter, and 
in the immigrant upon growing up in an almost masculine world. Thus, it
is observed that "the Argentine man does not hold love but friendship as
absolute." Even today the Argentine man finds it quite impossible to 
establish any close friendships outside his own sex, although to be sure 
the Argentine man may have romantic or passionate attachments with female 
companions. As Mafud notes, the Argentine man, who still considers being 
in love as a masculine weakness, "will pour out his most anxious communi­
cation and feelings upon beings of his own sex." It is noted also that, 
in most instances involving society and the law, the Argentine will seek
out foremost a male friend who knows society or the law and not society
70or the law itself.
The Socio-Urban Components
Urbanism (the concentration of economic activities and people
in a contracted area) in Argentina has its origin in the tendency of
economic activities to localize in one common area in order to minimize 
the costs of transportation. Therein arises the concentration of eco­
nomic and demographic movements in one area of reduced s p a c e . T h e  
provision of services and other attractions characteristic of urban 
concentrations represent a "pull" factor in stimulating rural population 
to migrate to the cities. The input of rural persons into more urban
^.PMafud, Psicologia de la viveza criolla. op. cit.. pp. 96-99.
^^Philip M. Hauser, "Urbanization: An Overview," in Philip M.
Hauser and Leo F. Schnore (eds.). The Study of Urbanization (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 7.
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localities is termed "urbanization." The world-wide trend toward greater
urbanization^^ has been even more starkly pronounced in the developing
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In 1950 the urban population
of Latin America stood at 50 million; by 1965 it had increased to 115
million. This revolutionary process has only just begun in Latin America,
for it is predicted that the total population there will double within
the next thirty years. And because the rate of population growth in the
73urban sectors is almost twice that of the total actual population, the 
social, economic, and political problems resulting from an increasing 
urban population are expected to intensify to an even greater level of 
criticality in the next decade.
Urbanization has proceeded rapidly in Argentina. Whereas the 
urban population in Argentina in 1869 was 26 per cent and the rural popu­
lation was 74 per cent, these figures are almost reversed today. This 
revelation accentuates the need for providing the basic services and 
necessities— water, food, housing, clothing, education, health, and 
sanitation, fuel, transportation, employment sources, etc.— to ever 
growing centers of population and economic activity. The housing deficit 
alone is around two million dwellings and is increasing at the rate of
150,000 per year. Running water, common to most large cities, is not 
enjoyed by 20 per cent of the inhabitants of the second city of Argentina,
p. 46.
72"Facts and Figures of the Americas," Americas. XVII (May, 1965),
73W. Stanley Rycroft and Myrtle M. Clemmer, Office for Research 
Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, A Study of Urbanization 
in Latin America (New York; The United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A., 
1963), p. ix.
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Rosario. And, with 2,966,816 persons living in just 199.5 square kilo­
meters of space, the problems of demographic congestion and lack of 
sufficient services are critical and demand immediate solutions.
Rather than discuss the more specific problems of urbanism, which 
will be dealt with in the next chapter, this section of the chapter will 
explore briefly the present extent of facilities for mass communication, 
public entertainment, and education in Argentina and the "urban Litoral." 
With a higher degree of development in any or all of these media of 
expression and learning, a more rapid and consequential degree of change 
can take place in Argentine society and politics.
Mass communication. In mass communication media Argentina greatly 
exceeds the minimum communication requirements per every 100 inhabitants 
(10 newspapers, 50 radio sets, 2 movie theaters, and 2 television sets) 
set up by UNESCO as a standard "for educating the masses."
Argentina has more than 300 daily newspapers and 1300 other 
periodical papers. Buenos Aires alone has more than 50 dailies circu­
lating in excess of two million copies. More than 90 per cent of the 
adults in Buenos Aires are regular newspaper readers and there are 16 
newspapers for every 100 inhabitants. Throughout the entire national 
listening audience there are 10 million radio sets (50 sets for every 
100 persons), ten times the recommended UNESCO quota; and 60,000 new 
radio sets are sold every year. At present, an estimated 1,500,000
74Dr. Miguel A. Nievas Goyenzchea, Conferencia Nacional sobre 
Urbanismo. Boletin No. 1 (November 7-12, 1966), pp. 3-4; Calamaro, 
op. cit.. p. 279; Rofman et. al., op. cit.. pp. 16-19; Tulio Carella, 
Picaresca portena (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte, 1966), p. 51;
interview with Nelia E. Urcola, school teacher in the Bajo (low-level 
slums bordering the Parana river), Rosario, Argentina, November 14, 1966.
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television sets are functioning in Argentina. In a radial 80 kilometer 
distance centered in Buenos Aires, there are 1,111,760 television sets 
for 10 million persons, with a potential audience of 40 million viewers. 
Transmitting to this audience are some 24 regular and 6 dependent 
(channels which emit the programming of a parent channel) television
channels which provide between 60 and 70 per cent of their own program-
. 75ming.
Public entertainment. It is recommended by UNESCO that there be 
2 movie theaters for every 100 persons. Argentina has a total of 2,931 
movie theaters, which is an average of 5.2 theaters for every 100 persons. 
These theaters are attended by each inhabitant an average of 6.6 times 
a year, according to box-office f i g u r e s . A s  to official attendance 
at public functions, official data show a total attendance of 2,051,000 
spectators at 567 soccer games for the first six months of 1966, with 
box-office earnings of 473,451,000 pesos. For the Federal Capital
930,000 spectators saw 188 games and paid 228,463,000 pesos in the same 
period. For the first seven months of 1966, some 2,425,000 persons went 
to 65 horse races. Ticket sales on the race-track events amounted to
5,379,342,000, having a total value of 10,758,685,000 pesos. With respect 
to professional boxing during the same period, there were 27 boxing cards
^^See Hector Hugo Coda, La educacion v las comunicaciones de 
masa (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Libera, 1966), pp. 30, 44, 72-73, 82-83,
101-105; Ronald H. Chilcote, "The Press in Latin America, Spain, and 
Portugal," Hispanic American Report (Stanford, California: The Institute
of Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1963), p. xxxii; Ricco 
Labhardt, "Argentina's Press Defends Its Freedom," International Press 
Institute Report. XII (January, 1964), p. 3.
7*Coda, ibid.. p. 73.
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with a total of 96 separate fights which were seen by 69,000 patrons who 
spent 51,518,000 pesos on entrance fees.
Education. For the Litoral region the mass educational facilities 
are particularly impressive. In Parana city of Entre Rios province in 
1963 there were 18,006 pupils in primary schools, averaging one primary 
student per every 6 inhabitants. Schools total 55, there being 13,838 
students in provincial schools, 5,063 in national schools, and 2,552 in 
mixed schools. This averages out to one school per every 2,036 inhabi­
tants. Only 1,155 children, or 6 per cent of primary*school-age children, 
do not attend. Of 23,295 adolescents (14-20 years), only 5,955 or 25 per 
cent attend secondary school. There is only one secondary school for 
every 8,615 inhabitants. In Santa Fe province (of which about 50 per 
cent of the total inhabitants are living in the cities of Rosario and 
Santa Fe), there are 1,656 primary schools which are attended by 235,534
students. In addition, there are 30,149 students in 15 normal schools,
four professional schools, seven national colleges, thirteen commercial 
schools, and twelve industrial schools in Santa Fe province. The 
Universidad Nacional del Litoral has an enrollment of 19,679 of which 
4,464 are studying in technical fields and 15,210 in medicine, economics, 
law, philosophy and letters, or music. In Buenos Aires province there 
exist some 4,149 primary schools, of which 2,157 are in rural areas.
There are 89 schools available to 6,824 students for remedial teaching
and other special services. In the Federal Capital there are 783 primary
77See Departamento de Estadîstica y Censos, "Estadîstica de 
espectâculos pûblicos," Boletîn de Estadîstica, op. cit.. pp. 257-258.
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schools with 262,000 students; 304 secondary schools with 113,000
students; 16 technical schools with 13,000 students; and 5 national
78universities with 60,000 students.
The Political-Legal Components
The problems of a political nature which confront Argentina 
during this study will be discussed in the succeeding chapters. But 
to mention one political-legal issue affecting national development 
and pressuring the political system in actuality, there is the need to 
modernize and move ahead economically on the one hand and the deleterious 
effects of repressive and outdated laws which dampen modernization and 
development on the other handfT' More specifically, the problem concerns 
"the freezing of rents" and the law of occupying unused housing.
The lower classes were aided considerably in their housing 
expenses by these two legally established practices passed during the 
Peron administration. By the freezing of rents, landlords are unable 
to raise the rental payments of their tenants, despite the rising cost 
of living and the rising value in housing. Consequently, many Argentine 
tenants are presently paying next to nothing for the housing they are 
renting while their landlords are paying out for taxes and utilities a 
greater amount than that which they are receiving from their tenants. 
Another aspect of the same problem which also developed during the Peron
78See Institute de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. II, 
pp. 193-199; Eduardo S. Calamaro, La comunidad argentina (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Losada, S.A., 1963), pp. 203-204, 272, 292; Centro de Investi­
gaciones Economicas, Institute Torcuato Di Telia, Los recursos humanes 
de nivel universitario y tecnico en la republica argentina. op. cit., 
pp. 76, 78, 81.
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administration, allows that any unoccupied or unused housing space can 
be squatted upon, and it is nearly impossible to evict the intruders. 
Persons can even move into an occupied habitation, particularly one 
enclosed by a high wall, and construct their own dwelling, taking 
advantage of a wall structure to build from one of its corners.
Food Supply and Consumption
The data collected by the researcher concerning food supply
and consumption in the "urban Litoral" is not complete enough to use
here. À passable amount of data was discovered for the city of Rosario
79concerning its consumption habits and food-supply sources, but there
is some question as to the value of such data by itself and whether it
is representative of the entire Litoral region. It is encouraging,
however, that an Argentine university graduate department is studying
specifically the problems of food supply, distribution, and consumption-
80and has developed a framework and model for studying these problems.
The Economic Components
Of considerable importance in studying the prospects of socio­
political change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina are the economic 
components of "the total environment." Because many of the economic 
factors will be examined in succeeding chapters, this section of the
79çiarin. June 18, 1966, pp. 14-15; Municipalidad de Rosario, 
op. cit.. pp. 31-36.
80Badler, et al.. loc. cit.; Rofman et al., op. cit.. pp. 1-34; 
Castagnola and Rosenfeld, loc. cit.
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chapter will focus on presenting the general economic "picture" of 
Argentina and Argentina’s Litoral region.
Gross National Product
The GNP for Argentina in constant figures, which are adjusted 
in relation to the real value of the peso, for 1960 through 1966 is 
given in Table 14. It will be observed that GNP shows no pattern of 
steady growth but rather varies from year to year. Thus, little if 
any actual growth has occured in the Argentine economy over the past 
six years. Table 15 gives GNP during the same period but in current 
figures. The inflated earnings in this table depict Argentina as 
undergoing a phenomenal ^ate of economic growth and hide the economic 
stagnation and fluctuations that are revealed in Table 14.
Gross Domestic Product
Another way of looking at the Argentine economy is by examining 
the Gross Domestic Product (Producto Bruto Interno), which tells the 
cost of the factors comprising the goods and services that are annually 
produced. For 1965, the productive value of the goods sector in constant 
figures, was about 584,931,000,000 pesos and services made up 450,473,000,000 
pesos for a total Gross Domestic Product of 1,040,404,000,000 pesos. In 
the goods sector in 1965, industrial production achieved 365,099,000,000 
pesos of the total whereas agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting 
accounted for only 173,344,000,000 pesos of the total. Construction was 
third with a product of 36,831,000,000 pesos and mining last with a pro­
duct of 14,747,000,000 pesos. Banks, insurance, and real estate grossed
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TABLE 14
GNP IN CONSTANT FIGURES (1960-1966)*
Value in Base Index Percentile
Years Millions of Pesos 1960=100 Variation
1960 956,500 100.0 .
1961 1,022,100 106.9 6.9
1962 989,300 103.4 -3.3
1963 964,700 100.9 -2.4
1964 1,052,300 110.2 9.2
1965 1,130,300 118.2 7.3
1966 1,077,300 112.6 -4.7
*Source : Fundaciôn de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericai
Indicadores de coyuntura. No. 8 (October , 1966), p. 56. Index and vari-
ations based on figures supplied by the Banco Central de la Repûblica
Argentina.
TABLE 15
GNP IN CURRENT FIGURES (1960-1966)*
Value in Base Index Percentile
Years Millions of Pesos 1960=100 Variation
1960 956,500 100.0
1961 1,139,600 119.2 19.2
1962 1,403,400 146.7 23.1
1963 1,724,700 180.3 22.9
1964 2,349,000 245.6 36.2
1965 3,207,500 335.3 36.5
1966 4,079,300 426.5 27.2
*Source: FIEL and BCRA, loc» cit.
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8141,736,000,000 pesos and communications 8,817,000,000 pesos. As the 
GNP figures show over the past six years, the individual cost factors 
for the 1960-1965 period also indicate a general stagnation in the eco­
nomy. The fluctuation of the factor earnings (for example, industry 
produced less in 1962 than it did in 1961 and less in 1963 than in both 
1961 and 1962) within the goods and service sectors is reflected in the 
annual gross product figures which similarly fluctuate, as shown in 
Table 14.
The Industrial Sector
More than seventy per cent of all the industry of Argentina is 
concentrated in the "urban Litoral" zone along the Plata and Parana
gorivers between the ports of Santa Fe and La Plata. Table 16 records 
the number and per cent of industrial establishments and workers in the 
"urban Litoral" against the national figures.
The Agricultural Sector
The Litoral region is also dominant in agricultural production, 
although the rest of the country is gradually increasing its percentage 
of the national t o t a l . T a b l e  17 presents the number of farms and 
agricultural workers in the "urban Litoral." The number of farms listed-
81Departamento de Estadîstica y Censos, op. cit.. pp. 264-265.
82Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 163.
83In 1955, the agricultural product of the Litoral earned 9.7 
billion pesos, which was 66.7 per cent of the national total. In 1962, 
however, its percentage share fell to 63.5 per cent. Lorenzo Juan Sigaut, 
El desarrollo agropecuario v el proceso de la industrializacion en la 
economia argentina (Buenos Aires: Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboracion
Internacional, 1964), p. 83.
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TABLE 16
NUMBER OF INDUSTRIAL ESTABLISHMENTS AND 





Buenos Aires province** 50,000 342,000
Federal Capital 41,000 355,000
Santa Fe province 20,000 170,000
Rosario 8,243 75,598 '
Santa Fe 1,633 13,639
Entre Rîos province 4,000 20,541
Parana 1,509 9,803
Litoral totals 115,000 887,541
National totals 151,828 1,055,496
*Sources: Isacovich, op. cit.; p. 175; "Santa Fe: perspectivas
y desarrollo economico," Veritas. XXXVI (June 15, 1966), p. 17; Direccion 
General de Estadîstica y Censos, Censo industrial de 1960. Boletîn No. 9 
(March, 1962), tabulations 1 and 11; Clarîn, June 18, 1966, pp. 4-5;
El Litoral. September 3, 1966, section 3, p. 2; Instituto de Planeamiento 
Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. I. p. 228.
**Excludes the Federal Capital.
in the table covers a land extension of 11,400,000 hectares in Santa Fe 
province and 26,600,000 hectares in Buenos Aires province. The value of 
the agricultural production in Buenos Aires province is more than 30 
billion pesos per year and more than 12 billion pesos a year for Santa 
Fe province. Data for Entre Rîos province was not collected. With 
respect to land under cultivation, Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Entre Rîos,
Santa Fe, and La Pampa provinces contain 81.6 per cent of the cultivated 
area of the nation.
84Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboracion Economica Internacional, 
Produccion agrîcola argentina. a nivel provincial (Buenos Aires: Direccion
de Plantificacion y Estudios, 1965), pp. 14-15, 100.
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TABLE 17
NUMBER OF FARMS AND AGRICULTURAL WORKERS 
IN THE "RURAL.LITORAL" (1966)*
Number of Number of
Farms Workers
Buenos Aires province 101,493 339,900
Santa Fe province 56,267 171,600
Entre Rîos province 32,676 90,000**
*Source: Oficina de Estudios para la Colaboracion Economics
Internacional, loc. cit.; Raul Pedro Scalibrini, Reforma agraria 
argentina (Buenos Aires; D. Francisco A. Colombo, 1963), p. 24.
**Represents an estimation based on population of Entre Rîos and 
number of workers in industry.
The Business Sector
In the first four months of 1966 Argentina’s exports totaled
78.855.600.000 pesos or $426,600,000 (U.S. dollars) and its imports
45.489.800.000 pesos, or $240,900,000 (U.S. dollars). The net gain
of exports over imports was 33,365,800,000 pesos, or $185,700,000
(U.S. dollars). Over the past four years exports have increased in
85volume and value while imports have tended to decline. Concerning the 
domestic business sector, Buenos Aires has some 92,877 business estab­
lishments, 17,490 of which are wholesale, 59,124 retail, and 16,263
86service establishments. Rosario has 19,853 business operations,
2,369 of them being wholesale businesses, 13,970 retail businesses,
85Direccion Nacional de Estadîstica y Censos, Comercio exterior. 
C.I. 41 (January-March, 1966), pp. 2-4, 7.
86Calamaro, op. cit.. p. 283.
82
and 3,514 s e r v i c e s . D a t a  was missing for Santa Fe and Parana. 
^^Clarin, June 18, 1966, pp. 10-11.
CHAPTER IV 
THE FUNNEL OF SOCIAL-CLASS INTERESTS
Within the components that comprise "the total environment," 
certain changes occur through time which set in motion processes that 
penetrate "the funnel of social-class interests" and enter the poli­
tical system in the form of pressures or stabilizers.
This chapter will be concerned with "the funnel of social- 
class interests" in its role of formulating and generating a number 
of pressures on and stabilizers for the political system of Argentina. 
This latter focus on "stabilizers" for a system takes recognition of 
the fact that not all changes which occur inside or outside "the poli­
tical environment" are of the destabilizing or disruptive type.^
The Social Structure
One of the underlying assumptions in this study holds that 
sociopolitical change is effected through 1) an aggregate force of a
^It is pointed out by David Easton that change need not lead to 
an increase in volume of demands made upon a system; that a system will 
not necessarily be less stable because economic progress has resulted 
in an increase in organized demands, since an increased economic growth 
is likely to provide government with more funds with which it can more 
effectively satisfy the increased demands (A Systems Analysis of Poli­
tical Life, op. cit.. pp. 81-82); on the other hand, Louis Irving Horo­
witz (op. cit.. pp. 431-441) proposes an ordering of theory of political 
change in which change is equated with instability; that the problem of 
development resides in determining "the point at which change can be at 
the expense of stability, or stability at the expense of change."
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group of politically relevant causes proceeding from the total environ­
ment; through 2) a dynamic social struggle to determine the distribution 
of levels of power, wealth, status, and mobility among individuals, 
groups, and classes; and through 3) the relative size of each of the 
societies— the elite, mass, and marginal societies— that comprise the 
social-group funnel.
The Politically Significant Societies
With respect to the rate of flow of pressures and stabilizers
through the social-group funnel and into "the political system," the
critical or determinant variable concerns the percentages of individuals
who will when tested fit into one of three societies: the elite, mass,
or marginal societies. The procedure for determining these percentages
consists of administering subjective-quantitative tests (measuring
political alienation, anomie, and social participation) to subjects who
are contacted— in this instance-— by chance but whose tests are classified
2according to their respective socioeconomic levels, sex, and ages. At 
this point, three kinds of hypothetical response patterns are assumed:
1) low alienation, low anomie, and high participation; 2) low or high 
alienation, low or high anomie, and low or high participation; and 3) 
high alienation, high anomie, and low participation. The first pattern
2According to their total scores on education and occupation of 
themselves and their parents, subjects are classified into corresponding 
socioeconomic levels : 0-12, lower class; 12-20, lower middle class; 
20-28, upper middle class. The predetermined ratio of interviews among 
these three socioeconomic classes is meant to simulate socioeconomic 
reality, as is also the ratio of male to female respondents and the 
ratio among the different age ranges.
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it is theorized should correspond to the upper middle class, the second 
to the lower middle class, and.the third to the lower class. But assuming 
that not every subject will respond in a manner indicative of his socio­
economic level, three new groupings, the "elite” society, the "mass" 
society, and the "marginal" society (which are sociopolitical rather than 
socioeconomic) are used for classifying the respondents into their respec­
tive response patterns.
The "Elite" Society
The position at the social-group funnel end in Diagram 1 is 
occupied by the so-called "elite" society.^ What distinguishes this 
society from the mass and marginal societies, located farther up the 
funnel, is a particular "response" set to social participation, poli­
tical alienation, and anomie.
Table 18 compares the size of original socioeconomic groupings 
used in the sampling and testing of subjects (the lower, lower middle, 
and upper middle classes, comprising about 40 per cent, 40 per cent, and 
20 per cent respectively of the total sample universe) with newer socio­
political groupings derived from the categorizing of individual responses 
according to three response patterns (labeled the "marginal," "mass," 
and "elite" societies by the researcher).
qThe term here, "elite," is assumed to be the more appropriate 
one to use. In labeling this innermost society the "ruling" or "governing" 
society, many "influential" but not necessarily "governing" persons would 
be excluded from consideration. It is a political fact that the "outs" 
may often exert more destabilizing pressure on a contemporary political 
regime and can have more influence on its dissolution than can the "ins" 
on the persistence and continuance of that regime. It is the objective 
of this scheme of classification to include all individuals who can exert 
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Upper middle class 14 4 18 (20%)
Lower middle class 13 22 1 36 (40%)
Lower class 12 24 36 (40%)
Total numbers 27 38 25 90
Total Per cent 30.0 42.2 27.8 100
The Size of the "Elite" Society
As demonstrated in Table 18, the percentage represented by the 
"elite" society nearly doubles the percentage represented by the upper 
middle class, which means that of the 18 interviewed subjects whose 
socioeconomic-status scores ranged between 20 and 28 points, 14 respond 
on the criteria (social participation, anomie, and political alienation) 
in a manner that agrees with the assumed response pattern for the 
"elite" society. From the next socioeconomic level, the "lower middle 
class," having a score range between 12 and 20, 13 of 36 individuals 
comprising that socioeconomic class respond in the same manner (low 
alienation, low anomie, and high participation) as should the "upper 
middle class." Thus, 27 subjects in all, or 30 per cent of the total
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sample of respondents » reveal the three salient characteristics of the 
"elite" society: a social-participation score of 6 or more, indicating
a high level of participation; a low political-alienation score of 3 
or less; and, a low score of anomie or 5 or less.
The Characteristics of the "Elite" Society
Subjective-empirical characteristics. Socioeconomic status is 
taken into account largely in drawing the sample and interviewing the 
subjects. From there, to determine whether an individual is a member 
of the "marginal," "mass," or "elite" societies, the determinants are: 
social participation, political alienation, and anomie. The general 
orientation (alienated or not; anomic or not) that an individual takes 
toward life in general and toward local government in particular will 
affect how he is going to behave politically. And the potency of the 
influence that an individual may wield on his associates will be comen- 
surate with the number of persons whom he is able to contact and the 
frequency with which he contacts them through both his formal and in­
formal associations. Therefore, the measurable characteristics of the 
"elite" society are the numbers and percentages of subjects who respond 
high on the social-participation scale and low on the political- 
alienation and anomie scales. The "elite" society, then, consists of 
high social participants and negligibly alienated and anomic persons.
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4Other characteristics. Apart from being less alienated from 
local government in particular and life in general, the members of the 
"elite" society are generally located in offices or positions of leader^ 
ship and/or influence, being either the ruling force or decisionmakers 
at all levels of social, economic, and political life, or the principal 
molders of mass opinion, political ideologies, or academic and scholarly 
ideas. In other words, they are persons who occupy the highest insti­
tutionalized positions within the basic national institutional structure.^ 
The "elite" society can be further characterized by the lesser degree of 
friction which exists among its members.̂
The "Mass" Society
As explained in the preceding discussion concerning the "elite" 
society, some 13 subjects among a 36-subject sampling of the lower^middle- 
class society qualify as members of the "elite" society in being social 
participants while being neither alienated nor anomic. There are exactly 
22 respondents in the lower middle class who demonstrate a response pattern
^An excellent description of some of the qualitative character­
istics of those who integrate this society is to be found in Jose Luis 
de Imaz, Los que mandan. op. cit.. entire book.
^Imaz, ibid.. p. 5.
^Jose Luis de Imaz in his two-volume study, Estructura social 
de una ciudad pampena (La Plata, Argentina: Departamento de Filosofia
Institute de Historia de la Filosofia y el Pensamiento Argentine, Uni- 
versidad Nacional de la Plata, 1965), II, p. 147, discovered in having 
conducted opinion research on social stratification, distance, and 
mobility among social classes in Rio Quarto, Argentina, that a great 
deal of affinity exists among members of the upper class; that the upper 
class members whom he contacted all considered themselves to be on the 
same social, economic, intellectual, and spiritual plane. Friction was 
nonexistent, the social distance being considerably less and mobility 
much greater for the upper class than for the members of any other social 
class.
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indicative of the "mass" society, which is augmented by four persons from 
the upper middle class and twelve persons from the lower class who responded 
in similar manner. Thus, the "mass" society ends up with 38 persons or 
42.2 per cent of the sample universe, who are neither highly alienated 
and socially isolated nor negligibly alienated and socially participating 
but who demonstrate a mixed response pattern to all these characteristics.
The Characteristics of the "Mass" Society
Subiective-empirical characteristics. Whereas the "elite" 
society is comprised only of those subjects who are high participants 
and low-alienated and low anomic persons and the "marginal" society of 
those who are low participants and high alienated and high anomic sub­
jects, in the "mass" society none of the members is wholly alienated nor 
wholly non-participating. Consequently, the mass-social individual may 
be either a "participant" or an "isolate." But if he is one or the 
other, he does not record any of the responsive sets which complement 
the "elite" or "marginal" patterns. Thus, the mass-spcial individual, 
who may score as a low social participant or "isolate," does not score 
as being both anomic and alienated but as being one or the other or 
neither; the mass-social individual who is a high social participant, 
similarly, is not both politically alienated and anomic but one or the 
other or neither.
Other characteristics. The "mass" society is chiefly characterized 
by the socio-politico-economic heterogeneity of its members. Since the 
defining characteristics of this society are its "split personality" and 
its social-psychological ambivalency in not fitting either the "elite" 
(socially participating and not anomic nor alienated) or the "marginal"
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(socially isolated.and anomic and alienated) patterns, its membership 
may be drawn from all three of the. socioeconomic levels used in this 
study: the upper middle, lower middle, and lower classes. Results of
the tests, to be reported in Chapter VII, "Alienation and Participation," 
reveal that 22 individuals or 64 per cent of the lower middle class 
group fulfills the necessary conditions for "mass" society membership.
One-third of the lower class (12 individuals) and from one-fifth to one- 
fourth of the upper class (4 individuals) are also able to qualify for 
inclusion in the "mass" society.
What further characterizes this "hypothetical" society is that 
its members are widely dispersed at all middle or mass levels of national 
life, most generally being found in any of the public currents: the 
growing numbers of small white-collar public and private employes; the 
thronging crowds in the streets, the restaurants, and the movie houses; 
the excitable spectators at the soccer games and race tracks; etc. It 
is an active, mass-participating society, the bases of which have long 
been under formation.^ And, although its economic position has deteri-
g
orated since 1947, it nonetheless has maintained its same level of
9consumption and other outward signs of affluency.
^Rodolfo Puiggros in a lecture given at the Teatro de Independencia 
in Buenos Aires, attended by the researcher, December 5, 1966, enumerated 
in much detail the late nineteenth-century conditions and developments 
which laid the bases for the emergence of a "mass" society in this century. 
These bases are also described by Gino Germani in his Politics v sociedad 
en una epoca de transicion. De la sociedad tradicional a la sociedad de 
masas. op. cit.. chapters 3, 4, 7, and 8.
g
Juste Cervera, op. cit.. pp. 37-39.
ÛIt is readily admitted by Argentines at all societal levels 
that they have not sacrificed their acquisition of luxuries nor their 
expenditures on entertainment, despite increasing difficulty because
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The "Marginal” Society
At the top of the funnel of socioeconomic interests is the 
"marginal" society.
The Size of the "Marginal" Society
Under its spatial allocation in Diagram 2, the "marginal" society 
is seen to occupy just 27.8 per cent of the total funnel space, as com­
pared to 42.2 per cent for the "mass" society and 30 per cent for the 
"elite" society. While exactly one-third of the subjects in the lower 
class qualify as "mass" social members, hone of the upper middle class 
and just one subject in the lower middle class show the "marginal" 
characteristics of isolation, alienation, and anomie.
The Characteristics of the "Marginal" Society
Subjective-empirical characteristics. The "marginals" are readily 
distinguishable by their almost complete nonparticipation, alienation, 
and anomie. The mental state (a great sense of normlessness, powerless­
ness, meaninglessness, isolation, and self-estrangement) of the "mar­
ginals," together with their anti-sociability and estrangement from 
pluralistic activity, almost ensures that they do not act politically
of rising living costs and the diminishing monetary value of their 
currency. "We go on spending just the same. Haven't you noticed 
that the movie houses and restaurants are always packed? The way we 
spend and consume is the one great national vice." And to illustrate 
the veracity of the foregoing indigenous criticism, reference can be 
made to just one luxury item: the automobile. Whereas only a rela­
tively small percentage of persons possessed automobiles ten years ago 
in Argentina, increasing numbers of middle class members, particularly, 
are acquiring automobiles. Data show that in 1964 the national figure 
was one automobile for every 16 inhabitants. But in the zones of 
Buenos Aires there is one car per every 5 persons; and, in Mendoza, 
with 109,149 persons in 1960, the figure was 1 per 5.3, decreasing to 
1 per 3.7 persons in 1964 when the city had 20,000 more inhabitants (La 
Razon. November 16, 1966, p. 8).
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in a society nor influence any political action that may be taken by a 
society. Consequently, insofar as sociopolitical change is concerned, 
the "marginal" soc^^^y exerts no: effective influence.
Other characteristics. As suggested by the term, the "marginals"
are persons who live almost on the "outside" of society and civilized
living. While there exist sor-called "marginal" areas in \diich to live
(slums, villas de emergencia. or villas miseria). objective socioeconomic-
indicators cannot reveal the subjective attitudes of slum inhabitants
nor the meaningful sociopolitical activity by such persons ; Many Argen-r
tines, it was noted, were living in "marginal" areas but did not reflect
a mental set complementary to their lower living conditions. But* it
can be generally said that the "marginal" person stays pretty much to
himself and seldom leaves the neighborhood in which he barely subsists.
His knowledge of life is thin and distorted, filled with superstition,
and he is distrustful of all persons who live outside his immediate
environment. He is continuously under the harsh realities of death,
sickness, starvation, poverty, hard physical labor with poor compensation,
10and abusive treatment by those who are his socioeconomic superiors.
^^For one of the most realistic and descriptive treatments of 
the type of individuals who comprise the "marginal" class and the 
conditions under which they live, see Bernardo Verbitsky, Villa miseria 
tambiên es Amêrica (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos
Aires, 1966); also, there appear the works of Juan Bosch, Cuentos 
santafesinos (publication data missing); Mateo Booz, Ires lagunas 
(Santa Fe, Argentina: Libreria y Editorial Castellvi, S.A., 1953);
J. P. Echague. Tradiciones. leyendas v cuentos argentlnos (Buenos 
Aires: Epasa-Calpe Argentina, S.A., 1960); and, the movie production,
"Los inundados," based on the novel by Mateo Booz of the same name and 
produced by Productora America Nuestra in 1960.
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A large proportion of the "marginal" society, because of the scarcity and 
irregularity of employment for its members, is counted within the "econo­
mically inactive" population.
Political Significance of the Structure
The very general theory which explains the flow of pressures 
and stabilizers through the social structure into the political system 
holds that the most catalytic bloc of individuals in forcing socio­
political change are those represented in the "mass" s o c i e t y . I n  
sum, the larger the "mass" society is in relation to the "marginal" 
and "elite" societies, the greater will be the outputs of "pressures" 
on the political system; the larger the "elite" society in relation to 
the other two societies, the greater will be the outputs of "stabilizers" 
into the political system; and, the larger the "marginal" society in 
relation to the other two societies, the smaller will be the outputs 
of both "pressures" and "stabilizers."
The results. In comparing the socioeconomic (the lower, lower 
middle, and upper middle classes) with the sociopolitical (the "mar­
ginal," "mass," and "elite" societies) structures in Table 18, it is 
seen that not all lower-class members are "marginals" and not all lower
The reader is referred to the preceding discussion on the 
characteristics of each of these three societies. There it was noted 
that the "elite" society is more approving of society and government 
and more able to achieve its goals of change through legitimized channels; 
the "mass" society is not quite so approving of life and the role of 
government in satisfying its wants, and its members have sufficient 
social contacts through which they can influence the process of change; 
and, the "marginal" society is so estranged from society and government 
and its social contacts so greatly limited that its influential capacity 
is nill and make it a poor catalyst for any kind of change activity, 
even for the transformational activity which is already in progress.
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middle class members are members, of the "mass" society. If all socio­
economically sampled subjects.were to respond on the subjective- 
quantitative sociopolitical, tests in a pattern corresponding to their 
stratum (whether lower, lower middle, or upper middle class), both 
structures would be exactly the same. But the fact is that the "elite" 
society represents 30 per cent of the socioeconomic funnel as compared 
with 20 per cent for the upper middle class in modern society; the mass- 
social subjects are 42.2 per cent in the socioeconomic funnel and the 
lower middle class 40 per.cent in society; and, the "marginals" the 
remaining 27.8 per cent of space in the funnel while the lower class 
is 40 per cent in society.
Implications for change. While in general persons who are far
down on the scales of occupation, education, and socioeconomic status
tend to be socially isolated, politically alienated, and anomic, such
is not entirely the case for Argentine lower-class subjects. Exactly
one-third of the lower class subjects in the sample show mass-social
12patterns in not being consistently isolated, alienated, and anomic. 
Furthermore, it is observed that persons who are not quite so well off 
in terms of occupation and education may still show characteristics of 
the "elite" society in being socially active, not alienated, and not 
anomic. This suggests a favorable trend for stable and gradual evo­
lutionary sociopolitical change in Argentina. The trend looks favorable
12This result is especially significant in view of the fact that 
most interviews of the lower class were conducted in areas inhabited by 
that species of human called the inundado. a transit day laborer of 
precarious living facilities and habits whose impoverished dwelling is 
near enough to the banks of the Parana river that he is frequently 
flooded out; hence, the term inundados. meaning the "flooded ones."
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because, first, there are much,fewer persons, only 27.8 per cent of the 
social structure, who are "marginals" and hence not acting in the,society. 
This means a greater amount of over-all political activity will be gen­
erated, with more than 70 per cent of the social structure being active 
in socio-politico-economic life. Second, there are 27 persons, or 30 
per cent of the sample, who demonstrate characteristics of the "elite" 
society, indicating the existence.of a significant front-line of national 
leaders and persons of influence to foster smooth, nonviolent change and
to cushion and channel the more violent pressures that are made on the 
13system.
The Social Struggle
Whereas the previous section identifies and describes those 
variables that help to explain the rate of flow of "pressures" and 
"stabilizers" into the Argentine political system, this section will 
discuss the content of those "pressures" and "stabilizers."
The Objects of Social Struggle
A major assumption in this study is that a political system is 
more directly and strongly pressured from the aspirations of individuals, 
groups, and societies, which aspirations arise from the struggle for I) 
wealth and welfare distribution, 2) power and political participation,
13The results show that 14 of 18, or 77.8 per cent of the upper 
middle class, are members of the "elite" society. This is significant 
since those who rank in the upper middle class for this study must obtain 
educational-occupational scores that total above 20, which in turn sign­
ifies that these individuals are high-level officials and/or highly 
educated persons who are on the front-line of influencing or determining 
policy and decisionmaking in the "urban Litoral."
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3) social status (education and occupation), and 4) mobility and prestige 
and crystalize into "pressures" that are directed at the political system. 
The content of those societal demands is determined by the shifting pre­
dominance of each one of the four objects— wealth, power, status, and 
mobility— of social struggle and conflict. If, for example^ the partici­
pants in the social struggle are chiefly concerned about the acquisition 
and distribution of the national wealth, then, those pressures most fre­
quently and intensely made upon the political system will be of an eco­
nomic and welfare-distributive character. Each of the previously named 
areas of struggle will now be elaborated somewhat.
Wealth and Welfare Distribution
Between 1890 and 1940 Argentina enjoyed a half century of stable 
prices and a hard currency. During this time the increase in monetary 
circulation paralleled closely the growth in production. But, from 1945 
to 1965, international payments increased 200 fold while production only 
doubled. This condition was symptomatic of a most pernicious and rampant 
inflation, marked by a steady decline in annual per-capita income, by a 
stagnation of GNP, and by a persistent rise in all the cost of living 
indicies and the numbers and percentages of the population not economically 
active.Consequently, demands are increasing not only for more personal
^^"Inflacion y estancamiento economico," Panorama de la Economia 
Argentina. V (II trimestre, 1966), pp. 48-49; Institute de Investigaciones 
Economicas y Financieras de la Confederacion General Economica, Programa 
coniunto para el desarrollo agropecuario e industrial (Buenos Aires:
Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 13, 58-65, 78; Direccion 
Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda, Costo 
de vida, precios minoristas. salarios industriales, informe E.S. 45 
(October, 1966), pp. 7-10; ClarIn Economico. VI (June, 1966), p. 1.
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15goods but to see Argentina achieve a higher rate of development. In 
this economic state, the more.important considerations are the stagnation 
of the economy, the levels of wages and cost of living, ownership and 
control of the means of production, and economic problems that are of a 
social nature; housing, unemployment, health, public services, etc.
The Stagnation of the Economy
It is widely recognized that a great disequilibrium exists among 
the different sectors of the Argentine economy^^ and that the present 
economic structure is dated and dominated by vested interests that cannot 
be easily dislodged.
^^"Inflacion y estancamiento economico," Panorama de la Economia 
Argentina, ibid.. pp. 52-54; Institute de Investigaciones Economicas y 
Financieras de la C.G.E., ibid., pp. 184-197; Javier Villanueva, The In­
flationary Process in Argentina. 1943-1960 (Buenos Aires: Institute
Torcuato Di Telia, Centro de Investigaciones Economicas, 1966 edition), 
pp. 35-64; Carlos Garcia Martinez, La inflacion argentine (Buenos Aires: 
Guillermo Kraft, Ltda., 1965), pp. 341-354, 370-373.
16Leopoldo Portnoy. Analisis critico de la economia argentine 
(Buenos Aires: Fonde de Culture Economica, 1961), pp. 14-16; Oficina
de Estudios para la colaboracion Economica Internacional, Produccion 
agricole argentine, a nivel provincial (Buenos Aires: Direccion de
Plantificacion y Estudios, 1965), p. 100; ■___________. Economie agro-
pecuaria argentins.^, problèmes y soluciones (Buenos Aires: Direccion de
Plantificacion y Estudios, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 28-35; Institute de In­
vestigaciones Economicas y Financieras de la C.G.E., ibid.. pp. 182-184; 
Benito Marianetti, Argentina, realidad y perspectives (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Platina, 1964), pp. 69-104; "Rosario y la zona de libre com- 
ercio," Zona. I (June, 1965), pp. 3-8; National Conference on Urbanism, 
notes on "Sesion plenaria," Rosario, Argentina, November 8, 1966.
17 -Gaston Gori, La forestal. la tragedia del quebracho Colorado 
(Buenos Aires: Editoriales Platina/Stilcograf, 1965), entire book;
"Puerto Rosario: puerto de hoy," Puertos Argentinos. VII (Nov. 15,
1963), pp. 20-25; C1erin. June 18, 1966, p. 9; Juan Lazarte, Feder- 
aliamo y decentralization eh la culture argentine (Buenos Aires:
Catedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1957), entire book and especially pp.
1-67; Ricardo Zorraquin Becu, El federalismo argentino (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Perrot, 1958), pp. 89-118; Portnoy, ibid.. pp. 191-197; 
Scalabrini, op. cit.. pp. 23-28.
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In order to reconstruct the Argentine economy and provide the
necessary stability for its growth, it is surmised that a certain amount
18of innovation and competition will be required. It needs no saying 
that the psychological cost of giving modernization and stability to 
the Argentine economy will be great, and there is no end of opposing 
schools on just how this modernizing and stabilizing process should be 
effected.
Wages and the Cost of Living
Wages. It was reported that the real worker salary, based on
1948 as 100, declined to 67.3 for unskilled workers and 62.0 for workers
in supervisory positions by mid 1963; and that whereas dependent workers
received 50.5 per cent of the total economic remuneration as compared
with 49.5 per cent for the entrepreneurs, professionals, owners, and
independent workers in 1949, the former received 41 per cent compared
20with the letter's receiving 59 per cent in 1962.
Cost of living. It would seem that salary-wise most workers are
21not any worse off than in past years, however, the inflationary char­
acter of the national monetary unit makes such comparisons meaningless.
A more revealing measure is the cost of living index, as based on some 
particular year. Note the results in Table 19. The white-collar
18"Inflacion y estancamiento economico," Panorama de la Economie 
Argentina, op. cit.. p. 54.
19See the opinions recorded in Chapter VIII, pages 220-228.
o n Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 283-289.
21 Clarîn Economics. VI (June, 1966), p. 1; see also Direccion 
Nacional de Estadîstica y Censos, op. cit.. pp. 43-44.
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employe class has suffered .higher rises in its cost of living index-
than has the working class for..every year since 1960. And, in September
22of this past year the figures reached 451.0 to 381.4 respectively.
TABLE 19
CUMULATIVE INDICIES OF THE COST OF LIVING 
FOR WORKERS AND-,EMPLOYES, 1960-1966*








July, 1966 371.4 432.7
August, 1966 375.7 441.9
September, 1966 381.4 451.0
*Source: Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latino-
americanas, loc. cit.
The foregoing data lend validity to the conclusion that all 
socioeconomic sectors, except the very upper classes r top-level 
bourgeoisie, have been negatively affected by national economic 
conditions. While the much publicized worsening condition of the worker 
is exaggerated and his loss a good deal smaller than he would have the 
national authorities believe, it is seen that the "real" wage of the
22
Fundacion de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas, 
Indicadores de Coyuntura. No. VIII (October, 1966), p. 9.
23Isacovich, op. cit.. p. 282, cites data showing each 
bourgeois-class member receiving a remuneration figure of 8.60 to the 
middle-class member's 0.15 and the lower-class member's 0.10.
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worker has been higher in past y e a r s , w h i c h  now motivates him to 
attempt forcing a redistribution of income that will again be in his 
favor. The middle class has definitely had its previous economic 
position impared and its "real" salary gains nullified by a superior 
increase in cost-of-living expenses.
Ownership and Control of the Means of Production
Basically, all the land, industry, and economic means of production
have been under the ownership and monopoly of individuals who are nearly
25all of upper class status or of the upper middle class.
Socially Derived Problems
Unemployment. It is noteworthy that Argentina, which never went
above an unemployment figure of 6 per cent even during the depression,
registered an unemployment figure of 8.8 per cent of its economically
active population in July of 1963 and 7.5 per cent in April of 1964.
For 1965 the figure was 5.8 per cent, and for 1966 it fluctuated
26between 5.4 per cent for July and 7.4 per cent February and March.
In October, 1966, it was 5.2 per cent as compared with 4.6 per cent in
27October of the previous year.
^^Cesar H. Belaunde, Problemas de politica social (Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Troquel, 1964), p. 47, using 1943 as the base year, surveys the 
comparative cost of living and nominal and real salaries for the indus­
trial worker since 1937, noting that while the "real" salary was at 148.4 
in 1963 and 142.9 in 1962 it had been 172.6 in 1958, 162.6 in 1957, 162.2 
in 1949, and 156.4 in 1950.
25isacovich, o p . cit.. pp. 292-299; Gaston Gori, El pan nuestro 
(Buenos Aires: Ediciones Galatea-Nueva Vision, 1958), pp. 143-145; Imaz,
Los que mandan. op. cit.. pp. 106-163.
2&Fundaci6n de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas, op. 
cit.. p. 26; Belaunde, op. cit.. pp. 101-103.
Z^La Capital. November 17, 1966, p. 7.
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Housing. Lack of housing has been a continuous national and 
9ftpersonal problem, the solution of which is most pressing for the lower 
and middle sectors of the population. Some eight million persons in 
Argentina are now in need of more adequate housing. As to the deficit 
in number of houses needed it is estimated that the growing deficit of
9Qdwellings will reach six million by A.D. 2000.
Migrations. A vast number of immigrants, an estimated two
m i l l i o n , h a v e  poured into Argentina from the bordering countries,
especially from Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. This influx of large
numbers of generally unskilled and illiterate persons constitutes not
only a great problem to the national authorities but to all Argentine
31citizens who must compete with the cheaper foreign labor, for there
are many social and economic implications of such population movements.
And, the extreme reverse of this situation is the emigration from
32Argentina of professionals and technicians.
^®It was noted in 1939 that of 31,951 inhabitants in the city of 
Rosario, Argentina, only 3,392 persons were living under adequate conditions. 
Alcides Greca, Problemas del urbanismo en la republica Argentina (Santa Fe, 
Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1939), p. 46.
^^"Juan sin techo," Panorama. No. 43 (December, 1966), pp. 32-37.
30"Argentina, pais invadidq" Panorama. No. 37 (June, 1966), 
p. 94. There are an estimated 900,000 Bolivians living in the villas 
miseria of Buenos Aires— Confirmado. II (December 8, 1966), p. 38. In 
the Patagonia of Argentina, the Chileans comprise 42 per cent of the 
population there, and in the Chacarita station of the Urquiza railroad 
in Buenos Aires two trainloads of upwards of one thousand Paraguayan 
immigrants arrive per week— "Argentina, pais invadid," Panorama, op. cit.. 
pp. 88-89.
31"La inmigracion de los paises limitrofes," Panorama de la 
Economia Argentina. V (II trimestre, 1966), pp. 55-60; "Argentina, pais 
invadido." ibid.. pp. 88-94.
^^Summarized data for the 1951-1960 period of Argentine immigrants 
admitted into the United States show a total of 8,515 persons, excluding 
unskilled workers. Of this total 3,946 were professionals and technicians.
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Provision of services. The problem of not being able to provide
all the population in the urban centers of the Litoral with the essential
services is one that affects the lower and middle classes the most since
the upper classes are either able to afford private services or to use
33their political connections in obtaining desired services.
Health and medical care. In the areas of health and medical care, 
particularly, are the social-class interests well differentiated. The 
upper class will afford the very best of private medical care, the middle 
class will obtain some private and public medical assistance, and the
lower class will have no other recourse than to free public medical
• . 34assistance.
1,377 high-level administrators, and 3,192 skilled workers. See Morris 
A. Horowitz, La emigracion de profesionales v tecnicos argentinos (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial del Institute Torcuato Di Telia, Centro de Investiga­
ciones Economicas, 1962).
33parodi, loc. cit. ; Arrue Gowland, loc. cit. Direccion General 
de Estadistico del municipio, Boletin estadîstico de la ciudad de Rosario 
(Rosario, Argentina: Municipalidad de Rosario, 1960), pp. 25-26, 42;
interview with Alberto Pedro Patio Fiorucci, Jefe de Division Tecnica 
(Technical Division Chief), Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 18, 1966; inter­
view with Raul 0. Ramon Flores, Comisario del Cuerpo de Bomberos Zapa- 
dores (Commissioner of Fire Fighting Units), Rosario, Argentina, Oct.
18, 1966; and inteirview with Julio A. Giosa, Inspector Mayor (Chief 
inspector. Head of Fire Fighting Units), Jefe del Cuerpo de Bomberos, 
Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 18, 1966.
^^Interviews with Jose Ciampo and Adelina De Tulsio de Propersi, 
social workers, Departamento de Servicio Social, Hospital Centenario, 
and Lidia Hernandez de Vitoriosso, Institute Infantil, Parque 9 de Julio, 
Rosario, Argentina, Oct. 17, 1966; Dr. Pedro Leon Luque, La salud en el 
medio urbano (Rosario, Argentina: Conferencia Nacional sobre Urbanismo,
1966), pp. 1-7; Dr. Miguel A. Nievas et. al.. Urbanismo v salud (Rosario, 
Argentina: Conferencia Nacional sobre Urbanismo, 1966), pp. 1-9.
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Power and Political Participation
The social struggle in the sphere of power and political parti-
35cipation, though only moderately intense during the period of this study, 
should receive increasing attention as the different lower and middle 
socioeconomic groups grow in political maturity and organization and
36arrive at a greater recognition as to the content of their group interests.
Social Status; Occupation and Education
In the struggle for socioeconomic status, again, the lower and 
middle classes, but particularly the latter, are apparently at a disad­
vantage. With per capita industrial productivity somewhat stagnated and 
the agrarian sector having long suffered the same fate, the number of 
lower-level industrial jobs do not seem capable of meeting the increased 
demand created by increasing rural-to-urban migrations and migrations 
from the bordering countries. But, among low-level bureaucrats, many 
of whom are entrenched in the state monopolies, the job situation is even
^^This was chiefly because all political groups and movements 
were suppressed by the revolutionary government until it could achieve 
its goals and until that time when the country, in its judgment, would 
be ready to have political parties and to hold elections. The majority 
of the citizens were content to allow the new government a free hand in 
resolving the problems of the country and to a large degree refrained 
from engaging in political activity.
^^Germani, Politica v sociedad en una epoca de transicidn. op. 
cit.. pp. 240-242, points out that the so recent formation of the indus­
trial working class, as well as the recency of the advent of the middle 
classes,— this "recent formation," "without the traditions of prestige," 
explains greatly the irrationality of the masses in having accepted 
peronism (pp. 245-252) and in having lived through the contingencies of 
Argentina in "the post-Peron era"; and to Torcuato S.,Di Telia, El sis- 
tema politico argentine v la clase obrera (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), p. 9, the working class of Argentina 
is "a class still in formation."
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37more precarious. As for educational opportunities among the classes, 
the Argentine case shows that any capable individual of lower class origin 
is able to alter his social position and to scale the social ladder through 
acquiring an adequate education. Still it is true that lower class stu­
dents are enrolled in smaller proportion to the upper and other superior
38classes. Nonetheless, the lower class students are not at a disadvantage. 
In the study by Gino Germani and Ruth Sautu it was discovered that lower- 
class students as a group are more close-knit and homogenous and hence 
more organized than are students of other social class origins. It was 
further shown that lower class students attend school and take examinations 
with nearly as much regularity as do the other social classes and are in­
volved in only a few more instances of irregular behavior and infraction
39of rules than are other social classes.
Furthermore, public higher education in Argentina is frfee even 
to foreign students (there are many Peruvian students who study in Argentine 
universities) and there are no high fees to pay. As for the entire social 
spectrum it is noted that over the years an increasing percentage of the 
entire population is achieving secondary and university education.
37As will be discussed later, many of the state ministries and 
departments are overstaffed, pointing toward the desirability of dismissing 
the surplus number of employes and threatening the ones to be dismissed 
with the prospect of having to be absorbed by private industry.
^®0f the total Argentine university students, only 8 per cent are 
of lower-class origin. "Ideas," Extra. II (November, 1966), p. 37.
39Germani and Sautu, op. cit.. pp. 58-69.
^^Centro de Investigaciones Economicas, Los recursos humanos de 
nivel universitario v tecnico en la repûblica Argentina (Buenos Aires: 
Institute Torcuato Di Telia, 1965 edition), parte I, p. 73.
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Mobility and Prestige
Within both the lower and middle classes upward vertical mobility 
is possible. The working class, which has never regained the prestige
41
that it formerly enjoyed during the Peron years, is yet lacking in the
leadership which must necessarily precede its social reassertion. The
middle social range seems yet too heterogeneous ever to conceive or 
achieve a common ideology. Some individuals in the middle class who 
have not found a personal identification with that class have aligned 
with the lower classes and are in most cases the leaders of the working- 
class groups with which they have affiliated. The upper class is not 
able to assert itself as openly now as in the era of capitalistic deve­
lopment (1870-1930) and has had to settle for greater political anony­
mity while achieving a disproportionate share of economic wealth.
^^Germani, Politica y sociedad en una epoca de transicion. op. 
cit.. p. 244.
CHAPTER V
THE FUNNEL OF POLITICAL-GROUP INTERESTS
While the fundamental approach in studying sociopolitical change 
in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina is total or comprehensive in pur­
porting to view all aspects of the change process, the major emphasis 
in this study is on the urban community. Consequently, political groups 
and power blocs are not examined as extensively. Nonetheless, this 
chapter will focus on the structure and struggle of some of the principal 
political groups which wield influence on the Argentine political system 
during the period of this study.
It seems unrealistic to view political man as being isolated 
from the society in which he lives. Rather, the phenomenon of grouping 
provides every individual with a number of political roles and related 
memberships. Out of these roles and memberships, which are neither 
static nor regressive, various political groupings emerge. In time, 
every political group develops a consciousness or self-awareness of 
its own personality and acquires a unity of common purposes which guide 
its strategy and actions. Moreover, every political group has its own 
power base, which is partly determined by the size of the group and by 
the degree of cohesiveness which exists among its members.
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The Structure of Political-Group Interests
The structural classification system under which the political- 
influence groups will be examined is the tripartite system proposed by 
Professor Carlos S. Fayt in which these groups are classified according 
to the nature of their political activity. "The funnel of political 
group interests" is composed of interest groups, pressure groups, arid 
tension groups. In this chapter, each of these three kinds of groups 
will be defined in terms of general characteristics, which may be applied 
to any country, but particular groups will be identified and described as 
they appear in the substantive context of Argentine politics.
The Political-Group Interests
Each of the three political-group interests— interest groups, 
pressure groups, and tension groups--will now be defined and briefly 
described.
The "Interest Groups"
The position at the end of the political-group funnel in Diagram 1 
is occupied by "interest groups." What distinguishes interest groups from 
pressure and tension groups is that interest groups petition directly the 
public holders of power and their right to do so is duly recognized and 
respected by the authorities in the political system.^ In effect, interest 
groups are defined in this study as any collectivities of forces or groupings
^Iris Mabel Laredo, Los grupos de presion como factores reales 
de poder (Rosario, Argentina: Institute de Derecho Publico y Ciencias
Sociales, Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), p. 16.
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of interests which are found in the society, economy, or government, and
which have sufficient resources and means for expressing and articulating
their interests. While interest groups try to promote certain programs
and ideologies and to bring the influence of their organizations to bear
2on the official power structure, they are more highly esteemed and their 
political activities more fully accepted by the system authorities than 
is the case with pressure and tension groups. Interest groups, too, can 
be recognized for their rather close communication with the governing 
officials and their rather effective facilities for political action, as 
well as by the fact that they have long been in existence and their appear­
ance on the political scene is more or less traditional.
The Size of "Interest Groups"
In this study no direct attempt was made to measure the size of 
the three political groups. The period of time in which this study was 
conducted would not have permitted a very precise measurement in any event.
The Kinds of "Interest Groups"
Whether a group is designated as an interest, pressure, or tension 
group depends not only on the political behavior of the group in question 
(whether it uses direct and legitimate means in its quest to influence the 
power factors) but on the official or governmental attitude toward such
3groups. Too, an interest group, in order to be classified as such, need
2Fayt, op. cit.. pp. 183-184,
3Whereas the Argentine political parties normally function within 
a legitimate and constitutional framework, their dissolution and suppression 
by the military government during the time of this study means that their 
political activity is neither desired nor respected by the official power- 
holders. Thus, while political parties generally act under official sanction
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not itself petition the public power holders if the reverse occurs and 
the national powerholders petition the interest group. The effect of 
the political system being influenced is the same in any event whether
the group petitions the system or the system the group. Under this and
the preceding criteria, the researcher identifies three kinds of interest 
groups: religious, economic, and international.
Religious. The chief religious interest group was the Roman
Catholic Church itself, particularly the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the 
Church. In the established national and provincial constitutions, which 
have evolved during the course of Argentine national history, the Catholic 
Church was made the official state religion and authorized to receive
4state support. In actual practice, the Church is highly regarded by the 
state and receives financial support. In present-day politics, it is 
quite obvious that the Catholic Church wields influence and helps to deter­
mine national policy.^
and high esteem in Argentina, they are neither sanctioned nor highly 
esteemed in this instance and hence cannot be considered as "interest 
groups" according to the preceding definition.
^Salvador M. Lozada, Instituciones de derecho publico (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones Macchi, 1966), pp. 136-141, discusses the state and
provincial constitutional precedents establishing the Roman Catholic 
religion as the official state religion and, as such, according it 
special protection and privilege. This fact has had numerous legal 
consequences, especially in the areas of education and marriage, 
favoring the position and doctrines of the Catholic Church (pp. 142-150).
^Luis H. Decurquez, "iGobierna la Iglesia hoy en la Argentina?" 
Politica Internacional. No. 79 (September, 1966), pp. 17-19, 22-24; 
"Iglesia: antes que las ideas, un buen gobierno," Confirmado. II
(September 22, 1966), pp. 24-26.
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Economie Interest groups. There are two major economic- 
interest groupings, both of which have long engaged in lobbying and 
other political activity to influence national policy and to bring 
about sociopolitical change, operating more or less legitimately in 
the political arena. Under the first grouping come two massive entre­
preneurial or bureaucratic organizations. The first is represented by 
the AsociaciCn Coordinadora de Instituciones Empresarias Libres (Co­
ordinating Association for Free Industrial Institutions), a super­
structure composed of three entities; the Union Industrial Argentina 
(Argentine Industrial Union), the Camara Argentina de Comercio (Argentine 
Chamber of Commerce), and the Comision Coordinadora de Sociedades Rurales 
(Co-ordinating Commission of Rural Societies) . The second organization 
is the Confederaciôn General Economica (General Economic Confederation), 
a federation of three distinct sectors: the Federacion de la Industria
(Federation of Industry), the Federacidn del Comercio (Federation of 
Commerce), and the Federacion de la Produccion (Federation of Production), 
plus various economic federations at the provincial level. Each of 
these two vast organizations has sufficient political connections to 
influence some degree of change of policy and to make its preferences 
and opinions felt by the system authorities.^ The second economic- 
interest grouping is composed of labor and trade-union entities and 
is generally represented by just two general labor organizations:
^Imaz, Los que mandan, op. cit., pp. 126-142; Raul PuigbG,
Cambio y desorganizacion sociales (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar,
1966), pp. 325-329.
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the Confederacion General de Trabajo (General Labor Confederation) with 
2,334,380 members and the Union Ferroviaria (Railroad Union) with 
222,978 members.^
International interest groups. Events in Argentina during the 
period of this study showed the military-directed government to be highly 
sensitive to international bodies and world opinion. Among the more im­
portant international interest groups that were contacted and courted by 
the Argentine government were: Inter-American Development Bank; Export-
Import Bank; GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs); International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or, as it is more popularly 
called, the World Bank; the Latin American Free Trade Association; the
8International Monetary Fund; and the International Development Association. 
These international organizations are classified as interest groups, 
because their reactions and policies toward Argentina greatly served to 
influence the national government in the formulation of its policies and 
decisions.^
^Imaz, ibid.. pp. 208-235 and particularly p. 218; "G.G.T.: en la
encrucijada." Confirmado. II (December 8 , 1966), pp. 17-19. While members, 
local chapters, and smaller divisions of these two labor organizations may 
not.petition the power holders directly nor always resort to legal means 
of political action, there is at least a fair proportion of top-level 
activity undertaken by officials of these organizations which falls within 
the range of interest-group influence;
®"La invasion de las Malvinas," Primera Plana. IV (October 10,
1966), pp. 19-21; "Banco Mundial: informe," Primera Plana. V (November
28, 1966), pp. 75-76; "Un servicio de salvataje permanente," Anâlisis.
VI (October 31, 1966), p. 13; Cronica. November 21, 1966, p. 4.
9"T*losa: iheroe o traidor?" Primera Plana. V (December 6 , 1966),
p. 15; La Razon. Nov. 8 , 1966, p. 1; La Prensa. Dec. 6 , 1966, p. 1;
"Energie a la caza de crédites," Primera Plana. IV (September 29, 1966), 
p. 61; "A la espera de dolares," Primera Plana. IV (October 10, 1966), 
pp. 12-14; "Podemos competir en ALALC," Anâlisis. VI (October 31, 1966), 
pp. 66-67; "Paso decisive de les empresarios," Anâlisis. VI (November 7, 
1966), p. 14; Esquiu. Nov. 20, 1966, p. 9; "Argentina en la Rueda Kennedy," 
Primera Plana. IV (October 25, 1966), pp. 61-62.
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The "Pressure Groups"
Not too unlike interest groups, "pressure groups" also attempt
10to influence the decisions of the public holders of power. However, 
pressure groups bring pressure to bear on the system authorities, rather 
than formally petitioning or presenting requests to them. That is, pres­
sure groups are organized almost exclusively for the purpose of pressuring 
the political system. This is either because they do not have the close 
contact that interest groups have with the system authorities, or because 
pressure politics are their most effective "game." Their desires for 
certain favorable action on the part of system authorities are converted 
into demands and protests that are supported by pressure rather than by 
formalities and niceties, as with interest groups. Furthermore, pressure 
groups operate outside the governing framework and seek to gain the 
sympathy of the public as much as they seek to attract the attention of 
the system authorities; but, they neither create nor provoke public dis­
order, limiting their action to at least the appearance of legal sanction.
That is, pressure groups attempt to attain their desired ends without
12altering or jeopardizing the public order. In other words, they are 
more prone toward demonstrations, pickets, strikes, lobbying pressure,
^^For an excellent handling of pressure groups vis-V-vis the pub­
lic power holders, see German J. Bidart Campos, Grupos de Presion v fac- 
tores de poder (Buenos Aires: Editorial A. Pena Lillo, 1961).
llpressure groups are likely to engage in coercive measures and 
use all means, legal and illegal, at their disposal to further their 
ends, but always under the façade of normality and legality. They fear 
loss of position and privilege as repercussions to their exceeding the 
boundaries of acceptable political behavior.
l^As Professor Fayt, op. cit.. p. 185, notes concerning pressure 
groups: "They Inng to maintain or even to extend their situation or
privilege or their security; that is, to conserve their benefits, ad­
vantages, utilities, or economic privileges. They do not seek to level- 
off the economy, or to equalize economic benefits."
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etc., but are not willing to go so far in their efforts that they pro­
voke retaliation from those whom they are pressuring; there are recog­
nized limits to their political activity and behavior.
The Size of "Pressure Groups"
As noted under "interest groups," no attempt was made to measure 
the size of any of the three kinds of political groups. But "pressure 
groups" appear to be more numerous in Argentina than either interest or 
tension groups.
The Kinds of "Pressure Groups"
In accordance with the preceding definition and description, there
are six major kinds of pressure groups; the armed forces: high-ranking
officers, social defensive groups, professional organizations, church-
related organizations, political party leaders, and moderate university
student organizations.
Armed forces: high-ranking officers. This particular "pressure
13group" represents in simplest terms the military "outs," i.e.. persons
who are high-ranking officers in the armed forces but who are not accorded
decisionmaking status and who do not support or remain neutral toward the
persons who have decisionmaking status. In any given opportunity, their
neutrality or opposition to the regime is capable of crystallizing into
14conspiracy and other types of political activity. Because of their 
13The "ins" would be those members of the armed forces who are 
either seated in the government, as were several of the chief military 
personnel in the Ongania administration, or who are among those military 
elements supporting and backing up the ones in power.
^^The Colorado faction in the army, generally, and such enigmatic 
military leaders as Division General Osiris Villegas, particularly, re­
presented a source of pressure on the Argentine government during the
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high status alone, all top-level military officers represent a threat to 
the decisionmaking authorities.
Social-defensive groups. Among the groups that are both formally 
and loosely organized but which all represent a source of real pressure 
on any ruling regime are the various associations of retired workers and 
employes and those living on government pensions, the associations of 
retired military personnel, the association of contributors and bene­
factors, and the associations of tenants and renters, plus various family 
co-operatives. These groups are organized to act in behalf of their own 
social interests.
Occupational Organizations. The grouping of occupation organi­
zations consists of economic, labor union, and guild divisions.
In the first division may be included all the smaller economic 
organizations which are appended to the two larger organizations: ACIEL
and CGE. Collectively, grouped under one or the other of these two giant 
structures, the smaller economic groups constitute interest groups; but, 
individually, each smaller unit or entity is a pressure group.
period of this study. Primera Plana related that since May of 1963, when 
a Christian Democrat accused him of wanting to take over the government 
and install a military-labor dictatorship, conspiracy and General Villegas 
have been synonymous. See "Ejercito y gobierno: ihay plazos?" Primera
Plana. IV (October 18, 1966), pp. 12-14. But while a much greater percen­
tage of azules (military personnel, led by Lieutenant General Ongania who 
defended the national Constitution and constitutional legality against 
the colorados. their antithetical contemporaries, in September of 1962 
and April of 1963) are found among the high governing officials, it was 
observed that the colorados had made inroads into controlling the univer­
sities and the means of communication. It was affirmed in November, 1966, 
that 'the universities are in the hands of the colorados" and that "the 
means of communication also have been placed in the hands of ex-colorados 
or stalwart colorados." "Para un Colorado no hay nada major que . . . 
otro Colorado." Extra. II (November, 1966), p. 7. See also "El gobierno 
y las fuerzas armadas," Inedito. I (October 12, 1966), pp. 4-6.
this regard, it is impressive to view the movement of public 
co-operatives in Argentina. There were 3,433 co-operatives with 2,616,292
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Thus, the following economic organizations, in acting politically 
wherein their own business goals are the raison d'être4 are "pressure 
groups": the Camara Argentina de Fomento del Intercambio (Argentine Chamber 
of Exchange Development); the Union Industrial Argentina (Argentine In­
dustrial Union); the Camara Argentina de Comercio (Argentine Chamber of 
Commerce); the Sociedad Rural (Rural Society); the Câmara de Sociedades 
Anonimas (Chamber of Anonymous Societies); the Federacion Gremial del 
Comercio e Industrial (Trade Federation of Commerce and Industry); the 
Bolsa de Comercio (Commercial Exchange Center); and the Asociacion de 
Fabricas de automotores (Association of Automobile Factories), which 
represent multiple associations of companies and individuals which pres­
sure collectively; then, Acindar, DECA, Mercedes Benz, FIAT, ESSO, and 
Cantabrica, Kaiser S.A., IBM, RCA Victor, Swift (individual companies of 
economic stature and prominence within their respective industrial branches); 
and finally certain family-ownership associations: Bunge and Bom, Braun-
Menendez Behety, and Di Telia.
Among the organizations in the labor-union division the following 
stand out: the separate sixty-two national organizations which make up
the CGT, e.g.. Confederacion General de Empleados de Comercio (General 
Confederation of Business Employees), La Fraternidad (The Fraternity), 
the Union de Trabajadores de la Industria del Calzado (Shoe Industry 
Workers Union), Federacion Argentina de Trabajadores de Industries
members in 1964. Today there are more than 4,000 co-operatives. The 
leading co-operatives are: agricultural (621 organizations), electric
(587), milk (501), credit (432), and consumer (260). See "El destino 
de las co-operativas," Correo de la Tarde. VIII (September 28, 1966), p. 8 .
^^Puigbo, op. cit.. pp. 327-329; Imaz, op. cit..pp. 132-139; 
Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 293-296.
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Quiünicas y Afines (Argentine Federation of Chemical and Related Industries) 
Unidh Obrera Metalifrgica (Steelworkers Union) , Sindicato de Mec^nicos y 
Afines del Transporte Automotor (Syndicate of Mechanics and Automotive 
Transporte Workers), Union de Trabajadores Gastrondmicos (Gastronomical 
Workers Union), Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industries de la Alimentaci5n 
(Workers of Food Industries Syndicate), Asociacion de Trabajadores del 
Estado (State Employes Association), AsociaciOh Bancaria (Banking Asso­
ciation), etc.; and, the provincial and other smaller divisions of the 
17same.
The third division, the guilds or trade unions, include most of
the occupational categories which correspond to professionals and high-
level employes, e.g., the medical association, the dental association,
the association of pharmacists, the several associations of teachers
and university professors, the various civil-servant or government-
18employe associations, etc.
Church-related organizations. Apart from the Roman Catholic
Church itself as an interest group, other entities within the Church,
plus other denominational organizations, qualify as pressure groups.
Particularly influential were the Accidh Cat^lica Argentina (a specially
effective pressure group) and the different Catholic university student
19organizations, as well as certain priestly and other orders.
^^La Raz^n, December 13, 1966, p. 1; Imaz, ibid., pp. 216-217;
"La politica laboral," Primera Plana, IV (September 20, 1966), pp. 18-20. 
18Puigb(?, op. cit., p. 328.
19Imaz, op. cit., pp. 164-183; Lozada, loc. cit.; Laredo, op. 
cit., p. 34.
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Orthodox political party leaders. While the national political
parties were not legally operative during the period of this study, they
20nonetheless did not refrain altogether from political activity. Parti­
cularly significant was the role played by the various political-party 
leaders in evaluating the government and its methods, in maintaining 
certain laison activity, in suggesting new approaches to politics in
general and political alignments in particular, and in otherwise maintaining
21pressure on the national political system.
Moderate university student organizations. There are a large
number of Argentine student organizations of different tendencies which
22entirely span the ideological continuum. Not all, however, act as
pressure groups, or are sanctioned and their activities approved by the
23national authorities. The university organizations that act as pressure 
groups and are more or less tacitly accepted by the administration are;
^^"Politicos: sofCar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, IV (October 24,
1966), p. 21; "UCRP Speaks Out," Buenos Aires Herald, November 20, 1966,
p. 2 .
21It is noted that ex-President Arturo Frondizi and his adviser, 
Rogelio Frigerio were active in the Centro de Estudios Nacionales: Arturo
Frondizi, et. al., Introducci5n a los problemas nacionales (Buenos Aires; 
Centro de Estudios Nacionales, 1965), preface and p. 299; that other major 
political,figures were also active, particularly during the period of the 
study; 'YQuf pueden hacer los Radicales?" Primera Plana. V (November 29, 
1966), pp. 18-20, See also footnote "46" in this chapter.
^^Antonio Salonia, "Polftica educacional," Introduccion a los 
problemas nacionales, op. cit., pp. 187-200; Leon Berdichevsky, El 
peronismo en la Universidad del Litoral (Buenos Aires; Ediciones Libera, 
1965), pp. 80-93; Interview with fourth-year medical student, Rosario, 
Argentina, Oct. 27, 1966.
23Berdichevsky, loc. cit.; Carlos L. Yegros Doria, La reforma 
universitaria hoy (Buenos Aires; Ediciones Libera, 1965), pp. 49-53;
65-78; Sergio Morero, "Rosario; el ojo de la tormenta," Primera Plana,
IV (October 25, 1966), pp. 16-19.
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the various university faculties and their administrators (e.g., in 
Economics, Exact Sciences, Philosophy and Letters, Engineering, Archi­
tecture, Medicine, etc.) and certain of the more orthodox faculty and 
student groups (e.g.. Federacion Universitaria Argentina (Argentine 
University Federation), Federacion Universitaria de Buenos Aires (Uni­
versity Federation of Buenos Aires), Federacion Universitaria del 
Litoral (University Federation of the Litoral), Federacion Universitaria 
de Cordoba (University Federation of Cordoba), and Federacion Univer­
sitaria del Sur (University Federation of the South).
The "Tension Groups”
In contrast to interest and pressure groups, "tension groups"
create and provoke organized crises and, on occasion, they disrupt the
economic order. In their search for material security they are often
found outside the law. They display a social rather than economic power
in confronting the governing authorities. Tension groups are wont to
choose those means which are illegal and which threaten the public order,
being afraid of neither social convulsion nor anarchy and seeking a
leveling of the economy and an equal distribution of the national wealth.
And, because tension groups often lack the requisite funds to utilize on
a grand scale the mass media and other influential propagandistic means,
they often mobilize vast social sectors and deliberately create states
of tension by the effects of their paralyzing and disrupting activities:
25strikes, sabotage, demonstrations, etc.
^^Jorge G. Mancinelli, "Universidad: cuatro meses de botet,"
Imagen del Pais & I (November, 1966), pp. 27-30; Bernardo Kleiner, Veinte 
anos de movimiento estudiantil reformista. 1943-1963 (Buenos Aires: Edi­
torial Platina, 1964), pp. 342-343, 347-367.
25payt, op. cit.. pp. 184-185.
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The Size of "Tension Groups"
The percentage of tension groups within the total context of 
political-influence groups is ever in a state of flux since any group 
(interest or pressure) is potentially a tension group, depending on 
whether it feels inhibited by formal legality, whether it determines 
that the structure in which it operates is too restrictive, and whether 
it decides to use the same modus operand! as coincides with a tension 
group.
The Kinds of "Tension Groups"
Fulfilling the definition of tension groups are; militant 
political-party leaders, extremist university student organizations, 
working-class and middle class organizations which function as "tension" 
groups, and the illegal and extremist organizations that are committed 
to violent, anarchic, and radical political behavior. It will be re­
called that not only do groups who function extra-legally outside the 
system qualify as tension groups, but any group is potentially or 
actually a tension group so long as its existence and activity are 
not condoned by the system authorities.
Militant political-party leaders. Differing from the orthodox 
political-party leaders, the militant leaders are those who are at odds 
with the system authorities and who feel obligated or who prefer to
depart from the usual and acceptable means of influencing decision and
26to create "tension" in order to achieve their ends.
26It is worth noting the contrast in behavior between the ortho­
dox and the militant political-party leaders. The former reorganized their
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Extremist university studfent organizations. The rise of student
political organizations as tension groups resides in two phenomena:
1) the political force of the middle classes, which greatly sense the
inferiorities of underdevelopment and which have made nationalism a
political doctrine and 2) the narrowness of national politics which
excludes the urban proletariat from active political participation.
In this kind of atmosphere, student groups are able to organize and
take advantage of opportunities, backed by a sumpathetic public, to
27dramatize their opposition to any government.
The social-tension groups. In this and the previous chapter, 
it was pointed out that within the lower and middle classes there exists 
a modest percentage of individuals who are politically alienated and yet 
highly participating,in their societies. For both lower and middle 
classes the political machinery for expressing demands or wants is
political activity in the form of study centers or communicate through 
publications (books and periodicals) and otherwise remain in the public 
light. But the militant party leaders retreated to secret havens and 
begin clandestine operations, without other pretense. The latter is 
represented by the parties at the extremes of the political poles.
27gome of the more influential student groups are: APRI--the
Agrupacion Pueblo v Reforma Indoamericana (People and Indo-American 
Reform Group); CEFYL-FUA (the front of the Argentine University Federation 
and other anti-imperialist elements); FANDEP: Federacion de Agrupaciones
Nacionales e Estudiantes Peronistas (Federation of National Groups'and 
Peronist Students); MNR— Movimiento Nacional Reformista (National Reform 
Movement); JUP— Juventud Universitaria Peronista (Peronist University 
Youth); Tacaura (the ultra-nationalist group), which destroyed paintings 
of.Elizabeth II, Prince Phillip, and Winston Churchill and defaced the 
walls in the British Consulate in Rosario in October, 1966; the Liga 
Humanista (Humanist League), and other humanist groupings; the Juventud 
Comunista (Communist Youth); and other Communist and Trotskyite groupings, 
etc.
121
rather ineffective and limited, so that individuals with common interests
will quite often decide to band together in order to put pressure on the
28political system and to act as a tension group.
The anarchists and extremists. If the actions of social-tension
groups, or of the individuals who participate in such groups, become
chronically polarized in various forms of anarchic and extremist acti- 
29vity, such actions will represent a source of continuous instability 
to a system, as well as an explosive catalyst for rapid and violent
■inchange.
Political Significance of the Structure
No sophisticated theory has yet been contrived concerning poli­
tical groups for Argentina, apart from classifying them according to the 
nature of their activity (whether they go about petitioning, pressuring, 
or upsetting the regime in power). However, it is possible to make 
several non-rigid, theoretical assumptions concerning the type of poli­
tical-influence activity that prevails within the Argentine political 
system. Normally, the society and the political system will change more
28Examples of this would be the immigrant societies in Argentina 
at the turn of the century, the spontaneous demonstrations and marches 
by working-class and white-collar masses, and the tension arising from 
marginal social areas in which there is privation and no hope of imminent 
satisfaction of unattended needs or neglected services. See "De la 
rebelion a la madurez politica: las masas argentinas buscan su rumbo,"
Anâlisis. VI (October 17, 1966), pp. 16-20.
29It is generally known statistically that more than two thousand 
bombs have been exploded in the Federal Capital in the past decade by 
peronist and anarcho-syndicalists.
^®It is logical that this tension group should include all those 
elements definitely seeking to overthrow the regime in power by violent 
means, among which could figure army officers, die-hard revolutionists, 
and the political "outs" who have so little actual power and prestige that 
they are forced to embrace extremism and violence.
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rapidly and radically from interest-group activity, provided that the 
political system possesses too low a capacity to absorb pressures and 
tension activity. Where the political system receives sufficient inputs 
of stabilizers and is sufficiently strong to withstand any degree of 
tension and pressures, the number of tension groups and the intensity of 
tension-group activity will have less significance.
The results. The structure of political groups in Argentina is 
a highly pluralistic one in which there appear a large percentage of 
pressure groups. It is observed that the different political-influence 
groups may perform in more than one capacity, as interest, pressure, or 
tension groups. Furthermore, it is seen that the degree of political 
freedom which different groups are accorded by their governments affect 
in no small manner the ideological positions taken and the methods of 
political action used by these groups.
Implications for change. The leading implication for change 
which the preceding discussion highlights is the possibility of increasing 
pressures and tensions because of there being too few interest groups 
that have official acceptance and sufficient means to act effectively 
and legitimately. This situation could be largely alleviated by broadening 
the funnel end of the political-influence structure; that is, by restoring 
the former political parties to legal status and by providing for the 
political representation and integration of the Argentine working classes.
While it is true that the political parties and the other poli­
tical groups each have their own ideas and disagree as to what the coun­
try needs and appear not to accomplish anything, it is obvious that the 
artificial suppression and submersion of their legitimate political
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activity will only force that activity to operate below the surface of 
legality and to emerge as explosive "tension."
The Struggle for Political Influence
This section of the chapter will discuss the objects of political 
struggle, from which the political system is pressured.
The Objects of Political Struggle
The same theoretical criteria that describe "the objects of 
social struggle" in the preceding chapter may also apply to the poli­
tical-influence groups in their struggle for 1) wealth and welfare 
distribution, 2) power and political participation, 3) social status 
(education and occupation), and 4) mobility and prestige. From the 
struggle within and between the political groups to obtain the desires 
of their demanding and pressuring efforts, certain "pressures" are 
generated which are directed at the political system. The content of 
these political demands is determined by the shifting and predominance 
of each of the four objects--wealth, power, status, and mobility— of 
political struggle and conflict.
Wealth and Welfare Distribution
It was correctly stated by one source that the revolutionary
government in Argentina (the same one that existed during this study)
"is not a fascist government because its ideas in economic, social, and
31moral concepts are those of a hundred years ago. . . . "  The fact is
^^George R. Waggoner in A Report to the American Academic Com­
munity on the Present Argentine University Situation; prepared by the 
Fact-Finding Commission of the Latin American Studies Associations 
(Austin, Texas: Latin American Studies Association, 1967), p. 42.
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that the ideas of the Revolution of June 28, 1966, are basically those
upheld,by the oligarchic, conservative governments that were ruling in
0 0Argentina until the Saenz Pena law of 1912. This phenomenon can be 
explained largely by referring to the alignment of political groups 
described in the first part of this chapter. There, it was pointed out 
that the most influential political groups in terms of power and position 
are the economic groups: the ACIEL and the CGE. It is reasonable to
assume that with such favorable resources these economically based interest 
groups should be able to influence national policy. But the activity of 
these two interest groups is only part of a broader, more sweeping orien­
tation which is responsible for the content and direction of Argentine 
policy.
The Capitalist Orientation of Political Influence
The capitalist heritage. The capitalist period in Argentine 
history began shortly after the advent of the Constitution of 1853 and 
persisted into the twentieth century, reasserting itself strongly just 
before the Revolution of 1943. Its theme was expounded by Juan Bautista 
Alberdi: gobernar es poblar (to govern is to populate), which meant not
only bringing in European immigrants to populate the sparsely settled 
country but also importing the progressive ideas of European civilization. 
In short, the capitalist colonization of Argentina was an intense phase
32The more specific aspects of late nineteenth century Argentine 
capitalism, especially in its political machinations, can be read in 
Rodolfo Puiggros, Pueblo.v oligarguîa. Vol. I: Historia critica de los
partidos politicos aygentinos (Buenos Aires: Jorge Alvarez, Editor,
1965), pp. 67-159; still other aspects of the capitalist period are 
found in Gaston Gori, Inmigracion v colonizacion en la Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1964), pp. 49-102.
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of economic development which sought to transform Argentina into a 
modern n a t i o n . A n o t h e r  of its exponents, Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, 
gave the structure its educational substance,while ingenius develop­
mental programs were shaped by Juan Bautista Alberdi, Julio A. Roca,
Nicolas Avellaneda, Bartolomé Mitre, and other members of the "patern­
alistic oligarchy." The leading tenets of these programs were: sup­
pression of the caudillos in the provinces, colonization and exploitation 
of the natural wealth via construction of railroads, attraction of im­
migrants, use of foreign capital, and orientation of the national mone-
35tary and trade policies to favor a world-trade economy.
Revised industrial capitalism. But the rapid national development, 
based on the productivity of the agrarian sector, slowed down and even
stagnated while the industrial sector continued to expand, and in produc-
36tivity industry gradually surpassed agriculture. Thus, a new era of 
industrial capitalism began which, aided by the world-wide depression
^^Notes by researcher of lecture given by Rodolfo Puiggros,
Buenos Aires, December 5, 1966.
^^A. J. Pérez Amuchastegui, Mentalidades argentinas (1860-1930) 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 45,
and all of Chapter I, "Mentalidad de la oligarquia paternalista," pp.
13-99.
35Puiggros, lecture, loc. cit.; Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferro- 
carriles argentines ("Cuaderno del Institute de Derecho Püblico y 
Ciencias Sociales"; Rosario, Argentina: Universidad del Litoral, 1966),
pp. 11-16; Germani, Politica v sociedad en una época de transition, op. 
eft.. pp. 179-216.
36Floreal A. Ferrara, Desarrollo y bienestar argentine (La 
Plata, Argentina: Libreria Renacimiento Editorial, 1966), pp. 59-62,
79-84, 95-96; Roberto Cortés Conde, "Problemas del crecimiento indus­
trial (1870-1914)," Argentina, sociedad de masas. eds. Torcuato S. Di 
Telia, Gino Germani, and Jorge Graciarena (Buenos Aires: Editorial
Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966 edition), pp. 59-84; Samuel Gorban, 
Plantificacion industrial (Rosario, Argentina: Editorial Rosario, S.A.,
1947), pp. 14-24; Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 141-147.
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and the special protection.afforded to industry by World War II, became
strongly entrenched in the thinking and life of the Argentine lower 
37classes. Now, after two decades of only a slight increase in total 
industrial productivity and an over-all decline in per-capita industrial 
productivity, there is a resurgence of the old capitalism. This hege­
mony of the old agrarian capitalism has blended with the newer indus­
trial capitalism to form a "revised industrial capitalism." Its poli­
tical influence has worked to modify the industrial capitalism of the 
preceding and immediate postwar years and to insert some of the old
principles of nineteenth-century capitalism which are manifested in
38current official Argentine policy.
Revised Industrial Capitalism and Postwar Nationalism
When notice is taken of the post-war economic stagnation that 
has plagued Argentina and the instability and failures of all the civilian 
governments during this period, it seems understandable and inevitable
37This fact is readily discerned even on casual contact with 
Argentines of different social backgrounds. It is notable that the 
Argentine representatives to LAFTA have not been willing to have Argen­
tina relegated to a minor industrial role.
3®"Imponer a la CGT desde abajo: la lucha conjunta," Politica
Obrera No. 8 (November 21, 1966), p. 1, appraises the government program 
announced November 7, 1966, as representing "the fundamental economic 
philosophy of financial capital in the semi-colonial days of our country." 
In focusing its future policy upon a greater agricultural exploitation 
and a freer rate of exchange, the leftist organ notes, the dictatorial 
regime has elected to take .the country back thirty years (p. 2), thus 
"confirming our thesis that financial capital is running the country," 
Puiggros, in his Pueblo v oligarguîa. op. cit.. p. 50, touches on 
another of the principles of nineteenth-century capitalism: "The idea
that Argentina cannot progress by its own efforts, or that its own 
efforts should be subordinated to a program of foreign investments, 
prevails in the higher ranks of the armed forces, in the national civil 
service, and in the leadership spheres of the political parties."
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that Argentina would again produce a military caudillo and readopt some 
of the successful economic principles of yesteryear. But such action, 
however inevitable, conflicts with all those interests which can be
39grouped under the heading of "postwar nationalism. But certain 
factions, the industrial powers (as represented by the members of ACIEL, 
CGE, and lesser economic-interest entities) and the new nationalists 
(current members of Tacaura, Guardia Restauradora Nacional /Rational 
Restoration Guax37, the humanist organizations, the peronists, labor, 
and the Christian Socialists) desire that something be done to revitalize
40the economy generally and to halt the rising cost of living specifically. 
But from thereon, no agreement exists.
The new industrial powers are not above receiving foreign capital 
or in any way increasing their margin of profit, whereas the new nation­
alists reject any kind of foreign participation in the national economy 
and demand a higher rate of remuneration for the salaried sectors in the 
economy. On the one hand, the new nationalists want far-reaching social 
change but do not approve of many of the projected economic changes, 
such as reorganization of state enterprises and adoption of a free rate
39The term, "postwar nationalism," is being used in this study 
to refer to the Peron-brand nationalism— Fernandez, op. cit., p . 558, 
lists economic independence, development, and industrialization;
Argentina predominant in Latin America; and xenophobia— and the nation­
alism of the extremist groups, calling for substantial structural changes 
in socio-politico-economic life under the banners of ultra-nationalists 
(Tacaura), Christian Socialists (Juventud Universitaria Catolica), and 
peronists.
40For example, the nationalist front headed by Juan Carlos 
Neyra, ex-milit&nt leader in FORJA and the UCRI, and comprising 
Peronists, nationalists, and Christian Socialists, came out "against 
the government but in favor of the Revolution." See "Otra forma de 
politica," Confirmado. II (December 8, 1966), p. 20.
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of exchange. On the other hand, the industrial powers favor vast eco-
41nomic modernization but are reluctant to receive any social change.
The CGT and its members. The economic measures which the Ongania
government adopted present a direct threat to the economic security and
welfare of many CGT members. Particularly threatened are the workers
in state monopolies that are losing money. Workers fear that the measures
which the government adopted, e.g.. devaluation of the peso, will further
compromise their already decreasing standard of living. It is widely
believed that the government measures taken will chiefly benefit the
42upper classes and jeopardize the economic status of the workers.
The entrenched opposition. Most labor elements, then, oppose 
the economic reform measures being advocated and undertaken by the pre­
capitalist government. But labor is indecisive as to whether and how 
it should act. Certain labor leaders, particularly, no doubt hoping for 
the success of the Revolution, are specially careful not to engage the
rank-and-file members in early disputes or to undertake any action that
43will be detrimental to the economy. Thus, the real and significant 
opposition is coming from student groups within universities. Their 
negative reaction to the military takeover and intervention into edu­
cation in July of 1966 was immediate and sustained and has consisted
^^The dichotomy of interests and reactions represented by these 
factions are presented in some detail in Chapter X, "The Responding 
Political System," pages
^^"iCon musica de future retornamos al paaado?" Azul y Blanco.
I (November 10, 1966), pp. 4-5; La Vanguardia. Nov. 16, 1966, p. 3;
Angel N. Ruiz, "Por un plato de lentejas," Propositos. Nov. 17, 1966. 
p. 3.
^^La Capital. Nov. 9, 1966, p. 7; Clarin. Dec. 2, 1966, p. 26; 
"CGT, en la encrucijada," Confirmado. II (December 8, 1966), p. 17.
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chiefly of mass demonstrations, strikes, speeches, publications,
marches, and other less violent means, although some bombs have been
exploded, some property has been defaced, and some physical clashes 
44have occurred.
The Pensioners and Retired Workers
Long alienated by the runaway inflation and diminution in the 
real value of their retirement checks, those persons who have retired or 
who are living on pensions continue to pressure the government to pay 
them regularly, to raise the retirement pay in accordance with the cost . 
of living, and to take measures to halt the rise in p r i c e s . ^5
^^Mancinelli, loc. cit.; "Ideas," Extra. II (November, 1966), 
pp. 32-42; "Universidad: 100 dxas de intervention," Confirmado.
(November 17, 1966), pp. 26-28.
^^"Los jubilados," Extra. II (October, 1966), p. 44. It is re­
ported.that the active-age population (18-55 years) in Argentina is 11 
million inhabitants, of which only 8 million can be considered to be 
economically active. Of this total, only 4 1/2 million are enrolled 
in pension and retirement programs. These 4 1/2 million persons enrolled 
in pension programs are donating 26 per cent of their salaries to support 
some 2 1/2-million persons who are retired and who are receiving payments 
under the present system. Under Law 14,499, it is required that retire­
ment payments constitute 82 per cent of the last paid salary to an em­
ploye. These 2 1/2-million retired workers, then, are being paid 82 per 
cent of their last salaries'* from the 26 per cent salary deductions of 
the 4 1/2 million working population that is enrolled in retirement pro­
grams. Simple mathematics reveals that-the regular retirement deductions, 
although 26 per cent of the salaries of 4 1/2-million workers, does not 
go far enough to cover the required 82 per cent payments to the 2 1/2- 
million tetired personnel.
It was stated in Correo de la Tarde that a new front of inter­
associations of retired employes is being formed to confront the govern­
ment. Among those forming the new front are: the Confederacion de
Jubilados Ferroviarios (Retired Railroad Workers' Confederation), the 
Confederacion de Jubilados de Comercio (Retired Businessmens' Associa­
tion), the Union de Docentes Jubilados (Retired Teachers' Union), and 
the Asociacion de Jubilados de YPF (Retired YPF ^jEhe state oil monopoly/ 
Workers' Association). See, "El doctor Merello versus el frente de 
jubilados," Correo de la Tarde. VIII (September 21, 1966), pp. 6-7.
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Power and Political Participation
The struggle for power and political participation engage three 
factions, primarily: the outlawed political parties and movements (the
political "outs"), the university organizations, and labor. In each 
instance the engaged political-interest groups are struggling to recoup 
the power and participation in politics that they formerly enjoyed.
The Political Parties and Movements
Leaders of the political parties and movements are directing
their behind-the-scenes political activity in two directions: on the
one hand, publicizing the hope that the government will soon see fit
to reinstate the political parties and hold civil elections; on the
other hand, working to maintain the disbanded power structure of their
parties and to effect certain realignments that will work to greater
46advantage once their parties are again legalized.
The Student Groups
It is logical to presume that the revolutionary government, 
which lays claim to the mission of changing and rebuilding existing 
national structures, would eventually propose statutes that would 
transform the educational structure of the country. During July of 
1966 the several rumors that were circulating indicated that the govern­
ment would first authorize a special commission to study university
^^While waiting out the governmental suppression of political- 
party activity, the leading politicians formed study centers: Arturo
Frondizi's Centro de Estudios Nacionales; the Institute de la Economia 
Social de Mercado, with Dr. Alfredo Barré acting as executive secretary; 
the Centro de Investigaciones Sociales Argentinas in which were ex­
militants Hector Portero of the UCRI and Carlos Neira of the Democrata 
Cristiana; Pedro Aramburu's Centro de Estudios Politicos, Economicos y
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problems and later draw up a new statute to go into effect in January
of 1967, during the time that the students and faculty would be on
47vacation and thus minimize the strength of any opposition.
Law 16.912 and its aftermath. Why the government acted so 
quickly and against its saner judgment in decreeing statute 16,912, 
limiting student participation in the governing and administering of 
the universities, on July 29, 1966, is explained only by intense pres­
sure from the colorados to force the government to act too quickly and 
consequently to discredit itself. In forcing the government to act too 
prematurely the colorados took advantage of the existing animosity be­
tween the armed forces and the students. Even on special occasions, such 
as the public homage paid to the memory of General Julio A. Roca during 
the Illia administration when students tossed coins and pamphlets into
the military throng (among which stood General Ongania), the students
48displayed their intolerance and scorn for the militarists. Upon 
announcement of the new law, all public university presidents, except 
those of the Cuyo, Nordeste, and Sur universities, resigned— followed 
by the resignations of some 2,000 professors. Student demonstrations, 
strikes, and sit-ins, with police and military intervention, occurred 
with regularity— all leading up to the death of Santiago Pampillon, 
second-year engineering student at the University of Cordoba, who was
Sociales, a UDELFA center; and the UCRI centers: the Centro de Estudios
Legislativos and the Estudio de los Problemas Agrarios. See "Politicos: 
secandose al sol," Primera Plana. IV (September 20, 1966), p. 22.
^^"Universidad, 76 dlas despufs: cual es la salida?" Confirmado.
II (October 13, 1966), p. 34.
^^Ibid.. pp. 34-37; "Para un Colorado no hay nada mejor que . . . 
otro Colorado," Extra, loc. cit.; "Universidad: cronica del exterminio,"
Extra, II (November, 1966), pp. 43-44.
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presumably killed by a police officer during a student-police clash on 
September 7, 1966.
The polarization of the conflict. The university conflict is 
one with two well-defined positions. In the first position are the 
government and its sympathetic supporters: some university faculty and
administrators, some professionals and specialists, some high-ranking 
public administration and industrial personnel, etc. This position has 
assumed that students generally enjoy more power and prestige within the 
university system than their actual skills and capabilities would warrant. 
It holds further that students are too strongly influenced by communist, 
peronist, and other extreme ideologies and that many of them are not 
"students" in even the most liberal s e n s e . B u t  the student position 
is firmly rooted in the historical struggle for reform of the national 
universities in granting greater student autonomy, with allusions to 
former victims or martyrs: Roberto A. Sanchez, law student from San
Juan who committed suicide in 1871 because he could no longer endure 
the delays which school officials were causing in his study program;
^^"Que pasa eh Cordoba?" Primera Plana. IV (September 20, 1966), 
pp. 13-16.
^^Lambert, op. cit.. p. 388.
5^In a number of interviews with students and instructors, 
strong complaint was registered against"students who are not students," 
who "go to school to throw Molotov cocktails," etc. See also "Preocupa- 
cion por la Universidad," Clarin. September 27, 1966, p. 10; Juan Carlos 
de la Vega, "Universidad: H a v e  maestra del destino nacional," La
Capital. September 15, 1966, p. 6. This latter point is well illus­
trated by statistics cited in Correo de la Tarde. September 21, 1966, 
p. 16. In 1964 there were 72,872 students enrolled in ten colleges.
Of these, only 15,297 took examinations in four or more subjects;
27,171 in less than two subjects; 1,801 had never presented themselves 
for examinations; and 1,257 had not taken any examinations for more than 
four years.
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the seditious students who instigated the University Reform in Cordoba 
in 1918; the victims in the clash between private and public education
in 1958; the student victims of repressive police action taken in the
schools of Law and Medicine in 1959 and 1962; and, most recently, the 
death of Cordoba student Santiago Pampillon.^2
The CGT, the Government, and the Unions
Not only are CGT leaders in a deadlocked struggle with the 
government to regain some of the power they previously held, but they 
are also being pressured by the unions and by certain individuals who
C Oare making bids for power control. The government strategy views the 
control of the CGT as the key factor in the implementation of its 
modernizing program; and, thus, effort was made by the government to 
influence the election of CGT officials in the fall, 1966, election 
and to obtain the greatest possible public support. At the same time, 
the individual unions and rank and file members were agitating for a 
head-on confrontation of labor and government and calling for their 
leaders to take a firm stand against the military regime.
52Daniel Muchnik, "iFue inutil el suicidio de Sanchez?" Panorama. 
No. 37 (June, 1966), pp. 106-113.
53"La revolucion a la prueba: los gremios enfrentan al gobierno,"
Anâlisis. VI (October 17, 1966), pp. 56-60; "Gremios: las espadas de
Damocles," Primera Plana. VI (December 5, 1966), pp. 13-16; "El extrano 
silencio de la CGT," Inedito.I (October 12, 1966), pp. 12-13; "CGT War 
Still Rages," Buenos Aires Herald. September 25, 1966, p. 2.
^^"Todos a la conquista de la CGT," Anâlisis. VI (October 3,
1966), p. 20; La Vanguardia. November 16, 1966, p. 2; "Imponer a la 
CGT desde abajo la lucha conjunta," Politica Obrera. loc. cit.;
Buenos Aires Herald. November 21, 1966, p. 8; "De la rebelion a la 
madurez politica." Anâlisis. op. cit.. pp. 19-20.
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Social Status; Occupation and Education
Little political group activity during this study was generated 
specifically over the problem of social status, but nearly all political 
activity was directed at influencing the government in its programs to 
reform the universities and to do something about the excess employes in 
state enterprises. Both these issues are closely tied to the basic 
government strategy: to transform the national economy and, while doing
so, to control the opposition. The Argentine economic minister promised 
the World Bank that his government would dismiss 40,000 railroad employes, 
and fears of massive dismissals and reorganization shuffles have been 
the undercurrent of labor's opposition to the revolutionary government.
And these fears have not been eased, despite the government's assurance 
that any dismissed government employes will be relocated in private 
industry.
Mobility and Prestige
Much emphasis has been given the rise to prestige of the Argentine 
middle classes at the turn of the century and of the working-class masses 
with the advent of Peron. Too little emphasis, however, is given to the 
loss of prestige suffered by the Argentine upper classes, both at home 
and abroad. For both the landed and the industrial oligarchy, the pro­
gressively diminishing value of the peso, the continuous political in­
stability, the prolonged workers' strikes, the nationalization of foreign 
enterprises, and the featherbedding in state-run monopolies— all have
eg
long been a source of dissatisfaction.
55"Las dos trochas," Primera Plana V (December 6, 1966), p. 15.
^^In interviews with various industrialists and landowners in 
the Argentine cities of Santa Fe and Rosario during October, 1966, it
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The new challengers. Although it has been an issue for years, 
the struggle between Buenos Aires and the provinces is still far from 
being resolved. At this precise historical moment, it seems that pro­
vincial or regional interest groups are developing and gaining in power 
and prestige. While there is a national struggle for prestige between 
the different political-influence groups and the government, there is 
also a less obvious but quite real struggle taking place between, for 
example, the agricultural and shipping interests in Santa Fe province 
and these same interests in Buenos Aires province. The resentment felt 
by provincial and regional groups outside the small periphery of Greater 
Buenos Aires toward the portenos (Buenos Aires-based interests) is deep 
seated, and its resolution can very well be at the expense of Buenos Aires.
was lamented that the peso no longer has its pre-war value; that the 
oligarchy is no longer accorded prestige in international circles; that 
Argentina is no longer the world's leading exporter of cattle and 
cereals, etc. See also "Desprestigio argentino en organismes inter- 
nacionales." Inedito. I (October 12, 1966), p. 15.
CHAPTER VI 
THE FUNNEL OF GOVERNING INTERESTS
In viewing the present-day political society, Professor Rene H. 
Balestra recognizes three large bureaucracies: a managerial bureau­
cracy, a labor bureaucracy, and a government bureaucracy.^ This chapter 
will look at the structure of government bureaucracies.
The Structure of Governing Interests
As in the case of the social-group and political-group interests, 
the governing interests have a tripartite or three-level structure. In 
this proposed structure, the three kinds of "governing interests" are 
classified according to the source of their authority and their area of 
jurisdiction.
The Significant Power Blocs
There are three kinds of governing interests— national, pro­
vincial, and municipal— which operate and have jurisdiction within the 
"urban Litoral" of Argentina.
^Rene H. Balestra, "El sistema contemporaneo de la burocracia," 
Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Economicas. Comerciales v Politicos.
IV (January-December, 1961), p. 61, points out that society is under a 
tripartite bureaucratization in being dominated by a labor bureaucracy, 




The national government, with its central organization located 
in the Federal Capital, dominates all governments in the "urban Litoral." 
Diagram I depicts the national government as the largest and most in­
fluential ruling force in the entire Litoral region.
The Components of the National Government
The national government is comprised of the President of the 
Argentine republic, the heads of ministries who are members of the 
Cabinet, the various immediate advisers and consultants who are in 
continuous contact with the government leaders, and the various agencies 
and supporting arms of the federal government and their personnel.
The Cabinet. Included in the national Cabinet are the heads 
of the following ministries: the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry
of Foreign Relations, the Ministry of Economics, the Ministry of Educa­
tion and Justice, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of 
Social Aid and Public Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 
and the Ministry of Public Works and Services.
The national decisionmaking authorities. Among those indivi­
duals who constitute the group of national decisionmaking leaders, 
apart from the President and Vice President, are: Dr. Mario F. Diaz
Colodrero, secretary of government; Raul Ernesto Cuello, director of 
the Direccion General impositiva (equivalent to U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service); the governmental advisers (Engineers Antonio Lanusse, Mario 
0. Galimberti, and Luis Marla Gotelli; Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio, Dr. Manuel 
J. Crespo, Dr. Rubens San Sebastian, and Francisco Rodolfo Aguilar); 
and the various ministers and secretaries: Roberto Petracca, minister
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of the newly created Ministerio de Bienestar Social (Ministry of Social 
Well-being); Dr. Jorge J. Salimei, minister of Economics and Labor; Eng. 
Adolfo Raggio, secretary of Agricultura y Ganaderîa (Agriculture and 
Livestock); Dr. Juan Manuel Saravia, Jr., undersecretary of the Interior; 
Carlos M. Geliy y Obes, secretary of Culture and Education; and Dr. 
Conrado J. Etchebarne, secretary of Justice.
The supporting àééhcies and arms of government. The supporting 
agencies and arms of government consist mainly of those individuals who 
are found throughout all the administrative and executive gradations of 
national government, branching out from the principal national power 
holders. The following represent the major supporting agencies and arms 
of national government. First, under the Ministry of Economics, there 
are; the Secretary of Agriculture and Livestock, the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Secretary of Industry and Mining, and the Secretary of 
Energy and Fuel. Under the Ministry of National Defense, there are: 
the Secretary of War, the Secreatary of the Navy, and the Secretary of 
Aeronautics. Under the Ministry of Public Works and Services, there 
are the Secretary of Public Works, the Secretary of Communications, 
and the Secretary of Transportation. There are also the large state- 
operated and semi-state operated enterprises: Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales (the state oil monopoly), Aerolineas Argentines (Argentine 
Airlines), Compania Argentina de Electricidad (Argentine Electricity 
Company), Sociedad Electrica General de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires 
General Electrical Society), Sociedad Mixta Siderurgica Argentina 
(Argentine Mixed Steel Society), the Central Bank, the Caja de Ahorro 
Postal (Postal Savings Bank), Ferrocarriles Argentinas (Argentine Rail­
ways) , etc. Within the national government are also specialized
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organizations devoted to research, planning, and development, such as 
the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (National Development Council) and 
the Institute Nacional de Tecnologia Agropecuaria (National Institute 
of Agricultural Technology). The judicial supporting power holders 
are the Supreme Court justice and judges, plus the judges of the lower 
tribunals. The legislative power holders, which include both senators 
and deputies, or representatives, are found in the Câmara de Senadores 
(the Senate) and the Camara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies).
The Provincial Governments
The provincial governments in the Litoral region are directed 
by General Francisco A. Imaz, governor of Buenos Aires; Admiral Eladio 
Vazquez, governor of Santa Fe; and Brigadier Ricardo Favre, governor 
of Entre Rios. The provincial governments are modeled after the 
national government in organization, so that about the same ministries 
and secretariats exist with the chief difference being in the more 
limited jurisdiction of the provincial divisions of government.
The Municipal Governments
There are four municipal governments in the "urban Litoral," 
viz.. the governments of the cities of Buenos Aires, Rosario, Santa Fe, 
and Parana. Most of the urban problems confronted by residents of these 
four cities are within the jurisdiction of these four municipal govern­
ments. While social and political change may be dictated from above by 
the national and provincial governments, it is the municipality within 
whose jurisdiction change takes place.
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Political,Significance of the Structure
The conceptualized three-part structure, consisting of the 
national government and the provincial and municipal governments, 
coincides with actual realities. Because these three kinds of govern­
ments have been examined somewhat superficially in this study, it will 
not be appropriate to impute a political significance to this structure 
at this time. However, it is theorized that the stronger in resources 
the local or municipal governments are in terms of the provincial and 
national governments, the greater will be the amount of change that will 
occur in that society or political system. This is because municipa­
lities are chiefly stifled in their desires to effect change by not 
receiving a greater share of funds from their own sources of revenue 
and from the higher governments.
The Governing Struggle
This section of the chapter will discuss the objects of the 
governing struggle, from which the political system is pressured or 
stabilized.
The Objects of Government Struggle
The same theoretical criteria that describe "the objects of 
political struggle" and "the objects of social struggle" in the two 
preceding chapters may also apply to the governments in their struggle 
for 1) wealth and welfare distribution, 2) power and political parti­
cipation, 3) social status (education and occupation), and 4) mobility 
and prestige. From the struggle within and between the political groups
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to obtain the desires of their demanding and pressuring efforts, 
certain "pressures" are generated which are directed at the political 
system. The content of these governments' demands is determined by 
the shifting and predominance.of each of the four objects— wealth, 
power, status, and mobility— of political struggle and conflict.
Wealth and Welfare Distribution
The struggle to acquire wealth and to effect a more socially 
just distribution of welfare among the three kinds of governments 
(national, provincial, and municipal) is in three areas: the economic
dominance of Buenos Aires, the distribution of national funds, and the 
reformation of certain state enterprises.
Buenos Aires Economic Dominance
The economic dominance of Buenos Aires in Argentina is an issue
2that has long plagued the nation. This economic concentration in the 
urban conglomerate of the Federal Capital and the Greater Buenos Aires 
area is seen as a negative factor in the actual and future development
3of Argentina. It is noteworthy that during this study the national seemed 
2Even in colonial times the economic interests of Buenos Aires 
prevailed and were in full sway during the period of Juan Manuel Rosas.
See Rodolfo Puiggros, De la colonie a la revolution (Buenos Aires:
Ediciones Leviatan, 1957), entire book; Juan Jorge Gschwind, El puerto 
de Rosario: su evolution histdrica; factores de su progreso (Rosario,
Argentina: Academic Nacional de la Historié, 1942), pp. 5, 7-8.
3
Leopoldo Portnoy, Analisis critico de la économie argentine 
(Buenos Aires: Fonde de Cultura Economica, 1961), p. 14. Gorbân, op.
cit.. p. 90, in noting that the Federal Capital (an area of just 200 
square kilometers) contains 40 per cent of the working force of Argentina, 
expresses the fear that "this painful reality /Euenos Aires economic 
dominancJ7 has created a monster whose enormous head, which is Buenos 
Aires, rests upon a starved and undernourished body, which is the rest 
of the country." He continues; "The danger, then, resides in the 
possibility that this body, continuously bled of all its strength.
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fully aware of this problem and promised to take steps to correct it.̂
At the same time, the provincial power holders were able to 
emphasize the need for a policy that will favor the outer provinces 
and benefit parts of the country other than just Buenos Aires. In 
the meeting of governors of the twenty-three provinces, November 8-9,
1066, called by Minister of the Interior Dr. Enrique Martinez Paz to 
analyze diverse problems related to the functioning of provincial adminis­
trations and the co-ordination of provincial with federal planning,the 
governors particularly were able to underscore their own provincial 
problems and the needs of federal assistance.^
will collapse under the weight of its gigantic head." In 1942 it was 
the position of the Colegio de Abogados (Bar Association) in Rosario, 
Argentina, that "the economic centralism in Buenos Aires is the most 
serious phenomenon threatening the national economy." See Juan Lazarte, 
Federalismo v decentralizacion en la cultura argentine (Buenos Aires; 
Catedra Lisandro de la Torre, 1957), p. 7.
^The system authorities admitted the dominance of Buenos Aires 
over the rest of the nation and expressed the hope that the unbalanced 
relationship could be changed. See the text of the Presidential Address, 
November 7, 1966, carried in full by most Argentine daily newspapers, 
plus the speeches of President Onganîa and Minister of the Interior 
Martinez Paz to the Conference of Governors, November 8, 1966; La Razon. 
November 8, 1966, p. 1; Cronica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, pp. 1-4; 
"Temas de Onganîa y Martinez Paz," La Capital. November 9, 1966, p, 7; 
President Onganîa was quoted as saying before the conference of pro­
vincial governors on November 8, "You know how much we are concerned 
about the situation in the provinces. I pray to God that in the not 
too distant future these meetings may be authentic expressions of 
national integration. I know that you are quite well aware that this 
is how ’the Revolution' interprets it. I know that you are cognizant 
that in this we are referring to socioeconomic activities, since 'the 
Argentine Revolution' does not only proclaim a federal regime but it 
seeks also an authentic provincial autonomy." Martînez Paz said that 
"there is no revolution without profound political and economic struc­
tural changes" and that many vested interests may be dislodged in bene­
fit of the whole nation."
^See La Prensa. November 9, 1966, p. 1; Cronica. (Rosario), 
November 9, 1966, p. 1; La Capital. November 8, 1966, p. 1. The governors
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The Distribution of National Funds
The major issue from, the past that is important and influential 
in actuality is how the outside provinces should relate to the national 
government economically. It is known that vast sparsely populated 
regions of the country are economically bankrupt and the residents of 
these regions in need of subsidy and government funds.^ One of the 
major complaints emphasized by the provinces is the seeming unequal 
distribution of the federal budget. It is generally believed that the 
provinces receive back only a small part of what they pay into the 
central government. In Santa Fe province the quoted statistic is 
20 per cent.^
Law 14,788 and its aftermath. Under Law 14,788, passed January 
1, 1959, the provinces should be receiving each year an increasing 
participation in the national taxes. In 1959, the provinces were to 
have received 28 per cent compared with 72 per cent for the National 
Government; in 1960, 30 per cent to 70 per cent; in 1961, 32 per cent
of Cordoba, Corrientes, Chaco, Formosa, and Chubut provinces laid stress 
on their administrative problems and on the great need for increased 
regional development. Brigadier General Guillermo Brizuela, the governor 
of Catamarca province, said that 95 per cent of the resources of the 
province were of federal origin and that without aid from the central 
government it would be impossible to lift Catamarca out of its current 
economic stagnation. See also "Gobernadores, en tren de consulta," 
Confirmado. II (September 22, 1966), p. 20.
^"Entre el Pilcomayo y el Berraejo," Correo de la Tarde. VIII 
(November 22, 1966), pp. 18-19, reports that the geographical region 
in the Chaco part of Argentina between the Pilcomayo and the Bermejo 
rivers is inhabited by more than 15,000 persons "who have no economic 
resources" and to whom national welfare and assistance have not arrived.
^"We only get 20 per cent back of all that we pay into Buenos 
Aires." Comments by various individuals in Santa Fe city and Rosario, 
Santa Fe province, October 2-November 12, 1966.
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to 68 per cent; in 1962, 34 per.cent to 66 per cent; and, in 1963, 36 
per cent to 64 per cent, etc., until the Federal Government would receive 
54 per cent, the municipality of Buenos Aires 6 per cent, and the pro­
vinces 40 per cent. In practice, however, the national government has
been receiving 75.1 per cent, the provinces only 10.6 per cent, and the
8city of Buenos Aires 4.3 per cent.
The Restructuring of State Enterprises
Several state enterprises were threatened during this study with 
restructuring and other profound changes that would make them more 
efficient and more profitable to the state. These state enterprises 
were YPF (the state oil monopoly), Yacimientos Carboniferos (Coal Deposits), 
Gas del Estado (state gas monopoly), CADE (Argentine Electric Company),
SEGBA (Buenos Aires General Electric Society), and the Institute National 
de Reaseguros (National Insurance Institute). There was also the creation 
and development of new state organisms and entities related to the 
housing problem and to the new monetary measures adopted by the govern­
ment. But perhaps the greatest changes were instituted within the state 
ports and railroads.
YPF. Yacimientos Carboniferos. Gas del Estado; CADE, and SEGBA. 
Related to the over-all government energy policy of improving productivity 
in energy products and of attaining self-sufficiency in petroleum pro­
duction in 1969, were the contemplated measures of reorganizing the state
e
enterprises, such as YPF, Yacimientos Carboniferos, Gas del Estado, CADE, 
and SEGBA. It was planned to unify all these organisms under the same
g
Norberto C. Ferrer et. al.. Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 
Co-participacion provincial en impuestos nationales (Buenos Aires:
Edition UcFi, 1965), pp. 225-226, 236.
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statutes, "leaving out only.the distinctive characteristics of each 
enterprise." The reorganization of state businesses would have in 
view a progressive increase in productivity through eliminating much
9of the inefficiency and duplication of jobs in these state organisms.
Meanwhile careful studies were being made as to the supply of
and demand for the different energy products in order to begin certain
planned projects. As a stimulus to increased petroleum production, the
first planned measure was to reform the national laws to facilitate the
participation of private capital and to encourage the construction of
10refineries and exploration for petroleum by private companies. With 
respect to CADE and SEGBA operations, it was hoped to complete first 
the hydroelectric project Salto Grande and then the projects of El 
Chocon-Cerros Colorados. The former would be accelerated in order to 
interconnect the electrical systems of Argentina and Uruguay.
INDER. Besides the projected changes in the antecedent fields. 
Dr. Salimei, economics minister, proposed also "smoothly and simply the 
elimination of INDER (National Insurance Institute)." INDER was founded 
in 1953 as a state enterprise "to prevent the excessive drain of
9Cronica (Rosario), October 18, 1966, p. 1.
^*^Ibid. ; Ricardo G. Hileman, "Sesenta dias de petroleo," Correo 
de la Tarde. VIII (September 21, 1966), p. 23; "Petroleo, YPF espera 
la ley," Confirmado. II (December 8, 1966), p. 31; "jCiudado con el 
petroleo!" Azul v Blanco. I (November 10, 1966), p. 11; Eduardo Conesa, 
"El petroleo," Confirmado. II (September 20, 1966), p. 64; "Eco al 
interrogante: ique pasa con YPF?" Correo de la Tarde. VIII (September
28, 1966), p. 15.
^^"Energia: a la caza de creditor," Primera Plana. IV (Sept­
ember 20, 1966), p. 61; "iChocon o Salto Grande?" Primera Plana. IV 
(October 18, 1966), pp. 58-60, details the ramifications of both pro­
jects, including the international parties involved; "&Ya puede comenzar 
la revolucion?" Confirmado. II (October 27, 1966), pp. 18-19.
ff
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reinsurance abroad and to strengthen the local insurance market. .
12But, according to many experts INDER has not fulfilled its objectives.
The housing problem. While one state enterprise (INDER) was
threatened with elimination, existing social needs inspired the creation
of the Ministerio de Bienestar Social (Ministry of Social Welfare) under
which was organized the Secretarîa de Vivienda (Secretariat of Housing)
and the transformation of yet another organization, the Banco Hipotecario
Nacional (National Mortgage Bank), to be the principal instrument in
carrying out the new government housing program. Also, the national
government gave special support to the Caja Federal de Ahorro y Prestamo
para la Vivienda (Federal Savings and Loan Bank for Housing) in its task
13of providing public funds for housing construction.
Monetary organisms and mechanisms. It was predicted that govern­
ment financial and economic policies would have profound effect upon 
the monetary organisms and mechanisms of the s t a t e . A n d  such was the 
case, for there were key officials in the state monetary organisms who 
strongly opposed the devaluation of the peso and other government policies. 
Their opposition to official policy resulted in their resignations. Be­
sides the resignations, the new policy forced Argentine authorities to
^^"iQue hacer con.el INDER?" Confirmado. II (November 17, 1966), 
pp. 30-31. ■ For a slanted defense of INDER, see "El Institute Nacional 
de Reaseguros: una ejemplar empresa del estado," Azul y BlancO. I
(November 10, 1966), p. 6; "Atentado en marcha: la privatizaciôn del
reaseguro," La Vanguardia. November 16, 1966, pp. 2, 4.
13"Con inflaciôn no habrâ viviendas," Anâlisis. VI (October 31, 
1966), pp. 56-60; Cronica (Rosario), October 10, 1966, p." 1; La Prensa 
January 17, 1967, p. 1; "Caminos y viviendas," Primera Plana. IV (Sept­
ember 27, 1966), p. 59; "Creditor para viviendas portenas," Anâlisis.
VI (October 3, 1966), p. 21.
14Clarin. October. 29, 1966, p. 11.
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make overtures to international monetary organisms in an effort to 
obtain loans and other funds that would help offset the initial mone^ 
tary losses caused by freeing the peso.^^
The port problem. Another problem which received the attention 
of the national government was over one aspect of the port situation, 
viz., to determine each port’s volume of shipping and level of moderni­
zation and development. Thexssue involved was whether the port 
interests and authorities outside of Buenos Aires would obtain greater 
national rights and advantages for their ports in terms of Buenos Aires 
port i n t e r e s t s . T h e  national government partly resolved this problem
by investing a sum of one billion pesos for improvements in all port
17facilities and by enacting a 24-hour shipping operation.
15See La Nacion. November 8, 1966, p. 1; La Razon. November 8, 
1966, p. 1; La Prensa, November 9, 1966, p. 1; "Los fantasmas del Banco 
Central," Primera.Plana. IV (November 14, 1966), pp. 13-14.
16por example, it is well known that the port of Rosario was 
severly affected and artifically restricted by the passage of Law 3,885 
which prohibited the port from exceeding a shipping volume of 2,500,000 
tons, particularly in view of the fact that just prior to that time the 
port was handling a volume surpassing 6,000,000 tons. The never realized 
canal of Emilio Mitre, the completion of which would have given Rosario 
the greater advantage in modern shipping, left the port unable to receive 
the larger cargo ships. Thus, Buenos Aires port, which covers 5,143,426 
surface hectares, or 27.6 per cent of the total portage of Argentina, 
handles 64.5 per cent of all shipping; whereas the port of Rosario 
covering 4,356,476 hectares or 23.8 per cent of national portage, accounts 
for but 6.7 per cent of the total shipping by Argentine portage. See 
"Puerto Rosario: puerto de hoy," Puertos Argentinos. VII (Nov. 15,
1963), pp. 20-25; Clarin. June 18, 1966, p. 9.
17Clarin. November 29, 1966, p. 18. For a criticism of nation­
alist orientation on government port policy, see "La reforma aduanera," 
Azul V Blanco. I (November 10, 1966), p. 11.
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The railroad problem. The state-owned and state-operated rail­
roads came under the greatest criticism of all state enterprises. Both
railroad officials and workers were charged with gross inefficiency by
18the most divergent sources. In sum, the railroad problem not only
represents a major point of economic policy for the national authorities
but also a major point of conflict in the struggle for power and wealth
19among the different interests.
Power and Political Participation
The struggle on behalf of national, provincial, and municipal
power holders to achieve ever greater power and political participation
20is historically well established. To understand more fully the present 
struggle among the governments ruling within the "urban Litoral," it 
would be appropriate to review briefly the historical precedents of the 
actual conflict of power interests between Buenos Aires and the provinces.
^®For example,"El desastre ferroviario," Azul v Blanco. I (Nov­
ember 10, 1966), pp. 8-9; Orlando Merchini, "Politica ferroviaria," Pro- 
positos. XV (November 17, 1966), p. 2; "Ferroviarios." Politica Obrera.
No. 8, (November 21, 1966), pp. 5-6; "Rail Plan; Government Will Hear 
Union Views," Buenos Aires Herald. September 25, 1966, p. 10; Lozada, 
op. cit., pp. 438-440; Juan Manuel Santa Cruz, Ferrocarriles argentines 
("Cuaderno del Institute de Derecho Publico y Ciencias Sociales";
Rosario, Argentina: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966), pp. 45-60;
"iEncrucijada: los ferrocarriles?" Imagen del Pais. I (September ./last
halfZ, 1966), pp. 14-17; Portnoy, op. cit.. p. 143; A. E. Suhr-Horeis,
La Argentina: pais en retroceso (Buenos Aires: Distribuidora S.R.L.
"Tres Americas," 1965), pp. 155-168.
^^See, "La batalla del riel," Primera Plana. V (December 6,
1966), pp. 12-16, for an excellent narrative of the economic and power 
struggle over the railroads.
See Bartolomé Fiorini, "Federalismo y decentralizacion admin- 
istrativa; democracia y servicios publicos," Revista del Instituto de 




It is in the heritage of two conflicting "isms," federalism and 
centralism, that the past and present struggle between Buenos Aires and 
the provinces resides.
Federalism. It is incorrect to assume that Argentine federalism, 
or its antithesis, centralism, has its origin in the colonial laws, royal 
decrees, and new-world governing systems of the Spanish Empire. The 
fact is that a number of antecedent factors (racial conditioning, the 
geographical environment, social and religious concerns, economic struggles, 
and political doctrines) converged to lay the foundation for a federalist 
mentality in Argentina.^2 This is borne out by the fact that Argentina 
is theoretically a federalist nation. Throughout the national period of 
Argentina there has existed a modest proclivity toward federalism. While 
it has not always been in force, federalism is the adopted form of 
government, as stated in the Federal Pact of 1831 and renewed in the 1852 
Agreement of San Nicolas and in the Constitution of 1853.
The immediate causes that influenced the Argentine nation to 
adopt federalism in the first place are named by law professor Juan 
Carlos Pereira Pinto: "regional isolation, necessity of defending local
economies from the power of the commercial oligarchy of the Buenos Aires
port, and the opposition of men of the provinces, with popular support,
23to Buenos Aires absolutism and centralism." Thus it is in provincial 
21Lazarte. op. cit.. p. 139; Lambert, op. cit.. pp. 209, 214-215.
Ricardo Zorraquin Becü, El federalismo argentino (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Perrot, 1958), p. 14.
23Cited in Lozada. op. cit.. p. 108.
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opposition to Buenos Aires centralism and dominance that Argentine 
federalism takes its roots and. tries to develop.
Centralism. Centralism in the "urban Litoral" is more a reality 
than it is a theory or tradition. While federalism represents a movement 
of opposition and struggle on the part of the provinces against the 
larger interests situated in Buenos Aires, centralism denotes a real 
life situation or state of affairs in which most of Argentina’s eco-
25nomic and political activity is concentrated in and around Buenos Aires.
The dominance of Buenos Aires in Argentina can be traced back
to the struggle between unitarios and federales in the 1820*s, the 1830's,
and throughout the era of Juan Manuel Rosas (1829-1832, 1835-1852).
The unitarios were determined to unite the country a palos (by force)
and to make Buenos Aires the economic and political nerve center of
Argentina. In contrast, the federales wanted decentralized authority
26and full provincial autonomy. Lazarte notes that although the unitary
and federal parties seemingly disappeared after the fall of Rosas and
upon subsequent unification of the nation, "they were nonetheless alive
in substance, form, policy, and belief." The later autonomistes were
nothing more than the federales renamed and the nacionalistas were
unitarios. The politics of general Julio A. Roca followed the linea
unitaria (unitary line) and in 1890 "appeared the federalism so bril-
27liantly championed by Leandro Alem."
^^Julio Mafud, El desarraigo argentino (Buenos Aires; Editorial 
Americalee, S.R.L., 1966 edition), pp. 147-148.
25Zorraquin Becû, op. cit.. pp. 23, 35-40.
26Ernesto Quesada, La epoca de Rosas (Buenos Aires: Ediciones
del Restaurador, 1950), pp. 53-57, 114-120, 125-135.
27Lazarte, op, cit.. pp. 149-150.
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A new federalism. The.political and economic dominance that 
Buenos Aires exercises over the pTovinces reflects an ineffective 
federal system. In the past the federal government acted without 
regard to an over-all program of meeting the economic and social needs 
of the provinces within a larger framework of national integration
noand development. But now, under the increasing pressure of some of 
29the provinces and the recognition of the national authorities that 
all Argentina must be integrated and equally developed, there is a new
OQkind of federalism emerging. This new federalism stresses.provincial 
and regional development, providing national support in resolving local 
problems. Under this new federalism, Buenos Aires is no longer to be 
accorded special concessions and treatment. Its interests are to be 
looked after along with and not above the interests of the provinces.
Political Implications of the Struggle
Notably, the political and economic power holders in Argentina 
are not one and the same. The center of political power, held by the
Simposio sobre federalismo y centralisme: las provincias en 
discusion." Analisis. VI (October 3, 1966), p. 19.
^^Two examples: "Chubut quiere ser argentine," Correo de la
Tarde. VIII (November 1, 1966), pp. 14-15; "El gobernador de Tucumân 
habla al pais," Panorama. No. 34 (March, 1966), pp. 27-30.
The base of a new federalism which will place special emphasis 
on the problems of the interior of Argentina was. discussed at the Con­
ference of Governors. One aspect of the development of the interior 
is the initiation of a number of public works under an over-all plan 
for national development. Secretary of Government Mario Diaz Colod­
rero has said: "Let us strive so that our interior, which up until now 
has been an enormous and empty extension of our port center, be trans­
formed into the vehicle for the vigorous rise of Argentina in the Latin 
American world . . .  ; the internal equilibrium of the country will be 
achieved to the degree that we put into real and not formal equality
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the national authorities, is only influenced but not controlled by the 
economic interests. This separation of the economic from the political 
powers seems to imply the existence of a more decentralized government 
policy that favors the provinces and municipalities. Thus, while the 
large economic interests wield the most political influence of all 
political groups and while the political action taken by the federal 
government appears to favor these large economic interests, still this 
economic-interest orientation of the political leaders is broadly based 
and directed at the needs of the provinces in harmony with those of the 
entire nation.
As a consequence of this new economic and political orientation 
of the national government, the provinces are being made the objects and 
recipients of the new policy. Since it is widely recognized that the 
national, provincial, and municipal governments are overstaffed and have 
large and inefficient bureaucracies,the new policies, which aim at 
the elimination of redundant employment and reorganization of any in­
efficient administration, directly threaten the economic position and 
power status of the affected bureaucracies.
Finally, of particular political significance is the economic
and political revolution taking place in Santa Fe province and in other 
32key provinces. Despite having been stagnated economically since the
our great historical regions with the metropolitan zone of the port."
See "Un nuevo federalismo," Confirmado. II (November 17, 1966), pp. 24-25.
q 1Hillyer Schurjin, Burocracia: la maquina remolona," Panorama,
no. 41 (October, 1966), pp. 36-42; A. Quintana, "Burocracia, lastre 
nacional," Esquiu. (November 20, 1966), p. 15.
32For example, in the Cuyo provinces of San Juan, San Luis, and 
Mendoza; in Cordoba, La Rioja, and Santiago del Estero; in the north­
eastern provinces of Catamarca, Jujuy, Tucuman, and Salta; in the north
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1930’s, Santa Fe province and,to a lesser extent. Entre Rios province, 
are moving toward the "take-off" stage in the process of economic.deve­
lopment and toward a resurgence of political power. The completion of 
the underground tunnel between Santa Fe and Parana cities, the connection 
of the tunnel with the new highway between Santa Fe and Rosario, the 
realization of the contemplated hydro-electric plant at the Salto Grande 
site, the renovation of the ports of Rosario and Santa Fe— all these 
developments point toward a'greater exploitation not only of northern San­
ta Fe province but of the other Litoral and upper provinces, not to 
mention the southern portions of Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay.
western provinces of Misiones, Chaco, Formosa, and Corrientes; in the 
Comahue region, taking in the provinces of La Pampa, Rio Negro, and 




It will be the purpose of this chapter to discuss alienation and 
participation in Argentine society. In the first part of the chapter, 
the disaffected sectors of urban life will be identified, as well as the 
themes or content of their disaffection. The second part of the chapter 
will report on the results of the tests conducted by the researcher to 
measure political alienation, anomie, social participation, and socio­
economic status among selected subjects. These measurements should 
reflect the capacity and inclination of the different socioeconomic 
groups to act politically and to effect sociopolitical change.
Disaffection in Argentina
It is the contention of this study that nearly all the sectors 
of national life are politically disaffected in lesser or greater degrees. 
The most intensely disaffected sectors are the middle class, the inde­
pendent working class, the extremist groups in the universities, and the 
labor organizations. Less disaffected sectors are the armed forces, the 
estancieros or landowners, the industrialists and financiers, the Roman 
Catholic Church, and the deposed political groups. The themes of the 
disaffection felt by these sectors are manifested in various aspects of 
social, economic, and political life.
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The Disaffected Sectors in Urban Life 
The following comments respecting each of the just named 
disaffected sectors are meant as a clarification and more precise 
identification of these sectors. They have been identified as being 
disaffected or alienated sectors by their own expressions and by the 
opinions expressed by other sources concerning them.
The Middle Class
The middle class, whose status and wealth are closely related
to the status and prosperity of the upper class, has been in progressive
decline since 1947. This group has been more affected economically
than the lower class by inflation and the rising cost of living. More
than the upper class, which can isolate itself socially from the lower-
class masses and "undesirables," the middle class— which per force has
to deal with lower-class persons but which aspires to chiefly upper-
1class customs and values— shows signs of being disaffected.
^The middle-class workers have to use public transportation and 
hence are exposed to the cabecitas negras (literally "little dark heads," 
referring to persons of more humble economic and social background, 
usually of Indian origin and from the more isolated rural regions of 
the country), having to rub shoulders with and brush against these 
economically and socially inferior persons. The middle^class workers 
go to their favorite bars and restaurants and are often unable to enjoy 
their food because there is a group of these cabecitas negras seated at 
the next table, boisteriously getting drunk. The lower class persons 
often file into public offices, where the middle class public adminis­
trators are working, to register their complaints and to have their needs 
met by free government services. Thus, the administrator or middle class 
employe is doubly alienated, by his reduced economic position on the one 
hand and by the increasing social power of working-class masses, en­
croaching on his sophisticated conceptions and aspirations, on the other 
hand.
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And while the lower-class workers are disaffected against the
national political system and the economic, social, and political forces
that are farther up the socio-politico-economic scale, very often lower-
class members will take out their disaffection and disappointments upon
2the innocent middle-class employes with whom they deal.
In contrast, there are other middle class elements that have 
come to identify with labor or the working classes, being members of 
the same unions and participating in many of the same working federations.
3Their alienation is directed upward, not downward.
The Independent Working Class
The independent urban day laborers represent yet another signifi­
cant segment of alienated opinion. Unlike organized labor, their dis­
affection is less specific and more generally directed against life 
rather than against particular labor policies. But like organized 
laborers, and sometimes more so, the independent workers come in contact 
with undesirable working conditions and see the need for change and re­
form.
University Extremist Groups
Student groups became disaffected or alienated when the new 
government tried to reorganize the universities with less student autonomy
%For example, a retired worker, Daniel Kouht, 66 years of age, 
shot and killed Alba Luz Minos, a female employe of the Caja de Jubila- 
ciones Rurales (bank for dispersing rural retirement checks) on February 
10, 1965. He shot her five times, in which all the pent-up wrath that 
he felt toward the national pension system was vehemently discharged 
upon an innocent worker. He had been trying unsuccessfully to complete 
the required procedures to receive retirement payments for more than four 
years. See "Los jubilados de pantalon corto," Extra, op. cit.. p. 43.
^The middle class labor leaders and students who support the
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and greater executive control in late July of 1966. Reacting to the 
government threat, university students gave vent to their inner aliena­
tion, which action provoked government intervention and a series of 
student protests, both of which resulted in a disruption of school 
work that could not be recouped and in a permanent schism between the 
government and students. The extremist groups in the universities 
generally espoused extreme nationalistic views and the cause of the 
worker and played down, except in the case of their own autonomy within 
the university, the plight of the higher socioeconomic classes from 
whence many of them had come.
The Labor Organizations
While all labor generally was alienated from government measures 
during September through December of 1966, the "62 standing organizations" 
of the CGT were more disaffected and more militant in pressuring for 
change than was the Central Committee of the CGT. These organizations 
made pronouncements of censure against the government when the CGT was 
yet reluctant to act. It was this labor element and more specifically 
the dockworkers union, SUPA, which carried out the first major strike
cause of the working class fit into this group, which is characterized 
by its intense hatred for upper-class values.
^In viewing the extreme rightist groups of Tacaura and the 
Guardia Restauradora Nacionalista operating within universities, it 
is noteworthy how the socioeconomic composition of the participants 
has changed. Tacaura in its beginning consisted of exclusively upper 
class students pressuring for free teaching in the universities under 
the directorship of the clergy. With the free-teaching campaign ended 
and many participants leaving to form an entirely rightist organization, 
the GRN, Tacaura received new recruits from the middle and lower classes, 
which have broadened not only itc philosophy but its alienation and 
resentment as well. See Juan Jose Sebreli, Buenos Aires, vida cotidiana 
V alienacion (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Siglo Veinte, 1966), pp. 108-109.
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against the revolutionary government on November 9, 1966, and was 
backed internationally in its position.^
The Armed Forces
The actual imperious role exercised by the armed forces in Argen­
tine politics and government is not without its precedents.^ Many times 
the military has been urged to take action by the civilian elements 
which desire a change of government. The armed forces quite often, then, 
act not only because they may feel displeased themselves and want a 
change of government but because other sectors have urged or importuned 
them to take action. Too, the disaffection of the military need not be 
as acute as in other segments of national life, for the armed forces will 
take action not because they have been greatly alienated or have become 
dissatisfied, but because they are the only organism with sufficient 
organization, discipline, and power to effect a change of government.
^"iPuede el Présidente ser enganado?" Confirmado. II (October 27, 
1966), pp. 21-24; "CGT: iguerra o paz con el gobierno?" Primera Plana.
loc. cit. See the discussion in Chapter X, "The Responding Political 
System," pages 257-282.
^Among these precedents are: the professional organization and
acquisition of respect by the armed forces, their purchase of excessive 
armaments and supplies that surpassed concrete needs, the isolation of 
the armed forces from government at the time universal suffrage was de­
creed and the fact that the government never did incorporate the military 
into nor indoctrinate the armed forces sufficiently concerning democracy, 
the acquisition of numbers of armed force personnel that exceeded the 
numbers needed for defense purposes, the assignment of many extra-military 
tasks to the armed forces, the organization of the armed forces into an 
effective pressure group, the fact that as a pressure group it was never 
challenged nor halted, the notable unity and organization which gave the 
armed forces the advantage of being able to act as one solid force in a 
moment of crisis without facing any significant opposition, the strict 
obedience with which lower-rank personnel carried out the orders of their 
commanding officers, and the fact that the armed forces never confronted 
any negative popular reaction. See Dario Canton, "Notas sobre las 
Fuerzas Armadas argentinas," Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologla. I
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The Estancieros or Landowners
As an alienated sector, the estancieros or landowners have 
sufficient reason for feeling disillusioned and for being disaffected; 
their once predominant and sacrosanct position in the nineteenth 
century economic social order has all but disappeared in this century. 
Their first major loss of power and prestige took place with the advent 
of Yrigoyenism.^ They next had to make sacrifices of their genealogical
purity by accepting marriages of convenience with industrialists and
O
"new" rich. But these preliminary losses and sacrifices were as nothing
when compared to the devastating frontal attack which peronism made on
9the landed oligarchy.
The Industrialists and Financiers
Although the gradual deterioration of the economic position of 
the landowning class and the mutual fear of both the agricultural and 
industrial aristocrats caused the former to unite with the latter, both 
are yet antagonistic toward one a n o t h e r . T h i s  antagonism, however,
(November, 1965), pp. 308-312; Gino Germani and Kalman H. Silvert, 
"Estructura social e intervencion militar en America Latina," Argentina, 
sociedad de masas. op. cit.. pp. 228-248.
^Puiggros, El yrigoyenismo. op. cit., chapters VI and VII.
®Sebreli, op. cit.. pp. 64-66, describes the social process in 
which the old landed aristocracy exchanges the prestige of its name for 
the money of the new industrial class by entering into "marriages of 
convenience."
®Julio Irazusta, Peron v la crisis argentina (Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Huemel, S.A., 1966 edition), entire book; Rodolfo Puiggros,
El peronismo. Vol. V: Historia critics de los partidos politicos (Buenos
Aires: Jorge Alvarez Editor, 1965 edition).
^^Sebreli, op. cit.. pp. 65-66. The fall of Frondizi (supported 
by the landowners and U.S. business interests) and the later struggle
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is "schizophrenic." The liberal and more revolutionary elements in 
both classes get along quite well with one another, whereas the more 
conservative landowning aristocrats refuse to associate with the indus­
trialists and the ultra-nationalistic industrialists refuse to associate 
with the old-line landowning elements that are aligned with foreign 
interests.
The Church
In September of 1966, for the first time since 1954, an irremedial 
break began to loom between Church and State. Theoretically, the Church 
favors social and economic revolution, but there is no little fear by the 
Church that the Revolution will fail to achieve any lasting changes and 
that it may falter a l t o g e t h e r . T h u s ,  the Church was alienated somewhat 
from the State, not over any anticlerical policy on the part of the 
government but over the antithetical situation: too much pro-clericalism
by the authorities and hence too much identity of the Church with the 
regime.
The Deposed Political Groups
It seems logical to presume that the politicians who have been 
ordered to cease all future political activity and who have had their 
properties and other possessions confiscated will tend to be rather
between the colorados and the azules in the armed forces in September of 
1962 and April of 1963 revealed the degree to which these factions con­
tinue to be antagonistic toward one another.
l^The goverament intervention in the universities and its moral­
ity campaign against pornographic literature were closely identified with 
the influence of the Catholic Church on government, much to the dismay of 
church leaders. The Argentine Catholic hierarchy did not want to risk 
being identified too closely with the military government, particularly 
if the government should fall. Such an occurrence would tend to discredit 
the Church, it was felt.
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alienated from the forces that brought this suppression and persecution 
12upon them. By the same analysis, it is not unlikely that other poli­
tical groups of weaker status are more pleased over the governmental 
attack on the stronger political groups than unhappy over the government 
circumscription of political freedom. This latter point, of course, is 
conjectural and no evidence has yet been found to support it.
The Themes of Urban Alienation
Now that the various disaffected sectors of national life have 
been described briefly, it is desirable to undertake a more definitive 
analysis of alienation by examining its different themes, as manifested 
in social, economic, and political life.
Alienation and Society
The themes of alienation in society are more starkly revealed and 
more easily discussed inside the framework of social contacts and social 
services.
Social Contacts
The upper class. First, a dislike for all industrial activity 
which is carried on at the expense of agricultural development is held 
by the land-owning class. Second, the native landowners, particularly, 
demonstrate alienation from the Italian and Spanish immigrants who have 
become their competitors. Third, this same landowning class is alienated 
from its own social decor, etiquette, mores, and customs. The tension of
^2"E1 martes de ceniza," Primera Plana. V (November 22, 1966), 
pp. 19-21.
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playing "the social game," of keeping up with appearances and complying
with onerous and tedious social obligations, etc., produces an emptiness
and negativeness that alienates no few members of the aristocracy from
13the social behavior required by their own class.
The middle class. Members of the middle class, according to the 
test results that will be presented later on in this chapter, reflect a 
notable ambivalence toward life; optimistic and non-alienated on the one 
hand and pessimistic and alienated on the other hand. They are alienated 
more significantly from the occupational role which they are required to 
play, as the buffer between the public and the higher authorities which 
they represent. They are subjected to abuses from both sides and are 
forced to suppress any feelings they may have of rebellion or violence. 
Next, evidence exists, through case studies and analyses of expressive 
forms, e.g.. the lyrics to tango songs, that many middle-class men are 
alienated as a result of not having satisfactory relationships in love 
and sex.^^ The same disillusionment in love and sex is shared by many
i^Sebreli, op. cit., pp. 26, 43, 57-59.
^^The common theme of many tango verses is the man who is sacri­
ficed to and crucified by the perfidity of the Argentine woman who has 
deceived him. The lyrics of Discepolo show an absolute disequality 
between man and woman, notes Julio Mafud— the innocent man (like the 
unblemished lamb), in a permanent childlike state, is defrauded and im­
poverished in ironic mockery of the adulterous "woman of the world" 
who knows and controls all the rules of the game of love. The following 
verse illustrates not only this just-described phenomenon but also the 
incapacity of the bewitched man to save himself and the inevitability 
of his perdition: "For vos a mi mujer la vida he destrozao, y es pan
de mis dos hijos todo el lujo que te he dao. No puedo reaccioner ni 
puedo comprender, perdido en la tormenta de tu voz que me embrujo..., 
la seda de tu piel que me estremece, y al latir florece con mi perdicion." 
Julio Mafud, Sociologia del tango (Buenos Aires: Editorial Americalee,
1966), pp. 73-75, and translated: "Because of you, my woman, I have
made a ruin of my life; and the luxury you enjoy represents food of
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middle-class individuals in their experiences and interpretation of 
life in general.
The working class. Related to the scarcity of housing, the rise 
of rent payments, speculation in housing, and the crowding of renters 
into inadequate quarters, the alienation of the working class is pro­
nounced. Not only are living conditions the source of alienation but 
working conditions as well. The workers are alienated from the noise 
of factory machines, the crowdedness of the buses and trains to and 
from their work, the oppressiveness of foremen and others who compel 
them to work long and hard, etc. They find little social prestige and 
satisfaction from the State, as they did in the era of Peron.^^ In 
fact, the actual State and the armed forces alienate the workers more 
than ever by their repeated attacks on Peron and the peronist movement.
which I ’ve deprived my two children. I can’t respond, I can’t think, 
lost in the tempest of your bewitching voice...this silk of your skin 
against which I tremble, and upon contact it blooms, along with my 
perdition."
the folkloric composition, "Milonga para mi perro," by
H. Guarany, one verse says: "Pero la vida es triste, si no la vivimos
con una ilusiôn." (Translated: "But life is sad unbearable? un­
less we live it with an illusion." The message of this passage conveys 
rather well another Argentine peculiarity, viz.. to substitute unreal 
but more pleasant images for the more realistic ones. Such idea con­
sists of two interpretations: a sophist view of life and a moral
necessity to rationalize its purposeful distortion in order to endure 
its harsh realities. The anomic character of Argentine existence is 
lamented in the tangos. In the cosmos of his existence the Argentine 
has no other possibility than to orbit in space with neither hope nor 
expectation. "Everything in the world has turned sterile through 
constant and repeated failure." It is a hopeless and normless en­
vironment: "Never expect any help, nor a hand to be lent, nor a favor."
Mafud, ibid.. p. 68.
^^Sebreli, op. cit.. pp. 151, 166-169, 176, 183.
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Social Services
Dissatisfaction is manifested generally by all classes over the 
lack of inefficiency of social services: transportation, housing, health
and facilities, essèntial services, and the general administrative 
handling of civil procedures. Indeed, the satisfying of individual, 
group, and societal demands for more and improved social services presents 
a formidable challenge.
Alienation and the Economy
There are five general economic themes around which most ex­
pressions and foirms of alienation revolve. These are: rising prices
and the cost of living, stagnation of production and foreign commerce, 
the encroachment of foreign economic interests, the concentration on 
agriculture, the financial deficiencies of the government in the deficit 
operation of some enterprises, and the niggardly redistribution of fed­
eral funds.
Prices and the Cost of Living
The Argentines contacted in this study were most overtly alienated
from high prices and increasing living costs. In most of these, the
government was blamed for allowing such undesirable occurrences to take 
18place. It was noteworthy, however, that in a few cases did the alienation
^^For a description of the social-service problems confronting 
Buenos Aires intendant Eugenio F. Schettini, see "La era de los munici- 
pios," Siete Dias, loc. cit. and "La nueva Buenos Aires," Confirmado.
II (September 29, 1966), pp. 32-38.
IQ The researcher explored in some depth the opinions of one 
Buenos Aires resident who expressed intense disdain for national life.
He told the researcher: "Life is bad these days. Who knows where all
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of atvy one person result in any action whatever, either negative or 
positive. The prices on food staples (particularly on milk and bread) 
were raised substantially during latter 1966. But perhaps more exasp­
erating to consumers than the fact that prices were rising was the fact
19that not all retailers charge the same prices.
Cost of living and price indicies. Using 1960 as the index 
base, it can be seen in Table 20 that the cost of living, as respects 
its general level, clothing and food costs, general expenses, cleaning 
articles and lodging, has more than tripled in the past six years.
The table shows that there has been even a substantial increase in 
comparing the first ten months of 1966 with the same period of 1965. 
Individually, most prices seem to have doubled since 1964; newspapers 
and magazines prices have more than doubled, as have transportation 
fares, while rent has more than tripled and electricity more than doubled 
since 1964.
Stagnation of Production
The stagnation of the industrial and agricultural production and 
foreign commerce of Argentina is an economic reality to which a number
this will lead? Whereas before it was rob and let live, now it’s rob 
and let die. Before, we could always at least get by. Our politicians 
and civil servants lined their pockets but they never interfered with 
the common man. They left us alone. Now it’s impossible. The govern­
ment has seen to that! I ’m a poor man, but I own some beat-up old cars. 
Now I’ve got to pay an exorbitant tax on them...."
l^The researcher witnessed and was told by consumers that food 
prices would vary in price as much as 100 per cent from one seller to 
the next, as would the prices on clothing and most other consumer goods.
Z^Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Secretaria de 
Estado de Hacienda, Costo de vida, precios minoristas. salaries indus­
triales. op. cit., pp. 9, 12-25.
166
of other problems are related, all of which cause no little alienation 
in the producing sectors of the economy.
TABLE 20
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE COST OF LIVING INDICIES FOR 
THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF 1966 WITH THE AVERAGE 
OF THE SAME PERIOD OF 1965*
Average of First Ten Months
Variations
1966 1965 in per cent
Index base: 1960 - 100
General Level 364.1 274.3 32.7%
Groceries 346.5 273.9 26.5
Clothing 378.7 281.7 34.4
General expenses 419.5 301.9 39.0
Cleaning articles 342.9 273.4 25.4
Rent 388.5 183.5 111.7
*Source: Direccion Nacional de Estadistica y Censos, Secretaria
de Estado de Hacienda, Costo de vida, precious minoristas. salarios in­
dustriales. informe S.E. 45 (October, 1966), p. 9.
Agricultural stagnation. Disaffection because of low producti­
vity is quite evident in the agricultural sector. One leading spokesman 
for the Sociedad Rural, Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio, complains that the dif­
ferent sectors of the Argentine economy have been struggling to gain
personal advantage and forgetting the general interest and that an in-
21creased agricultural production would be in the general interest. 
Economist Gustavo Adolfo Nores observes that the rural population has 
recently decreased by 4 per cent and calls for an increased agricultural
21Raggio, loc. cit.
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production to satisfy a greater internal consumption and to obtain a
greater quantity of foreign exchange with which to purchase more capital 
22equipment.
Industrial stagnation. Disaffection over industrial stagnation
assumes two different forms, depending on the set of causes to which
such stagnation can be attributed. Both workers and entrepreneurs are
displeased with the declining per-capita production in industry, but
they each disagree as to the causes. To the worker, or anyone else of
similar orientation, the problem is caused and aggravated by a presumed
hegemony of the landed oligarchy, whose latifundio reduces the internal
market for native industry, and by becoming economically dependent on
"imperialist" countries, such as "greater subjection to the United States 
23since 1958." Thus, the solution to the current industrial crisis, so 
far as this group is concerned, lies in doing away with the old economic 
structure, implementing agrarian reforms, and eradicating foreign interests 
from participation in the native economy.
2%Nores, op. cit.. pp. 100-111, 119-120.
23Accordingly, those who push for eliminating foreign ownerships 
within the national economy argue that foreign control is anti-national 
and seeks to keep the native industry of the country from growing beyond 
the light-industry stage of development. Thus, foreign-based companies 
can sell not only heavy-industry goods but all the machinery and raw 
materials needed by the light industries of the country. Furthermore, 
once foreign capital is invested in some branch of industry it will 
never be content with a status quo but will continue to expand and deve­
lop, exerting increasing pressure on domestic producers to fall in line 
with its policies. A more detailed development of these and other 
points can be found in Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 147-149.
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In contrast to the nationalist-brand of disaffection is that 
disaffection expressed by entrepreneurs and manufacturing interests who 
condemn what they call "false nationalism" and urge even greater domestic 
expansion of industry through foreign investment and participation. To 
them the problem is one of insufficient capital, technology (in some 
areas), and capital equipment, which could be supplied by foreign invest­
ment. The disaffection of this sector is expressed by denunciations of 
"false nationalists" and any repressive activity (such as demands for 
wage increases, strikes, violence, and on the job sabotage) that may 
threaten national development.^^
Commercial and trade staanation. The export and shipping sector 
of the Argentine economy, particularly, expresses its consternation over 
the many physical and legal obstacles to expanding its volume of business
and trade. It is noted that Argentine ports are among the most expensive 
25in the world. Not only are local shipping and commercial interests
disaffected but also the foreign trade interests which do business in
26Argentina.
^^Rogelio Frigerio, "Politica economica y social," Introduccion 
a los problemas nacionales (Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Nationales,
1965), pp. 94-95, 98; La Razon. December 13, 1966, p. 1, statement by 
ACIEL: "Fensamiento de la Federation Gremial acerca del problema
ferroviario," Revista de la Federation Gremial del Comercio e Industria. 
XXXVII (January-February, 1966), pp. 5-6.
^^Presidential address, November 7, 1966; Buenos Aires Herald. 
December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9.
Z^The Argentine companies which ship to foreign buyers complain 
of the indignation of their clients upon learning that they have to pay 
a tax on the sales of their purchases made in Argentina. See "Rosario 
y la zona de libre comercio," Zona. I (June, 1965), p. 8.
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Foreign Economic Interests
Argentine history has been replete with examples which illustrate
27the more undesirable aspects of economic imperialism. Such unpleasant
history of foreign economic dealings has conditioned many Argentines to
resent any foreign intrusion into the national economy. Even Peron could
28not violate successfully the "sacred cow" of economic independence.
The opposition that eventually overthrew Arturo Frondizi was motivated
29by the foreign oil contracts made by the Frondizi government. Whether 
these two preceding assertions by North American writers are correct or 
not, the fact is that any participation of foreign interests, public as
27Among the more outstanding ones were: the bitter rivalry among
the British, Dutch, Portuguese traders during the colonial period and 
later into the national period, who often drove hard bargains with the 
Argentine merchants; the British invasions of 1806 and 1807, in which 
local residents rose up and defeated superior British forces without any 
aid from Spain; the French blockade of Buenos Aires, 1838-1840, and the 
combined British-French blockade, 1845-1849; the unwilling involvement 
in the War of the Triple Alliance, 1865-1870, with Argentina, Brazil, 
and Uruguay aligned against Paraguay; the intrigues and low-calibre re­
presentation of foreign diplomats, particularly from the United States; 
the century-long dispute over the Falkland Islands by British and Argen­
tine forces, possession of which changed hands various times. See Mario 
Rodriguez, "The Genesis of Economic Attitudes in the Rio de la Plata," 
Hispanic American Historical Review. XXXVI (May, 1956), pp. 171-189;
Mario Telser, "Rosas y Sarmiento contra la agresion yankee," Politica 
Internacional. No. 81 (November, 1966), pp. 17-19; John F. Cady, Foreign 
Intervention in the Rio de la Plata. 1838-1850: A Study of French.
British, and American Policy in Relation to the Dictator Juan Manuel 
Rosas (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1929), entire
book; Paul D. Dickens, "The Falkland Islands Dispute between the United 
States and Argentina," The Hispanic American Historical Review. IX 
(November, 1929), pp. 471-488.
^®William J. Stokes, Latin American Politics (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company), p. 405, trades upon this idea in referring to the 
nationalist opposition which Peron provoked upon proceeding to sign an 
oil contract with Standard Oil.
29Arthur P. Whitaker, Nationalism in Latin America (Gainsville, 
Florida: University of Florida Press, 1962), p. 52.
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well as private, in Argentina is looked upon with disfavor in many
30sectors of the economy.
Emphasis on Agriculture
Many segments of Argentine life subscribe to a corrupted version 
of the well-known Prebisch thesis. In this version, it is not only 
charged that the primary-producing countries are at a trade disadvantage, 
because of the inelastic demand for primary products, but that the foreign 
producers of finished goods would like to maintain the same unfavorable 
relationship of supplying Argentina with heavy goods at higher prices 
and receiving primary goods from Argentina at lower prices. The idea 
that agricultural production should be expanded is repulsive to the in­
dustrial proletariat and to other nationalistic proponents desiring that
31Argentina should have a prominent industry.
■^Opposition to foreign investment businesses, or economic assis­
tance was the basic line of labor and nationalistic groups and was preached 
in Politica Internacional. Azul y Blanco, and Propositos. See "Ciudado 
con el petroleo: entrega a la vista," Azul v Blanco, loc. cit.; Alfredo
Canedo, "Estados Unidos y la hora nacionalista en la America Latina" and 
Victor Perlo, "Monopolios Norteamericanos en la America Latina," Politica 
Internacional. No. 79 (September, 1966), pp. 7-8, 9-12; and Angel N. Ruiz, 
"Por un plato de lentejas," Propositos. loc. cit.
31In stating that Argentina is not pro-North America simply be­
cause the United States has nothing to offer to the country, the editor 
of Politica Internacional asserts that the United States "aspires to con­
vert us into a large farm or plantation without basic national industries 
but only industries controlled by its monopolies, which sell their pro­
ducts at monopolistic prices...; that gives us crumbs for economic aid 
and under terms that are counter to our national interests...; that gives 
priority to Southeast Asia over Latin America...and has made Brazil its 
basic branch office in South America." From an editorial by Jorge Julio 
Greco, "USA no nos hace falta," Politica Internacional. No. 79 (September,
1966)r pp. 5, 37.
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State Enterprises and Financing.
During the time of this study, the state enterprises came under
sharp criticism from various sources, as did the public administration
and the federal redistribution of national income to the provinces.
Common charges leveled at the government entities and their operations
are: inefficiency, corruption, surplus personnel, nepotism, obsolete
32procedures, centralism, and partiality to vested interests. The
government is charged with the culpability that the enterprises are not 
33more profitable.
O O The Federacion Gremial del Comercio e Industria (Guild Federa­
tion of Commerce and Industry) of Rosario, Argentina, criticized both 
technical and administrative bureaucracy in state enterprises for having 
perpetuated instability for so long by "false nationalism." State organisms 
were characterized as "unorganized incompetence." "Fensamiento de la 
Federacion Gremial acerca del problema ferroviario," Revista de la Fed­
eracion Gremial del Comercio e Industria. loc. cit. Panorama, monthly 
news and picture magazine, in which North American capital participates, 
notes that there exists on the full-time public payroll two million 
state, provincial, and municipal employes who consume 70 per cent of the , 
national budget; the railroads alone, operating under an increasing deficit, 
still managed to hire an additional 12,000 employes since 1963. Schurjin, 
op. cit.. pp. 37-38. See also Portnoy, op. cit.. pp. 14-15; Gorban, loc. 
cit.; Lazarte, op. cit.. pp. 5-7, and entire book; Norberto C. Ferrer, 
et. al., loc. cit.
33Among several handbills distributed in the Chacarita-Colegiales 
zone of the Federal Capital the day preceding the general labor strike of 
December 14, 1966, is one put out by the Comision Obrera, Popular y Estud- 
iantil de Solidaridad con Portuarios y Ferroviarios (Labor, Popular, and 
Student Commission of Solidarity with the dockworkers and railroad workers), 
informing the reader that 480 diesel locomotives and 30,000 railroad cars 
are out of service "purely and exclusively because of the persistent sabo­
tage that is being carried out against the railroad workers." The handbill 
charges that tools, replacement parts, and other necessary materials are 
not in supply; that in most repair shops the workers do not even have 
paint and it is normal for workers to be required to supply their own tools. 
Eli L. Oliver, an international labor economist and consultant for the GAS 
who did a study on the Argentine railroad problem for the International 
Transport Workers Federation, describes the policy of the Argentine govern­
ment toward the railroad industry as "the height of folly" and says that 
instead of firing 30,000 employes it could hire another 25,000. Applying
172
Alienation in Political Life
Four major themes of alienation were predominant in the political 
arena during the course of this study; first, the suppression of full 
civil liberties and the censure of political activity by the military 
government; second, the loss of national sovereignty, as signified by 
British rule over the Falkland Islands and by the presence of Russian 
fishing vessels in or near Argentine territorial waters; third, the 
amount of control which the national government should exercise over the 
university versus the amount of autonomy that should be enjoyed by the 
students; and, fourth, the apparent pro-oligarchic bias and orientation 
of nearly all official policy.
Suppression of Political Participation
For some politicians and political activists the suspension of
political activity, which is believed to be only temporary, may have
34been a welcome respite. But for others it means delay and frustration; 
and many months, even years, of political work now is jeopardy. Even if 
full civil liberties would be granted again in six months, a year, or two 
years, the lost time will never quite be compensated. The alienation of
the U.S. traffic unit to Argentine data, a total of 26,528 new jobs 
would have to be created in order for the labor force to increase in 
proportion to the increase in traffic, he says, Finally, it is speci­
fied that 20,000 train cars are needlessly out of service and that one 
million tons of perishable goods rot each month while waiting to be 
transported. Buenos Aires Herald, December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9. And dis­
placed SUPA leader Eustaquio Tolosa lays the blame for the port problems 
on the government. See "Sobre el tejada de zinc caliente," Primera 
Plana. IV (October 18, 1966), p. 18.
^^As implied in "Politicos: secandose al sol," Primera Plana.
loc. cit.
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this group has its stimulus in the extra-legality of the government in
35power and its attempted control over politics.
Violation of National Sovereignty
The intrusion of foreign powers into Argentine territory always
36provokes immediate and sustained retaliation. But* Great Britain ended 
by retaining the Falkland Islands (called "Islas Malvinas" by Argentines), 
so that the abortive attempt of the group of young nationalists to take­
over the islands on September 28, 1966, received much commendation for its
37audacity and dramatic expression of national sentiment. But to the 
government the event was internationally embarassing, and it acted swiftly 
to punish the youthful invaders.^^In a related but different occurrence,
^^However, such alienation is expressed with measured restraint.
"We should not launch out in an absurd and hysterical opposition," counsels 
one high UCRP official. All in all, though, the politicians feel that time 
will work in their favor in discrediting the actual government and in pre­
paring opinion to support the return of the parties and groups to political 
activity. "JEl retorno de los politicos," Confirmado. loc. cit.. and 
"Sonar no cues^a nada," Primera Plana, loc. cit.
See footnote "27" in this same chapter.
37It is worthy of commenting that on September 28, 1966, a nation­
alistic group of twenty men and one woman, the so-called "Operacion Con­
dor," boarded the DC-4, LV-AGG airliner of Aerolîneas Argentines and three 
hours later four of the group, armed with pistols, forced the pilot to 
change the travel route and land in the Falkland Islands. After landing 
at Port Stanley the intention of the group was revealed by radio: to re­
affirm Argentine sovereignty over the "Islas Malvinas" for God and the 
Republic. "Operacion comando en las malvinas," Panorama, op. cit.. first 
six pages. The 62 labor organizations under the leadership of Augusto T. 
Vendor pronounced in favor of the invasion: "Let the members of Operacion
Condor be secure in the knowledge that Argentine workers accompany them 
in this patriotic action." The other anti-Vandorist "standing organiza­
tions" were not so willing to support the movement, although "the attitude 
in itself deserves our sympathy." See "La invasion de las malvinas," 
Primera Plana. IV (October 4, 1966), pp. 19-21.
38The government acted forcibly in reaffirming before international 
organisms the Argentine rights to the Falkland Islands but at the same time
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the need to expand the declining national fishing industry^^ was made 
more vivid by the sighting of Russian fishing vessels in or near Argen­
tine territorial waters. In a subsequent newspaper article it was 
argued: "If we don't exploit our own fishing possibilities, others
will do it for us."^®
The University and the Government
The mishandling of the university situation by the Argentine 
government was widely condemned both at home and abroad. That the 
university could not be used as a political sounding board and trampoline 
was unthinkable in many student circles, which went on the oppose the 
government's intervention in the universities and in educational policies.
denounced the partisan and non-official attempt by the individual parti­
cipants in Operacion Condor and promised that they would all be prosecuted 
in the fullest rigor of the law. "Asi no recuperaremos las Islas Malvinas," 
Analisis. VI (October 3, 1966), p. 10. Politics Internacional. No. 81 
(November, 1966), in "Grupo condor, Isalud!" on page 1, defends energeti­
cally the action of the group and laments that the more serious press and 
figures in the nation have so harshly condemned Operacion Condor. It 
objects to the participants being dealt with as criminals in such severe 
fashion.
S^Clarin. November 24, 1966, p. 44; Clarin, December 6, 1966, p. 15.
^̂ Clarin. November 24, 1966, ibid., also editorial, "Fomento 
de la explotacion pesquera," La Capital. November 24, 1966, p. 4.
^^APRI (Agrupacion Pueblo y Reforma Indoamericana) and MNR (Movi- 
miento Nacional Reformists) denounced law 16,912 and the government inter­
vention into the eight national universities to dissolve the student 
government organs; and they called upon all students to resist the 
government, praising their fellow students who had been injured or killed 
in skirmishes with military and police forces. "Students also prefer to 
study unmolested instead of losing a year of study, or being jailed, or 
being struck; or dying as did Santiago Pampillon. But the road of re­
sponsibility is not marked by hedonistic sentiment." Resistencia o normali­
zation. October, 1966. The JUP (Juventud Universitaria Peronista) urged 
opposition to the government, as had been effected successfully in the
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On the other hand, there were other students, ones whose chief purpose 
was to obtain an academic education, and disinterested professionals, 
who deplored the political antics of students and said they would 
rather see the university faculty and administration and responsible 
students have control.^2
The Oligarchic Influence on Policy
In the first place, the tighter control over opposition activity 
is quite unpalatable to the political a c t i v i s t s . B u t  when the political 
course of the revolutionary government was finally charted in more detail, 
the opposition was sorely offended, for it represented to the opposition 
an entrega (a "selling-out" or "giving-away") of the Revolution to "the 
hated oligarchy.
case of all preceding post-Peron governments, claiming that "we are willing 
to struggle so that the blood and sweat of the worker may cease being the 
price which our oligarchy demands in order to repay the aid that the crim­
inal imperialists of the North give it." JUP publication, circulated 
December 13, 1966. The Federacion de Agrupaciones Nacionales de Estudi- 
antes Peronistas (Federation of National Peronist Student Groups) states: 
"There never was, nor is there, nor will there ever be a university to 
serve both the government and the people, so long as the people do not 
control the state....In this historic dilemma...we the students should 
submit ourselves to the struggle of the working class...." FANDEP, loc. cit.
42;
43
De la Vega, loc. cit.; senior medical student, loc. cit.
IAttention is called to the violent protest reaction in the 
universities, precipitated by the attempt on the part of the government 
to exercise greater control over the national education system.
44see the first section of Chapter X, "The Responding Political 
System," for the decisions and specific policies of the Executive Power.
Jorge Julio Greco asked, in referring to the economic ministry 
and those responsible for national economic decisions, "What contribution 
can be made by men whose panacea consists in massacring the peso, causing 
a redistribution of income that fattens the coffers of the latifundistas
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The Development of a Selected City; Rosario 
It has been contended that urbanism and its related problems 
contribute significantly to the extent to which urban inhabitants feel 
alienated. To look at this contention more concretely, the urban deve­
lopment of one selected city, viz.. Rosario, will now be described.
Urban Development
The rapid population expansion, from 23,169 persons in 1869 to 
50,914 in 1887 to 113,168 in the census of 1900, brought on critical 
urban problems for the city of Rosario which from then on have necessi­
tated creative planning and administrative dedication. To mention just 
a few highlights in the urban growth of Rosario: running water was first
installed in 1887; Dr. Luis Lamas directed the municipal government at 
the turn of the century and Parque Independencia, the public park which 
now occupies an immense area of the city, was conceived and worked on 
during this administration; by 1906 Rosario had 150,845 souls; in 1909, 
some 3,500,000 hectares were incorporated into the municipality by an­
nexing the northern districts of Alberdi, Nuevo Alberdi, and La Florida.
Metropolitan Rosario as such began in the area which is the 
present-day central district of the city and then extended from Pellegrini
and exporters, ties the knot around the necks of the lower and middle 
classes, and leaves the national industries at the mercy of foreign 
investors?" Jorge Julio Greco, "Carta abierta al President Ongania," 
Politica Internacional. No. 81 (November, 1966), pp. 4-5. "El gobierno 
entrega la revolucion," Azul y Blanco. I (November 10, 1966), p. 3; 
Ruiz, loc. cit.; "Poner a la CGT desde abajo: la lucha conjunta,"
Politica Obrera. op. cit.. p. 2.
46Gomez, op. cit.. pp. 43-47; Montes, op. cit.. pp. 16-17, 65.
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Avenue in three directions. To the north, a nucleus of population 
located around a sugar.refinery that had established there; and the 
area, comprising the present wards of Alberdi, Arroyito, and La Florida, 
became chiefly residential with a number of resorts being built north­
ward along the Parana river. To the west, out from the railroad, an 
upper-class district, called Fisherton and settled mainly by English 
railroad executives of the Ferrocarril Central Argentine, sprang up 
and filled continguous areas: Echesortu, Belgrano, and Mendoza. And,
to the south arose another nucleus near the Swift meatpacking plant, 
in what is called Lower Saladillo, or simply el bajo. Although chiefly 
a low-class residential district, for its most southeastern and south­
western parts consisted of villas and slums, its appearance changes to
47middle class in moving west toward the Tiro Suizo ward.
These movements of people and constructions, which were econo­
mically inspired, disregarded long-run considerations, such as how the 
municipality could bring these districts the essential services; for, 
in the 1930's the land area of Rosario nearly equalled that of the 
Federal Capital in Buenos Aires, with not even one-third as many people. 
Only after 1935 did city ordinances require open streets, lighting, and 
a minimum of transportation and services. Since 1958 all subdivision 
of lots for construction must be preceded by paved streets, potable 
water, and electricity.^®
^^Parodi, loc. cit.; Arrue Gowland, loc. cit.
^^Parodi, ibid.
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Status, Alienation. Anomie, and Participation 
The results of the tests conducted by the researcher on the 
socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomie, and social parti­
cipation of Argentine subjects will now be reported.
Socioeconomic Status 
The measure of socioeconomic status for the subjects who are 
tested in this study consists of the occupation and education of the 
subject and the father of the subject. The scores made on these four 
items are used to classify all interviewees into one of three socio­
economic strata: 0-12, lower class; 12-20, lower middle class; and
20-28, upper middle class. Table 21 shows the ranking and distribution 
of subjects by their scores on the socioeconomic criteria. Four suc­
cessive tables, 22 through 25, show occupation and education of father 
and occupation and education of subject by SES levels.
TABLE 21
RANKING AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUBJECTS 






Occupation-Education of Subject 
and Father
Per cent ................... 40 40 20 100
Number of cases ........... 36 36 18 90
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TABLE 22
.OCCUPATION OF. FATHER BY SES LEVELS
Lower Upper
Occupation Lower Middle Middle
Class Class Class
1. Blue-collar worker (dependent and
unskilled) . . .  ............... 17
2. Blue-collar worker (independent and
skilled) ........................ 11 11
3. Small-scale white-collar worker 7 8
4. Small businessman, medium white-
collar worker ................. 9 9
5. Professional university employe,
medium businessman, lower-ranking
military officer ............... 1 8 4
6. University professor or adminis­
trator-high-ranking employe.
high-ranking military officer 5
7. Entrepreneur, top-ranking official
large landowner ...............
Number of cases ..................... (36) (36) (18)
TABLE 23
EDUCATION OF FATHER BY SES LEVELS
Lower Upper
Education Lower Middle Middle
Class Class Class
1. No school................. .. 18 1
2. Some elementary ................... 7 5
3. Elementary completed ............. 10 21 8
4. Some high school ................. 4
5. Completed high school ............. 5 2
6. Some college ..................... 1
7. Completed college ................. 1 7
Number of cases ....................... (36) (36) (18)
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TABLE 24
OCCUPATION OF SUBJECT BY SES LEVELS
Lower Upper
Occupation Lower Middle. Middle
Class Class Class
I. Blue-collar worker (dependent and
unskilled) ..................... 13 3
2. Blue-collar worker (independent and
skilled) ..................... 16 9
3. Small-scale white-collar worker 7 17
4. Small businessman, medium white-
collar worker ................. 7
5. Professional university employe,
medium businessman, lower-ranking
military officer ............... 13
6. University professor or adminis­
trator, high-ranking employe,
high-ranking military officer. . 5
7. Entrepreneur, top-ranking official
large landowner ...............
Number of c a s e s ................. (36) (36) (18)
TABLE 25
EDUCATION OF SUBJECT BY SES LEVELS ——
Lower Upper
Education Lower Middle Middle
Class Class Class
1. No school ....................... 10
2. Some elementary . . . . . . . . . 11 2
3. Elementary completed .......... 14 22
4. Some high school ............... 1 3
5. Completed high school . . . . . . 4 3
6. Some college . . ............... 5 4
7. Completed college . . . . . . . . 11
Number of cases ..................... (36) (36) (18)
181
In the measurement of occupations among subjects and their 
fathers in this study, the two largest categories are blue-collar 
workers (independent and skilled).and small-scale white-collar workers 
(ones who perform errands and other menial tasks which do not involve 
hard physical labor). In education, the majority of the subjects have 
completed grade school, followed by those with no education, those 
with some grade school, and those with college completed.
Socioeconomic Mobility
On the whole, it does not appear that any appreciable mobility 
has occurred between generations.
Lower class members. A slightly upward movement is noted in 
occupation and education of the younger generation. The younger generation 
has acquired a little more elementary education and working skill than 
has the former generation. But one lower-class member was greatly sur­
passed by his parent who had achieved a college education and was a doc­
tor.
Lower middle class members. In the lower middle class, the same 
numbers and proportions of individuals are found in the middle range but 
more younger-generation persons are in the upper range and more older- 
generation persons in the lower range, indicating that some mobility has 
occurred.
Upper middle class. A definite occupational and educational ele­
vation has been achieved by younger-generation members of the upper middle 
class over the preceding generation. This fact may suggest that the socio­
economic stratum of greatest mobility on the entire socioeconomic scale
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is the upper middle class, from which ambitious individuals cam improve 
on their already favorable socioeconomic status in surpassing their 
parents. Individuals in the lower and lower middle classes were able 
to advance only a little farther than did their predecessors.
Political Alienation 
Political alienation, together with anomie, are key variables in 
studying the phenomenon of mass participation in political change. Both 
are intermediary variables between low socioeconomic status on the one 
hand and low social participation on the other hand. Table 26 presents 
total rankings by all respondents to each of the revised Zimmer Scale 
items in a format which allows summary comparison along the different 
scale items.
Table 27, using previous socioeconomic data, shows which per 
cent and number of cases in each socioeconomic stratum are "alienated" 
and "not alienated." The sum of the questionnaire responses (from ap­
proximately 90 subjects in number) are dichotomized by collapsing the 
response categories in the scaling procedure, based on scale scores 
ranging from a low of 0 to a high of 6. Those subjects making scale 
scores of 4 or more are considered to be alienated while those below 
4 are termed "not alienated."
Results and Discussion
General political alienation. Some two-thirds of the individuals 
sampled in this study are politically alienated by the revised Zimmer 
criteria. Item 1 (municipality not interested in neighborhoods) and item 
3 (waste of time to discuss urban problems with city officials) elicited
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TABLE 26
POLITICAL ALIENATION EE.OK LOCAL G0VEB3MENT: IN .ARGENTINE SUBJECTS 
SEPTEMBER: .14.-DECEMBEE.. U,- 1966-, IN THE "URBAN LITORAL"
Response Categories 
Agree Disagree Undecided
1. Municipality not interested in 
neighborhoods
Per cent ................. 67 15 18
Number of cases ........ 60 13 16
2. City government responsible 
for economic and social 
problems
Per cent ................. 43 25 32
Number of cases ........ 38 22 29
3. Waste of time to discuss urban 
problems with city officials 
Per cent ................. 67 16 17
Number of cases ........ 60 14 15
4. Political parties intervene 
too much in city adminis­
tration
Per cent ................. 57 21 22
Number of cases ........ 49 18 19
5. Only national government can 
resolve neighborhood needs 
Per cent ................. 55 24 21
Number of cases ........ 47 20 18
Total average per cent ........... 58 20 22
Average number of cases ........ 51 17 19
the most affirmative responses or highest manifestations of alienation. 
The two items registering the lowest amount of alienation are item 2 
(the government responsible for economic and social problems) and item 
5 (only national government can resolve neighborhood needs).
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Political alienation by SES strata. Out of the 34 cases in the 
lower class, the entire 34 respondents tested are politically "alienated," 
or obtain high scores on the political-alienation scale. In the lower 
middle class, 17 cases or 57 per cent are "alienated" with 13 subjects 
or 43 per cent "not alienated." Significantly, only 4 respondents, or 
22 per cent, in the upper middle class have high scores of political 
"alienation," whereas 14 cases, or 88 per cent, are "not alienated."
TABLE 27
POLITICAL ALIENATION FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
IN THREE SES STRATA
Political Alienation
Alienated Not Alienated Totals
Upper Middle Class
Per cent ................... 22 88 100
Number of cases ........... 4 14 18
Lower Middle Class
Per cent ................... 57 43 100
Number of cases ........... 17 13 30
Lower Class
Per cent ................... 100 100
Number of cases ........... 34 34
Per Cent ..................... 67 33 100
Total Number of Cases . . . . 55 27 82
Chi-square equals 33.58, p <  .001, with 2 degrees of freedom.
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Anomie
As in the Zimmer scale on political alienation, the Mizruchi 
version of the Srole scale contains also five items. Table 28 gives 
the total rankings by all tested subjects to each of the Srole items. 
Table 29 pairs respondents as to whether they are "anomic" or "not 
anomic," based on scale scores ranging from a.low of 0 to a high of 
10. The respondents scoring 6 or more are rated as "anomic," with 
those rated as "not anomic" falling below the score of 6.
TABLE 28
ANOMIE IN ARGENTINE SUBJECTS, SEPTEMBER 14- 
DECEMBER 14, 1966, IN THE "URBAN LITORAL"
Response Categories 
Agree Disagree Undecided
1. Public officials not interested
in common man
Per cent .     . 73 15 12
Number of cases . . . . . .  61 13 10
2. A person does not really know
whom he can count on
Per c e n t    56 35 9
Number of cases . . . . . .  47 30 8
3. A person has to live just for
today
Per cent . «   58 37 5
Number of c a s e s   48 31 4
4. No solution to this country's
economic difficulties
Per c e n t    38 60 2
Number of cases . . . . . .  31 49 2
5. God permits the misery in the
world, not man
Per c e n t .................. . 37 58 5
Number of c a s e s ............ 30 48 4
Total Average Per Cent . . . . . . .  52 41 7
Average Number of C a s e s   43 34 6
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Results and Discussion
General anomie. Less than 40 per cent of the total sample survey 
are "anomic," there being 36 individuals "anomic" and 46 "not anomic." 
On individual items, item 1 (public officials not interested in common 
man), of similar bent to the items in the Zimmer scale, attracts the 
largest anomic response, 61 of 84 subjects, or 73 per cent, almost 
three-fourths. Item 3 (a person has to live just for today) and item 
2 (a person doesn’t know on whom he can count) obtain 58 per cent and 
56 per cent respectively of the "anomic" vote. On the other hand, 
items 4 and 5 receive affirmation from little more than a third of the 
subjects who are tested.
TABLE 29
ANOMIE IN THREE SES STRATA IN ARGENTINE SUBJECTS
Anomie
Anomic Not Anomic Totals
Upper Middle Class
Per c e n t ................  100 100
Number of cases . . . .  18 18
Lower Middle Class
Per c e n t ........ 33 67 100
Number of cases . . . .  10 20 30
Lower Class
Per c e n t ........ 77 23 100
Number of cases . . . .  26 8 34
Per C e n t .......... 44 56 100
Total Number of Cases . . 36 46 82
Chi-square equals 30.05, p <.001, with 2 degrees of freedom.
187
Anomie by SES Strata. Even more than on the Zimmer political- 
alienation items, the different socioeconomic levels are distinguished 
in the responses given to the Srole items. According to this study, 
the upper middle class has no rating of "anomie" whatever, all eighteen 
subjects being "not anomic." The lower middle class is one-third more 
"anomic," there being 10 subjects or 33 per cent that test out as 
"anomic." But the lower class has a much higher incidence of anomie,
26 of 34 subjects, or 77 per cent, responding in the "anomic" affirmative.
Social Participation 
The three measurements of social participation are: frequency
and kind of informal-group participation, formal-group membership, and 
formal-group attendance. Table 30 shows the total frequency of informal- 
group participation while Table 31 shows the same by SES strata. Table
32 gives a breakdown of informal-group participation by frequency of 
participation and by informal groups visited. Number of formal group 
memberships and extent of formal-group participation are shown in Tables
33 and 35. In Table 34 the formal group memberships by socioeconomic 
groups are given; Table 36 gives formal-group attendance by SES levels.
Frequency of Informal Group Participation
General informal participation. Table 30 is based on 89.75 
cases (90 subjects having responded in three situations and 89 subjects 
in one situation) which yield 359 total responses, distributed in pro­
gressive frequencies of 54, 59, 115, and 131 responses respectively.
In the table it is seen that the total subjects who visit relatives, 
friends, neighbors, and co-workers "at least twice a week" amount to
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only 15 per cent of the total. Slightly more, 17 per cent, visit "once 
a week"; 32 per cent "less often"; and 36 per cent "never."
TABLE 30
TOTAL FREQUENCY OF ARGENTINE INFORMAL 
GROUP PARTICIPATION, IN PERCENTAGES
Total Association with Relatives, Per Cent of Total
Friends, Neighbors, and Co-workers Respondents
At least twice a w e e k ..........................  15
Once a w e e k ....................................  17
Less o f t e n ............... ..................... 23
N e v e r ..........................................  36
Per C e n t ......................... ............  100
Total Number of C a s e s ........................... 89.75
Informal participation by SES strata. The response patterns for 
both lower-class and lower-middle-class subjects on total frequency of 
informal associations are similar, but the upper Aiddle class differs 
somewhat. As given in Table 31 the lower class and lower middle class 
visit informal groups "at least twice a week" and "once a week" at rates 
of 18 per cent and 15 per cent respectively. These same classes visit 
informal groups "less often" at rates of 28 per cent and 30 per cent 
and "never" at rates of 36 per cent and 40 per cent. But in the upper 
middle class 8 per cent visit their informal associates at rates of 8 
per cent "at least twice a week," 15 per cent "once a week," 45 per 
cent "less often," and 32 per cent "never." Thus, the lower and lower 
middle classes tend to make generally less frequent visits; but, of the 
visits which they make, a greater number of more frequent visits are
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made than less frequent visits. On the other hand, the upper middle 
class makes more over-all visits; but, of the visits made, more are of 
the less frequent type.
TABLE 31
TOTAL FREQUENCY OF ARGENTINE INFORMAL GROUP 
PARTICIPATION IN THREE SES 
STRATA,. IN, PERCENTAGES
Total Association with 
Relatives, Friends, 
Neighbors, and Co-Workers
Socioeconomic Class by Percentages 
Lower Lower Upper 
Class Middle Middle 
Class Class
At least twice a week
Per cent of groups ........ , . . 18 15 8
Once a week
Per cent of groups ........ , . . 18 15 15
Less often
Per cent of groups . . . . , . . 28 30 45
Never
Per cent of groups . . . . . . . 36 40 32
Total Number of Cases . . . . . . 36 35.75 18
Individual association in informal groups. Among the informal 
groups with which subjects associate, neighbors, and co-workers are 
visited the most infrequently, 51 per cent of subjects never visiting 
neighbors and 48 per cent never socializing with co-workers. Relatives 
are the most popular. Some 41 per cent visit relatives at least once a 
week or more often. While not quite so popular as relatives, friends 
are nonetheless visited to some extent by 79 per cent of the sample universe.
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TABLE 32
INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATION WITH SEVERAL 
ARGENTINE INFORMAL GROUPS, IN PERCENTAGE
Relatives Friends Neighbors Co-workers
At least twice a week . . . .  22 21 15 2
Once a week . . . . . . 15 12 18
Less often . . . . . . . . .  30 43 22 32
Never ................. 21 51 48
Per Cent . . . . . . . 100 100 100
Total Number of Cases . . . .  90 89 90 90
Formal Group Memberships
Number of formal group memberships. Of the 90 total subjects,
28 belong to no formal groups, 33 to one, 16 to two, and 13 to three.
Of the total of 52 subjects who have formal group memberships, 63 per 
cent belong to just one formal group, 31 per cent to two groups, and 
6 per cent to three groups.
Formal-group memberships by SES strata. As might be expected, 
the lower class has the lowest level of social participation, the lower 
middle class the next lowest, and the upper middle class the highest 
participation. Some 64 per cent of the lower class belong to no organi­
zations and 36 per cent belong to just one organization. The lower 
middle class registers some 14 per cent belonging to no groups, 45 per 
cent to one group, 19 per cent to two groups, and 22 per cent to three 
groups. The upper middle class subjects all belong to one or more or­
ganizations, 22 per cent having membership in one formal group, 50 per 
cent in two groups, and 28 per cent in three groups.
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TABLE 33
NUMBER OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS
Per Cent of Per Cent of
Number of Groups Population Members
N o n e .......................... 31
O n e   37 63
Two . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 18 31
Three . . . . . . . . . . . .  14 6
F o u r .........................
F i v e ..........................
Six or more
Per Cent . . . . . . . . . . .  100 100
Total Number of Cases . . . .  90 52
TABLE 34
NUMBER OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP MEMBERSHIPS IN 
THREE SES STRATA, IN CLASS PERCENTAGES
Socioeconomic Class by Percentages 
Number of Lower Upper
Groups Lower Middle Middle
Class Class Class
N o n e .............................  64 14 0
O n e .........................   36 45 22
T w o   19 50
Three .  ............   22 28
F o u r ..........................
F i v e .........................
Per C e n t   100 100 100
Total Number of Cases . . . .  36 36 36
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Total frequency o£ formal-group participation. It can be seen 
in Table 35 that 43 per cent of the total sample and 54 per cent of the 
total number who have formal memberships attend formal group meetings 
and otherwise participate "at least once a week" or more often. There 
is a progressive trend toward "more frequent" rather than "less frequent" 
participation.
TABLE 35
EXTENT OF ARGENTINE FORMAL GROUP PARTICIPATION
Formal Group 
Participation
Per Cent of 
Population
Per Cent of 
Members
Non-members
No association ........... 21
Members
Cannot ascertain ........ 5 6
Never attends ........... 2 3
Once a year ............. 2 3
Several times a year . . . 6 8
Once a month ............. 9 11
Two or three times a month 12 15
Once a week ............. 26 33
More often ............... 17 21
Sub Total ................. 79 100
Grand Total ............... 100 100
Number of Cases ........... 90 62
Extent of formal-group participation by SES strata. As Table
36 points out, the three Argentine socioeconomic groups are rather
"frequent" participants. Some 76 per cent of the formal-group members
of the lower class attend organizational functions "once a week" or
"two or three times a month," 61 per cent of the lower middle class
attend "two or three times a month" and more frequently, as does 71 
per cent of the upper middle class.
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TABLE 36
PER CENT OF ARGENTINE FORMAL ASSOCIATION MEMBERS WHO ATTEND
A SPECIFIED NUMBER OF MEETINGS IN THREE SES STRATA
Socioeconomic Class by Percentages
Frequency of Lower Upper
Attendance Lower Middle Middle
Class Class Class
More than once a week . . . 24 22
Once a week ............... 22 41
Two or three times a month . . . .  30 15 8
Once a month . . . . . . . 7 19
Several times a year . . . 8 5
Once a year ............... 5
N e v e r ........ ............ 12
Cannot ascertain . . .  . . 5
Total ..................... 100 100
Number of members ......... 31 18
Social Organizations
Lower class. It was previously noted that of the 36 subjects 
in the 0-12 socioeconomic range, only 13 have association in formal 
groups. Each of the 13 formal-group members is a participant in just 
one organization. Some 10 belong to sports clubs and 3 are affiliated 
with labor organizations.
Lower middle class. Some 31 of 36 lower-middle-class subjects 
are social participants, of which 16 belong to one organization, 7 to 
two organizations, and 8 to three organizations. Seventeen memberships 
are in sports and recreational clubs; II in unions and labor organizations; 
10 in cultural, education, aesthetic, or academic organizations; 5 in 
religious organizations, apart from regular church membership; and 5 are
not ascertainable.
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Upper middle class. All 18 subjects in the upper middle class 
are "social participants", 4 belonging to one organization, 9 to two 
organizations, and 5 to three organizations. Fourteen of the member­
ships are academic and cultural, 11 sports, 4 trade-union, 4 not ascer­
tainable, 3 church-related, and 1 ethnic.
Correlations
In examining carefully the variables of socioeconomic status, 
political alienation, anomie, and social participation, this study 
appears to confirm the initial hypothesis that a chain relationship 
exists among these respective variables. Indeed, individuals of lower 
socioeconomic status are more politically alienated and anomic than 
are those of higher socioeconomic status, and the lower socioeconomic 
individuals participate less in their society than do those in the 
higher socioeconomic levels. That persons of lower socioeconomic status 
tend to withdraw or refrain from political activity also seems to be 
confirmed in the modest results of this study. There is a rather high 
correlation between political alienation and anomie. Because of the
dearth of responses on the final part of the questionnaire dealing with
political attitudes, no attempt is made, however, to correlate negative
political attitudes with high alienation and anomie.
Socioeconomic Status and Social Participation
In Tables 37 and 38, all individuals with high scores of poli­
tical alienation and anomie are noted. They are all classified according 
to their socioeconomic status (lower class, lower middle class, and upper 
middle class) and level of social participation ("isolates" designating
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low social participation and "participants" referring to high social 
participation).
TABLE 37
PERCENTAGE OF ARGENTINE SUBJECTS HAVING 
HIGH SCORES OF POLITICAL ALIENATION BY 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND SOCIAL ISOLATION






Number of cases ........... 28 2 ——
Participants . . . 18 88 ipo
Number of cases ........... 6 15 4
Chi-square equals 24.90, p <  .001 , with 2 degrees of freedom.
TABLE 38
PERCENTAGE OF ARGENTINE SUBJECTS HAVING HIGH SCORES






Isolates ........ 10 _ _
Number of cases . . . . . .  23 1 --
Participants . . . 90
Number of cases ...........  3 9
Chi-square equals 23.26, p .< .001, with 2 degrees of freedom.
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Lower class. The.-lower class .demonstrates a significant 
relationship among socioeconomic status, political alienation, and 
social isolation. Some 28 respondents, or 82 per cent, in the lower 
class are "politically alienated" and "socially isolated." Signifi­
cantly, all the lower class subjects achieved high scores on the 
Zimmer political-alienation scale. In regard to "anomie," the corre­
lation is not so high, only 77 per cent of the lower class have high 
scores of "anomie." But between the variables of "anomie" and "social 
isolation" there exists a higher correlation, some 88 per cent of all 
those with high scores of "anomie" qualifying as social "isolates."
Lower middle class. As hypothesized, the lower middle class 
should be at a midway point on all scales, about half of the subjects 
scoring as being slightly "alienated" and "anomic" and slightly "not 
alienated" and "not anomic." The results do not follow completely this 
theoretical reasoning. A slight majority of lower-middle-class respon­
dents (17-13) are "politically alienated"; but of these "alienated" 
persons only 2, or 12 per cent, have low scores of "social partici­
pation." But; notably, all the lower-middle-class subjects who are 
not "politically alienated" are "social participants," having high 
scores of "social participation." With regard to "anomie," just one- 
third of this group is "anomic," of which only 10 per cent are "soc­
ially isolated." Of the "not-anomic" persons, 85 per cent are "social 
participants."
Upper middle class. Only 4 individuals, or 22 per cent of the 
upper middle class are "politically alienated." Of that total, all, or 
100 per cent, are high "social participants." All of the 78 per cent of
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the subjects "not alienated" are also "not socially isolated.” None 
of this group has high scores of "anomie," and all subjects of this 
class have high scores of "social participation." Thus, the highest 
confirmation of the hypotheses of the study is found in the upper 
middle class.
Alienation and Anomie
The preceding results on socioeconomic status and the variables 
of alienation, anomie, and social isolation strongly support the postu­
lated theses concerning the existing interconnections and interrelation­
ships among the four factors in question. But what of the relationship 
between political alienation and anomie? Table 39 gives the percentage 
of subjects having the same and different levels of scores on both poli­
tical alienation and anomie. As can be seen, 63 of the 82 total respon­
dents, or 77 per cent, have the same level of scores on both alienation
TABLE 39
PERCENTAGE OF SUBJECTS HAVING SAME AND DIFFERENT LEVELS 
OF SCORES ON BOTH POLITICAL ALIENATION AND ANOMIE
Alienation-Anomie
High scores in b o t h .....................  44
Number of c a s e s ........................ 36
Low scores in b o t h .....................  33
Number of cases  .................  27
Different scores in b o t h ..............   23
Number of c a s e s ........................ 19
Total Number of C a s e s ...................  82
Total Percentage  .........................  100
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and anomie. Some 44 per cent have high scores on both and 33 per cent 
low scores on both, with 23 per cent scoring differently (high on one 
scale but low on the other).
Correlation coefficient. A more rigorous measure, Pearson's 
correlation coefficient, is used in testing the correlation between 
political alienation and anomie. The first step in calculating this 
correlation is to tabulate the individual scores, of which there are 
eighty two. Next, the scores are ranked in columns, political alienation 
scores comprising the "x" column and anomie scores comprising the "y" 
column. Then, Pearson's equation^^ is applied to this raw data and the 
result is a coefficient of .564. This means that 31.81 per cent of the 
variation in "y" (anomie) is explained by "x" (political alienation).
As to the level of significance, it is noted that the coefficient of 
.564, derived from 82 responses or frequencies of scores, is significant 
beyond the .001 level.
^^Pearson's correlation coefficient is determined in this study 
from this equation: ^
K. K  XX-foe Gey)
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CHAPTER VIII
ATTITUDES AND BELIEF SYSTEMS
Attitudes and belief systems figure into Diagram 1 at the 
juncture of the three funnels (social-group, political-group, and 
governing interests) and constitute the receptive and regulatory 
chamber for all political and environmental pressures applied to the 
political system. To the extent that the political actions by system 
authorities find their legitimacy in the set of attitudes, values, and 
belief systems held by the political culture, the power-controlling 
and decisionmaking forces can decide policy and authoritatively allo­
cate values for members of the political system without sensing too 
much outside pressure in the form of negative responses to official 
policy. But when the policies of the system authorities run counter 
to the attitudes, values, and beliefs that are reflected in the poli­
tical culture, the political system may then receive a negative "feed­
back response" that could well provoke changes within and by the poli­
tical system.
Political Attitudes 
Attempts were made during the period of this study to gauge 
public opinion with respect to the June revolution itself and concerning
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particular political, social, and economic groups in the country. The 
first part of this section of the chapter will report on the results 
of interviews conducted by the research departments of two Argentine 
publications on the public reaction to the revolution. The second 
part of this section will discuss the results of the interviews con­
ducted by the researcher in which subjects rated the major political, 
social, and economic groups which are generally prominent in national 
life, plus some six major foreign governments.
The Revolution of 1966
At various times after the revolution of June 28, 1966, took 
place, the research department of an Argentine publication^ interviewed 
1000 subjects by unstructured street contact in the metropolitan disr 
tricts of Barrio Norte, La Boca, Once, Flores, Barrio Rivadavia, Avella- 
neda. Villa Ballester, San Martin, Ciudadela, Norte, Haedo, the metro­
politan port zone, and La Plata. Another publication^ conducted 300 
interviews during the first thirty days of the new government to establish 
opinion concerning it. The sampling of subjects was based on a propor-r 
tional socioeconomic distribution of the population, but the individual 
subjects were contacted by probalistic or fortuitous contact. A second
1The publication is Correo de la Tarde, a weekly publication of 
the Institute Promotor de los Argentines (Institute for Promoting Argen? 
tines). See "Once mil respuestas traducen alarma," Correo de la Tarde. 
loc. cit. The-questionnaire herein reported was presented at various 
times (the latter part of each month from July to September), so that a 
comparison of the results in different time periods is possiblA.
^Panorama.(having North American economic ties with Time-Life 
International). See "Habla el pueblo: que espera del gobierno,"
Panorama. No. 40 (September, 1966), pp. 12-21.
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opinion survey was published by Correo de la Tarde during October 26-28,
31966, based on the same geographical areas.
Expectations of Citizenry (Panorama Survey)
Responses to the Panorama survey compiled during the first thirty 
dàys of the revolution reveal that at the outset the majority of the 
people, some 74 per cent, felt that the government would benefit and act 
on behalf of the entire country. It is noteworthy that some 66 per cent 
of the workers said that they would support the government. To the 
question asking which group would best direct the country forward, 37 
per cent said the armed forces, 16 per cent the economists, 13 per cent 
the workers, 9 per cent the universities, and down to 4 per cent in favor 
of the entrepreneurs. Among the leading national problems, 82 per cent 
pointed to the cost of living, 59 per cent to housing, 49 per cent to 
industrial development, 41 per cent to education, 27 per cent to pensions 
and retirements, 26 per cent to labor problems, 25 per cent to salaries 
and unemployment, and down to only 20 per cent considering as important 
agricultural promotion and development.^
Asked which of six political leaders (Frondizi, Illia, Alsogaray, 
Aramburu, Ongania, or Peron) the country needed most in order to progress, 
47 per cent of the subjects singled out Ongania, 12 per cent Perôn, 6 per 
cent Frondizi, 4 per cent Alsogaray, 3 per cent Aramburu, and 1 per cent
q"El hombre comdn sigue esperando," Correo de la Tarde. VIII 
(November 1, 1966), pp. 32, 18. This questionnaire also reported on 
responses made at different times to the same identical questions.
^"Habla el pueblo: que espera del gobierno," Panorama, op.
cit., pp. 12-17.
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Illia. Some 68 per cent of the respondents felt that the government 
would preserve the exercise of freedom. Seventy six per cent attributed 
to the government a longevity of at least two years, 16 per cent pre­
dicting that it would have a duration of from five to eight years and 
31 per cent predicting a duration of more than eight years. The majority 
of those interviewed, 68 per cent, predicted that the then current 
government would transfer power by holding elections.^
Reactions of Citizenry (Correo de la Tarde Surveys')
Necessity of the June 28. 1966 revolution. The largest bloc of 
the citizenry, 45.3 per cent, still were of the opinion in late October 
that the revolution was necessary, although this figure diminished from
77.2 per cent in late July and from 58.7 per cent in late August. The 
percentage of those believing that the revolution was not necessary 
steadily increased from 17.4 per cent in late July to 29.5 per cent in 
late September and to 30.2 per cent in late October. The diminution of 
the "yes" replies and the increase in "no" replies was indicative of 
growing public discontent, as was also the increase in the percentage 
of subjects "without opinion," from 5.4 per cent in late July to 24.7 
per cent in late August, to 27.3 per cent in late September.^
Continuation of previous government. The percentage of those 
desiring that politics should continue as they had prior to the revolution 
increased from late August (19.2 per cent) to late September (29.3 per
^Ibid.. pp. 18-21.
p. 32.
^"El hombre comûn sigue esperando," Correo de la Tarde, op. cit..
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cent) but then decreased-.during October (27.2 per cent).̂
Continuation of. the-Revolution or return to political parties. In. 
the survey that Correo.de la Tarde conducted in October of 1966, subjects 
were asked for the first time whether the revolution should first fulfill 
its announced designs or whether elections should be called at once to 
return the country to the political parties. Some 61.8 per cent favored 
the former course and 21.9 per cent the latter, with 16.3 per cent having
O
no opinion or being doubtful.
Knowledge of the objectives of the revolution. In order to test 
opinion on the preceding query, Correo de la Tarde asked subsequently 
the extent to which subjects knew the objectives of the revolution. In 
this query 72.2 per cent of the subjects indicated that they knew very 
little— next to nothing— and were not interested in the objectives of 
the revolution. This response seems to show that the common man wants
gchange per se but is confused as to all that such change may encompass.
Emotional reactions to the revolution. Interviewees were tested 
as to which of several emotional states (optimism, happiness, hope, 
depression, fear, expectation, confidence, shame, pride, sadness, or 
indifference) best described their reactions to the revolution. The 
state of "fear" increased in persons tested from 21.3 per cent in late 
July to 34.0 per cent in late October, whereas "hope" decreased in sub­
jects examined from 27.2 per cent to 20.3 per cent in the same two 





cent in August and to 20..2 per cent in September, and then declined to
18.2 per cent during October. "Optimism" and "confidence" increased 
from 2.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent and from 3.1 per cent to 10.3 per 
cent respectively from. July to October. "Expectation" declined from
15.2 per cent in July, to 2.2 per cent in October. "Indifference" 
declined from 6.2 per cent in July to 2.5 per cent in October. All in 
all, it is noted that negative sentiments increased from July through 
September, but decreased during October. Negative sentiments were re­
duced from 66.4 per cent of the total in September to 61 per cent in 
October.
The tendency of the Revolution. Subjects had numerous descriptive 
terms (some 19 in all) by which to label the revolution. In late September, 
the vast majority of interviewees felt that the revolution was of a 
"markedly undefined" tendency and also "clerical" and "nationalist."
In October it was again "markedly undefined," but in addition "centralist" 
(Buenos Aires oriented), "nationalist," "clerical," "militarist," "right­
ist," "franco-oriented," and "corporatist," which all added up to 39.5 
per cent of the total items by which the revolution was described.
Most effective government measure. The government acted swiftly 
in restoring order to the ports, suppressing activity by political parties, 
intervening in the universities, and handling the Tucuman problem. Of 
those who commented on the most effective measures taken by the government, 
some 40.2 per cent pointed to the government measures to organize and
^^Ibid.; "Once mil respuestas traducen alarma." Correo de la 
Tarde, loc. cit.
^^"El hombre comün sigue esperando," ibid.. pp. 32, 18.
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straighten out the ports., 33 per cent to the doing away with political
parties, 18.3 per cent to- the intervention in the universities, and 8.5
per cent to the Tucuman.problem.
First measure-that’the government should take. Of striking
significance is that the largest bloc of citizenry, 24.6 per cent, would
imprison or repress the speculators (stock and money exchangers) as its
first measure if it were in power. Among the other percentages of
respondents, 21.4 per cent said they would straighten out the railroads;
18.1 per cent would end all the strikes; 8.3 per cent would take care of
the retired people; 7.8 per cent would effect large public works; 8.0
per cent would take other measures; and, 11.8 per cent had no opinion or
13no concrete measure in mind.
The principles of Ongania. In late August, the chief character­
istics making up the image of Ongania were "patriotic," "honest,"
"balanced," "indecisive," and "disciplined." In late September, Ongania 
was rated as being "indecisive" (20.01 per cent), "honest" (15 per cent),
"disciplined" (12 per cent), "patriotic" (10.35 per cent), and "subject
14to influence" (10.2 per cent).
Good and bad procedures of the government. In late September, 
some 22.5 per cent of the respondents believed that the government acted 
well in no situation, 18.5 per cent said it acted well in foreign relations, 
and 14.3 per cent noted it did well in education; whereas, 24.5 per cent
l^ibid.. p. 18. 
l̂ Ibid.
^^"Once mil respuestas traducen alarma," loc. cit.
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thought it acted badly in all matters, 15.4 per cent said it proceeded 
badly in general policy, 14.7 per cent said badly in economic affairs,
14.3 per cent badly in labor, and 12.3 per cent badly in education.
International Political Attitudes 
Six foreign governments and seventeen national groups were 
classified according to three factors (force, activity, and evaluation) 
of the Semantic Differential by from 30 to 73 subjects giving ratings 
on each item. Table 40 gives the average ratings of six foreign govern­
ments and Tables 41 through 44 in this chapter and Tables 45 through 49 
in Appendix D give the average ratings of seventeen national groups on 
each of these factors by socioeconomic strata. The tables in Appendix D 
also show the number of respondents who have rated each item. In com­
piling individual scores to arrive at the average ratings, the values 
of 2, 3, 5, 7, and 8 were computed into each of the five-point scales 
in order to highlight the extreme positions and reveal more strikingly 
the differences among the three socioeconomic groups. It should be noted 
that the more intensely positive the political conception (strong, 
active, and good) being recorded the smaller the average score; the 
less intensely positive the conception (weak, passive, and bad), the 
larger the average score.
The Socioeconomic Groups
It is regretted that only a few of the subjects in the lower and 
lower middle classes rated the six foreign governments in this study.
l̂ lbid.
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The time factor and the relative ünfamiliarity of the lower classes 
with some of the foreign governments considerably reduced the number 
of expected responses. Nonetheless, a few generalizations are possible 
with regard to the responses that were given and that are shown in 
Table 40.
While the upper middle class does not differ too much from the 
lower middle and lower classes in its average ratings bestowed upon the 
governments of France and Red China, it differs markedly in its ratings 
of the government of Argentina. It shows a more negative conceptuali­
zation of the political strength, activity, and worth of its own country 
than do its lower socioeconomic counterparts. The upper middle and lower 
middle classes are quite close to one another in their ratings of the 
governments of the United States and Cuba, and they are more.closely in 
agreement in their ratings of the six foreign governments than is the 
lower.class with either the lower middle class or the upper middle class, 
except in the instance of Russia in which the two lower socioeconomic 
levels view the Russian government more positively than does the upper 
middle class. Apart from its similar ratings of the Red Chinese and 
French governments, the lower class does not agree with the two higher 
socioeconomic groups on its ratings of the United States, Argentine, and 
Cuban governments. On these, the lower class exemplifies a more positive 
or favorable evaluation than do the other two classes.
The Foreign Governments
The government of the United States. In the minds of lower class 
subjects, the U.S. government is seen as being stronger, more active, and
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TABLE 40
AVERAGE RATINGS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ON THREE
FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA
The Government of the United States 











2 3 4 5 6 7 8
The Government of Argentina 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
 ------------
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
The Government of Cuba 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7
The Government of the Soviet Union 










3 4 5 6 7
The Government of Red China
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
The Government of France 

















Lower middle class-o-o 
Lower class------------
°“Extreme groups significant beyond .05 level 
-H-Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level 
**Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level
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more virtuous, although neither the upper middle class nor the lower 
middle class rate it too unfavorably. It is rated below the median scale 
position (5) on all three factors by all three classes, meaning that in 
the minds of all subjects it tends more toward strength than weakness, 
more toward activity than passivity, and more toward virtue than virulence.
The government of Argentina. Notably, the lower class sees the. 
Argentine government as being "rather strong," "rather active," and "rather 
good." The upper middle class, however, rates the government of Argentina 
as being "rather weak," as being "midway between activity and passivity," 
and as being "rather bad." To the lower middle class, the Argentine 
government is "somewhat weak," "rather active," and "mediocre." On the 
evaluation factor, it is noted that the upper middle class rates the 
Argentine government as "rather bad," the lower middle class rates it 
"somewhat good," and the lower class rates it "good."^^
The government of Cuba. All three classes basically agree that 
the government of Cuba is "rather strong" and "active," with the upper 
middle class rating it less active than the lower two classes. On the 
evaluation factor, the lower middle class rates it as being "bad," the 
upper middle class rates it "not so good," and the lower class rates it 
as being "good."
^^These results do not coincide with the hypothesis that the more 
anomic, politically alienated, and isolated that a subject is, the less 
he will participate politically and the more negative will be his political 
participation (in the event that he participates at all) in politics.
While it is more or less correct in assuming that an estranged and iso­
lated individual will not participate politically, the results from this 
Semantic Differential test suggest that the estranged and isolated indi­
vidual is more inclined to respond positively than negatively in national 
or international politics. It is the partly anomic^ the partly alienated, 
and the partly isolated individual who is the one most inclined toward 
negative political participation.
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The government of Russia. On the force and activity factors it 
is seen that a progressively positive political rating occurs from the 
upper middle class to the lower middle class to the lower class. Accord­
ingly, the Russian government is seen as being "strong" and "active" by 
the upper middle class, as being stronger and more active by the lower 
middle class, and as being stronger and more active by the lower class.
On the good-bad scale, the lower middle class views the government of 
Russia as being "good" while the upper middle class sees it as "not so 
good" and the lower class esteems it as being "neither good nor bad."
The government of Cuba. All three classes agree that the 
government of Red China is quite "strong" and "active," and all three 
classes rate it as being "bad," with the strongest rating of "bad" coming 
from the lower class and the least strong rating of "bad" from the upper 
middle class.
The government of France. With little variation among their 
scores, all three classes esteem the government of France to be "quite 
strong," "highly active," and "excellent."
To sum up these observations, the following two conclusions are 
offered. First, the upper middle and lower middle classes in general 
give higher or more negative ratings to these six foreign governments 
than does the lower class. This may be due to a difference in education 
and communication. It is speculated that the two higher socioeconomic 
classes are more informed and their evaluations reflect a more knowledge­
able frame of reference. This seems to suggest that negativism evaluating 
other governments increases with greater education and access to information. 
Second, the lower class tends to view all governments as being stronger.
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more active, and more virtuous than do the two other classes, with the 
exception of the evaluative factor for the government of Red China. The 
lower class sees the Red Chinese government as "bad."
National Political Attitudes 
Perhaps greater confidence can be placed in the results concerning 
national political attitudes since the number of subjects rating the 
seventeen different politically significant groups, movements, and or­
ganizations in Argentina was higher than it was for the number rating 
the six foreign governments. The results of these ratings by socio­
economic strata will now be presented under four headings: political
parties and movements, power blocs, occupational groupings, and economic 
interests.
Political Parties and Movements
The six political parties and movements that are rated by Argen­
tine subjects in the "urban Litoral" region are: the UCRP (Union Civica
Radical del Pueblo), the UCRI (Union Civica Radical Intransigente), the 
UDELPA (Union del Pueblo Argentino), the Socialist Party, the Peronist 
movement, and the Communists. The factor ratings of these six parties 
and movements by the three socioeconomic classes are shown in Table 41.
In examining the average ratings of these six political groupings 
by the three socioeconomic classes, it is quite striking that the three 
political parties (UCRP, UCRI, and UDELPA) are rated quite negatively 
on all three factors by all three classes of subjects. All three classes 
agree that the UCRP is "quite weak" but a "little bit active" and "not 
so good." The average ratings on the UCRI, like the ratings given to the
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TABLE 41
AVERAGE RATINGS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS
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Union Civica Radical Intransigente 






Union del Pueblo Argentino 
3 4 5 6
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The Socialist Party 
3 4 5 6
The Peronist Movement 























Upper middle class  ooExtreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-*-* ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class  **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level
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UCRP, show little if any variance among the three classes in regarding 
the UCRI to be "rather weak," only "slightly active," and "not so good." 
The ratings go even higher or in more negative directions for the 
UDELPA party. On the evaluative factor, UDELPA is rated "about even," 
or in the middle, by the upper middle class, whereas the lower middle 
and lower classes categorize it as "bad."
While the Socialist Party is not liked by any of the groups, it 
is still not as much disliked as the three preceding political parties.
To all classes, it is "weak," "inactive," and "not so good." As could 
be expected, the Peronist movement is rated progressively more positive 
in going from the highest to the lower socioeconomic class, but the 
differences surprisingly are slight ones and do not justify concluding 
that the Peronist movement is viewed more favorably by the lower socio­
economic classes. As can be seen in Table 41, Peronism is considered 
to be "neither strong nor weak," "neither active nor passive," and 
"neither good nor bad" by all three socioeconomic groups. And, apparently 
the Communists are not very popular. They are rated as being "somewhat 
weak," "not very active," and "bad."
The Power Blocs
Regarded by the researcher as perhaps the four strongest or most 
influential power blocs outside, the government structure itself, the 
Roman Catholic Church, the armed forces, the CGT (General Labor Confed­
eration), and the university students all seem capable of acting upon 
and changing the national social and political orders. These power blocs 
or entities are rated in Table 42.
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TABLE 42
AVERAGE RATINGS OF POWER BLOCS ON THREE













Roman Catholic Church 
4 5 6 7 8
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
2 3
The Armed Forces 
4 5 6 7 8
The General Labor Confederation 
2 3 4 5 6 7
The University Student Groups 
2 3 4 5 6 7
















Upper middle class  ooExtreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-o-* ++Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class-- **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level
Whereas all three classes display with little variation among
them a general disdain for political parties and a general indifference 
toward political movements, there are significant differences among the 
classes in their ratings of the four power blocs. The lower class looks 
upon the Roman Catholic Church as being politically stronger, more active.
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and more virtuous than do the other two classes. The lower middle class 
rates the Church as being stronger and more active than does the upper 
middle class, but the latter judges the Church to be "somewhat good" 
whereas the former rates the Church as "neutral" (neither good nor bad). 
The upper middle class views the, armed forces as being a little weaker, 
a lot less active, and less virtuous in politics than do the other two 
classes. All three classes, however, rate the armed forces as being 
"quite strong," "quite active," and "not so good." The CGT is rated 
the most favorably by the lower class, although all three classes con­
sider it to be "strong," "active," and "good." Similarly the university
students are rated as being "strong," "active," and "good" by all three
classes, although the students are rated as being stronger by the lower
class, as being less virtuous by the lower middle class, and as being 
more active and more virtuous by the upper middle class.
Occupational Groupings
Four major occupational groupings— the bureaucracy or public 
service employes, the industrial working class or proletariat, the pro­
fessionals, and the peasantry— are rated by the respondents. Table 43 
records the average ratings on the three factors by the socioeconomic 
classes.
Generally, all three classes rate the bureaucracy as a negative 
element in the national political context. The lower middle class, in 
which no few of the subjects are bureaucrats themselves, rate the 
bureaucracy as being weaker and less active politically than do the 
other two classes. But the lower class imagines that the bureaucracy
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TABLE 43
AVERAGE RATINGS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS
ON THREE FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA
The Bureaucracy 
2 3 4 5 6 7





The Industrial Working Class 





3 4 5 6
The Professionals 
2 3 4' 5 6 7 8
Very strong ^ ------------ r*#,----------------Weak
Very active  ---------------  V**----------------- Passive
Excellent ----------------------------    —  Bad
The Peasantry 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Very strong---------------------- ^  . « -------------r̂ tt---- Weak
Very active 
Excellent
Upper middle class  ooExtreme groups significant beyond ,05 level
Lower middle class-o-o 44-Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class  **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level
is stronger and more active. On the evaluation factor, the lower class 
views the bureaucracy as "not so good" and the upper middle class sees 
it as "somewhat bad." As may be expected, the lower class considers
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the industrial working class to be politically stronger, much more active, 
and rather more virtuous than do the two higher socioeconomic classes, 
although all three classes deem it to be from slightly to very strong, 
from neutral to highly active, and from somewhat good to excellent. The 
professionals are rated quite strong and active and somewhat good by the 
lower class and the lower middle class, but they are rated as being only 
a little bit strong, somewhat passive, and not so good by the upper middle 
class. None of the classes rate the peasantry as being "strong" or "active" 
in politics, but all three classes view it as being politically "good" to 
"excellent."
The Economic Interests
The three groups which constitute "the economic interests" are: 
the local trade unions, the large landowners, and the industrialists and 
financiers. In Table 44 these groups are rated on force, activity, and 
evaluation by the socioeconomic classes.
The upper middle class subjects are by and large unaware of and 
unwilling to pass judgment on the local trade unions. As can be noted, 
the lower class rates the local trade unions more favorably on all three 
factors than does the lower middle class. With regard to ratings of the 
large landowners and the industrialists and financiers, it is significant 
that these two groups are rated progressively more favorably in moving 
from the highest to the lowest socioeconomic levels. Communist and other 
leftist propaganda, which is most generally directed at the lower socio­
economic levels, attributes the ills of the working classes to exploitation 
by the landowners and capitalists. As this table shows, however, the
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TABLE 44
AVERAGE RATINGS OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON THREE
FACTORS BY SOCIOECONOMIC STRATA
The Local Trade Unions 
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Very strong ------------------ - ---- --------------------Weak
Very active-------------- ---------------------------------- Passive
Excellent — =------------ — - ------------- **— =•--------- Bad
The Large Landowners 







2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Very strong ------------------------Weak
Very active----------------------------------------------- Passive
Excellent ---------  v \ ----------------------------------Bad
Upper middle class  ooExtreme groups significant beyond .05 level
Lower middle class-*-* -H-Extreme groups significant beyond .01 level
Lower class  **Extreme groups significant beyond .001 level
lower class regards the landowners as being quite "strong," "active," 
and "good" politically. The lower middle class views the landowners 
as being less so, and the upper middle class views them as still less 
strong and active but a little more good. The industrialists and 
financiers are rated only "somewhat strong," "rather active," and 
"not so good" by the upper middle class, whereas both the lower class and 
lower middle class rate this group as being quite "strong," "active," 
and "good."
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Political Belief Systems 
Political belief systems in the "urban Litoral" in Argentina 
consist of both the "is" and the "ought," together forming existential 
and normative propositions concerning the actual and ideal behavior of 
men and societies. It will be the purpose of this section of the chapter 
to examine more methodically and in greater detail the relevant political 
values manifested in Argentine society and how these values affect be­
havior on the political scene.
Existential and Normative Values 
It is of paramount importance to realize that the image of reality 
that an individual constructs in his mind is of greater consequence than 
is the concrete reality itself. Expressed in more specific terms, the 
conceptions held by Argentines concerning what is and what should be the 
actual state of political affairs in their country are more relevant and 
important than is the actual state of political affairs there per se.
The preceding section reported on the investigation of the personal 
conceptualizations of political groups and governments. The subjects 
tested revealed their "value conceptions" of the groups and governments 
which they rated. In this part of the chapter, the focus will be on 
some of the more important value conceptions and beliefs^^ that determine 
the correctness of the lenses through which Argentines view their political 
environment.
^^While this is meant to be a total approach, admittedly not all 
relevant aspects of Argentine political culture and belief systems, 
given the several limitations of this research, can be covered in this 
paper.
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General Orientation toward National Life
So far as individual conceptualization of national life is con­
cerned, the approach or direction taken by Argentines is either incurably 
optimistic or utterly pessimistic. To illustrate this fact, it is suf­
ficient to cite the opinions of two nationally prominent persons who have
distinguished themselves in the same field of endeavor. Both are act-
18resses who give their views concerning national life.
The life situation is dependent on each individual. The 
governments do not matter. For example, if there is a good 
horse race on (Forlî is running), the race track is crowded 
with people. With respect to the government, I can say that 
I am hopeful. We've got to have faith. Life has knocked me 
around but I keep on believing.— Tita Merello.
To say what I am thinking /about the national situation/,
I will have to use a crude expression: from bad to worse,
from every point of view. In my activity I am completely 
paralyzed. We don't know where we are going.— Beatriz Matar.
Value Conceptions concerning the Nation
The most important general value conceptions held by Argentines 
were those concerning the nature and potentiality of their country in 
terms of its strengths and weaknesses.
The Greatness of Argentina
The idea is still rampant among Argentines (because it has existed 
for so long and was so conclusively confirmed in the first half of the 
century) that their country is the most developed of the Latin American 
countries and one of the great commercial powers of the world. The
18Opinions cited in "Argentina pregunta icomo vamos?" Extra. II 
(October, 1966), pp. 52-53.
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present contradiction in Argentina— between this widely disseminated and 
deeply instilled belief and harsh economic realities that have written a 
tragic postlude to Argentina’s former high rate of economic development—  
is not seen with equal clarity by all Argentines;
The Problem with Argentina
Lack of integration and participation. It is current among the
Argentine "intelligentsia" that the ills of the country are the result
20of an insufficient social integration and participation.
Enough of the theories and cure-alls. What must be done 
is to form a body of workers, managers, professionals, and 
university and technical personnel in order to discover the 
best means for resolving the problems that affect Argentines.—
Luis Angeleri, labor official.
The problem with Argentina arises in the marginalization 
of the working class, which exists in national life solely 
for the purpose of being servants to the rest of society.—
Juan Carlos Marin, sociologist.
/National life is worsened bv7 lack of a sense of nation­
ality, by more individual behavior than social action, by a 
lack of concern with transcendental problems, and by not 
giving opinions for fear of becoming involved.— A. J. Amuchas- 
tegui, historian.
19The failure to distinguish between what Argentina is in past 
realities or wishful conceptions and what the country is in actuality 
reflects the same defect (or, if you will, virtue) characteristic of 
the inner man. "The Argentine tends more toward seeing himself as he 
would like to be or not like to be rather than seeing himself as he 
in reality is, and so he is disoriented." Salvador Nielsen, "iEstamos 
sumergidos los argentines? iQue nos pasa?" Panorama. No. 41 (October, 
1966), pp. 53, 57. As financier Alejandro Shaw, put it: "We were taught
in school that our country was the most advanced and progressive in all 
Latin America, but we now discover, in view of the evidence, that if 
this were true, it no longer remains so." Cited in Nielsen, ibid.. p. 59. 
Note, too, how insistent Raggio, loc. cit.. is that Argentina is not an 
underdeveloped country, but is slowed down by obstacles that it could 
well surmount. See also Noble, loc. cit.
ZOcited in Nielsen, ibid.. p. 59.
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Lack of purpose and dedication. From other intellectuals and
national figures a simpler explanation is offered for the failure of
Argentina to achieve a higher degree of development, viz.. that the
21inhabitants of the country have neither goals nor initiative.
We live in an illogical country. While vitality is the 
first fruit to bloom here, there is no continuity nor organ­
ization. We have a life ferment that is not channeled. We 
live as the reflection of other countries.— Gyula Kosice, artist.
We are a new country with no objectives, with no true 
teachers; what happens to us happens because of the deformed 
images to which we respond in all experiences.— Egle Martin, 
entertainer.
What we need is to make the present system function better, 
fundamentally through a system in which is will be possible 
for adversaries to co-exist, whether it be a liberal democracy 
or some other system.— Torcuato Di Telia, industrialist.
What's wrong with us is that we have not wanted to work; 
and, in addition, each person has his own solutions for 
straightening out the country. What then is the real solution?
Three words: work, work, and more work.— Clemente Lococo, Jr.,
industrialist.
Inequitable distribution of wealth. The working class and its 
defenders firmly believe that the big economic and financial interests 
of the country function and conspire to exploit the w o r k e r s . The 
middle class blames directly the shifting social structure and rise of 
the proletariat and indirectly the government for permitting the
Zllbid.
22The newest revolution in Argentine politics (marked June 28, 
1966, date of the military coup ending the civilian Radical administration 
of Arturo Illia) has been greatly hampered in obtaining mass support for 
its various economic measures, particularly, because the mass working 
population firmly believes, despite the great amount of official pro­
nouncements to the contrary, that its revolutionary government acts only 
in support of the old-line conservatives and landed oligarchy and "sells 
out" the country to foreign imperialists, thus "destroying the Argentine
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23inflationary trend that has taken away its purchasing power. And 
the upper classes throughout the various geographic regions vie against 
one another to obtain greater shares of the national wealth
Actions and Beliefs Inherited from the Past
Certain beliefs have prevailed in Argentina through time and 
have particularly conditioned the present belief systems. It is certain 
that they will continue to influence Argentine thinking processes and 
behavior.
Heritage of Aggression and the Scapegoat
From the aggressive persecution directed by Juan Manuel Rosas 
against his political enemies and the civil strife of the caudillo era 
to the devastating Indian campaigns led by General Roca, the vindictive
economy and submerging the people in a sea of misery, hunger, and unem­
ployment." "Onganîa-Alsogaray: hambre-desocupacion-entrega," printed
notice by the Argentine Communist Party (Capital Federal ZBârrio O n c ^ : 
December 9, 1966).
23lnstituto de Investigaciones Economicas y Financieras de la 
C.G.E., loc. cit.; Isacovich, op. cit.. pp. 283, 289; Fundacion de Inves­
tigaciones Econômicas Latinoamericanas, loc. cit.; Belaunde. op. cit.. 
pp. 72-75, 101-104. The Sindicato de Vendedores de Diarios y Revistas 
de la Capital y Gran Buenos Aires (Trade Union of Newspaper and Magazine 
Sellers of the Capital and Greater Buenos Aires), in analyzing the re­
sults of the.first five months of the "Argentine Revolution," pointed 
out as one result: "fiscal policy impoverishing vast sectors of the
middle class." (Buenos Aires: December 13, 1966).
^*"For 55 years we have been struggling against the economic 
interests of Buenos Aires that have not permitted us to expand. Only 
now are we starting to break through the chains of centralized policies 
and control. For years now we have seen all our best technical people 
taken away by Buenos Aires. As soon as some one here shows any promise 
whatever, Buenos Aires will grab him up. But once the tunnel and high­
way are completed /see pages 246-2$Z7 and our port /Santa Ffi7 is renov­
ated and enlarged, we will achieve a high degree of development. We
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attacks upon the Argentine oligarchy particularly by Eva Peron, and the
vengeful purges of peronists that followed, Argentine political history
abounds with examples of aggression. The object of this aggression is
referred to by Argentine author Julio Mafud as,the chivo emisario* or
scapegoat. For men as politically and mentally diverse from one another,
as were Rosas, Sarmiento, and Hernandez, the Indian was the national
scapegoat. Later, after the Indian was exterminated, the gaucho became
the national scapegoat. Still later, the scapegoat was elevated to the
political arena and became converted into the opposing party and the
defeated or outgoing government. Ever since then the opposition parties
and past government administrations have always been at fault and to
25blame for all the national crises and ills.
Heritage of Absolutism
Evidenced in the uncompromising struggles between unitarios 
and federales, in which excesses abounded on both sides and neither side 
was willing to concede any of its p r i n c i p l e s , this mental state has
will tap all the wealth of the North, not only the Litoral but the entire 
Parana basin, including parts of Uruguay, Paraguay, and Brazil." Inter­
view with youthful business executive, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 10, 
1966.
25For a more extensive discussion of the chivo-emisario pheno­
menon in Argentina, see Mafud, El desarraigo argentino. op. cit.. pp.
66-68. Salvador Nielsen, loc. cit.. observes that "something of a per­
secution complex oppresses the Argentine soul . . . Z@o that?the Russians, 
the North Americans, the British, the Nazis, the Jews, the liberals, the 
antüiberals, the rich, the poor, or the state are to blame. All nation­
al ills are traced to the archaic agrarian-cattle structure or to the 
impatient developmentalists." Jose Miguens, sociologist, states: "Social 
life is highly neurotic. The typical life is filled with neuroses. The 
typical life is a paranoic life. There is no dialogue, just aggression."
26Quesada, loc. cit.
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been rather influential in shaping the course of Argentine political 
life. In the absolutist frame of mind, the individual is "absolutely 
correct"; his ideas are the only ones plausible and he alone is able 
to perceive "the national reality." His opponents are "absolutely" 
wrong, and their ideas are not at all appropriate nor in keeping with
the national reality. This mental set renders political compromise
27out of the question, and tends to engender a superfluity of ideologies 
and political positions.
Heritage of Xenophobia and International Distrust
That Argentina resents any foreign intervention into either its 
economy or politics has been substantially documented in the preceding 
chapter. This historical resentment and distrust of foreign powers has
found its way into that broad.range of ideology that constitutes the
28most prevalent kind of Argentine nationalism.
The National Cult of Courage and Heroes
The national cult of courage is regarded as a sociological 
institution which lies between barbarism and civilization and provides 
"the only civilizing element that structured and channeled human life
27The unerring and adamant refusal to compromise in the,face of 
an overwhelming opposition has led no few Argentine political figures—  
see Jorge Sânchez Arana, "Los présidentes no se mata," Extra., II 
(October, 1966), pp. 55-60— such as Leandro Alem, Horacio Quiroga, 
Leopoldo Lugones, and Lisandro de la Torre, to commit suicide.
28 ,Fernandez, op. cit.. p. 558, describes the Peron kind of
nationalism in which xenophobia is one of the chief component elements.
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29during a period famed for its incivility." Under the national cult
of courage, men are judged not by their words but according to the
courage they display and the valor of their actions. On the foundation
of courage.and heroic deeds alone Argentine society and politics are 
30structured. This traditional affection for the courageous man or
the caudillo is esteemed to be very much alive today in the Argentine 
31soul.'
The spirit and character of the Argentine man are 
molded on the background of these sentiments described 
by Juan Agustin Garcia: the native code of honor, the
national cult of courage^ and disrespect for the law.
To these we should add the Catholic faith and the familial 
tradition of friendship and hospitality.— Enrique.Fentanes, 
inspector general of the Federal Police.
We Argentines practice the cult of heroes and we have 
gone too long a time without heroes. The bad part about 
this is that we continue to believe that national recon­
struction does not begin nor repose in the action of 
every one of our fellow patriots but rather is the exclu­
sive result of the action of the "magic wand."— Jose Luis 
de Imaz, sociologist.
Argentina in the Contemporary World
The foreign policy and international disposition of Argentina 
resemble in certain respects those of its European cultural model,
^^Julio Mafud, El desarraigo argentino. op. cit.. pp. 61-63, 
discusses specifically el culto nacional del coraje (the national cult 
of courage).
30Four periods in Argentine political history particularly 
demonstrate the phenomena of courage and heroics: the chaos of the
1820's, the caudillism of Juan Manuel Rosas (1826-1851), Yrigoyenism 
(1890-1930), and Peronism (1943-1955).
^^Cited in Nielsen, loc. cit.
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France under De Gaulle. Its foreign dealings have reflected a ruggedly 
independent and nationalistic course, and its external like its internal 
policies and ideologies have reflected a superfluity of ideas with a 
frame of reference tending toward authoritarian solutions.
Economic Nationalism
The doctrine of "economic nationalism," which calls for not 
only increasing national productivity but also for decreasing the parti­
cipation of any foreign or external interests in the national economy,
32is subscribed to by the majority of Argentines.
Foreign Participation in the Economy
An antithetical belief to the above is the one held by many of 
the landowning oligarchy, or at least attributed to the agrarian aris­
tocracy,^^ that the country cannot develop nationally without receiving
^^The 1963 election of an obscure country doctor, Arturo Illia, 
to the highest national office reflected in part the great public support 
engendered by the campaign promise made by Dr. Illia and his running mate 
Carlos H. Perette to annul foreign oil contracts. The UCRP, led by 
Ricardo Balbxn, favoring the granting of oil concessions to foreign 
companies and paying those companies with the oil they produced, lost 
out in the 1957 elections.
^^The day after the Presidential Address of November 7, 1966, in 
which many opponents charged the revolution with yielding to the large 
economic interests of the country, the elementary-school children of 
working-class parents in one particular school commented to their teacher: 
"Have you heard, teacher, that the Japanese are going to come and take 
over our railroads? Isn't that a macana /bad deal or revolting deve- 
lopmeqtZ?" Such conclusion was drawn 1) from the affirmation by President 
Ongania that unprofitable state enterprises would either begin to correct 
their deficit operations or be turned over to private enterprise and 2) 
from the increasing relations between Argentina and Japan. This comment 
is a defensive one and shows the jprojpensity of the working class to believe 
the worst of their government which, to them, is desirous of bringing in 
foreign capital and expanding economic relations with foreign powers.
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considerable aid and capital from abroad. This conception is termed 
"anti-national" by nationalists.
A Significant Agrarian Destiny
One of the chief reasons why agricultural production has remained
stagnant in this century, apart from the latifundist structure and the
dilatory application of modern technology,lies in the belief that an
increased agricultural production will further subordinate Argentina
as a primary producer, subject it to the inelasticity of demand for
primary products, and place it in a disadvantageous trade position.
But elsewhere it is believed that this reasoning ignores the reality
35of a more promising agricultural future for Argentina.
Latin American Economic Integration
Argentina is viewed as being in a condition of stagnation in 
which most sectors of national life have suffered a marked decrease in 
real income and standard of living. Part of this stagnation is the re­
sult of archaic social and economic structures which resist change and 
reform. Thus, more and more Argentines are reaching out for a single 
new economic solution to topple the old structures and more and more they
^^See Raul Pedro Scalibrini, Reforma agraria argentine (Buenos 
Aires: D. Francisco A. Colombo, 1963), pp. 37-41; Ventura Morera,
Agriculture e industrie (Buenos Aires : Editorial Universitaria de
Buenos Aires, 1963), chapter 22.
35Interview with Alquiles Allevi, agricultural exporter, Santa 
Fe, Argentina, October é, 1966. Mr. Allevi affirmed his belief to the 
researcher that the future of his country lies in the exportation of 
agricultural products. It was further his opinion that the productive 
potential of., the farm land is only being partly exploited and that 
shipping can be greatly expanded. He told the researcher: "There is
no hope in industry alone. We must rededicate outselves to agriculture. 
Only in agricultural production is the future of Argentina secure."
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are turning to the prospect of Argentina becoming both a primary exporter
36and industrial power within an economically integrated Latin America.
36This was borne out by newspaper and magazine accounts of the 
proceedings of the LAFTA meetings in which the Argentine government, 
various economic interests, and diverse groups seemed to place much 
emphasis on faith in LAFTA.
CHAPTER IX 
THE RECEIVING POLITICAL SYSTEM
Whether a political system or a society undergoes any change or 
not will depend on all the preceding elements that have been discussed 
(the total environment; the funnels of social-group, political-group, 
and governing interests; and the chamber of political culture), plus 
the receiving and responding capabilities of that political system.
This chapter will deal specifically and entirely with the receiving 
contemporary political system in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.^
The Change Capability of the System
The stability of the political system in question may depend on 
its ability either to resist or to undergo change. Every system receives 
a certain amount of pressures and stabilizers. When a system is bombarded 
by excessive pressures its stability is placed in jeopardy. The simul­
taneous presence of a number of stabilizers in a political system will 
give that system a certain strength or capability, to absorb and resist 
all the incoming pressures and the demands for certain changes. Or, a 
system can utilize the margin between stability and instability, which
^Being considered as the political system of the "urban Litoral" 




stabilizers have provided for it, in order to respond to demands for 
change and to effect notable changes outside and within the system.
The kinds of pressures and stabilizers which affected the political 
system in the "urban Litoral" during the period of this study will now 
be elaborated. The procedure for determining the emerging pressures 
and stabilizers which influence the system is one that is admittedly 
casual. The identification and elaboration of these so-called pressures 
and stabilizers are dependent on observations made by the researcher, 
on the relevancy and exactness of the sources that are used, and on the 
interpretation given phenomena in determining whether they are primarily 
pressures or stabilizers.
Pressures
Pressures for change need not be violent in order to force and
bring about desired changes. Neither do the changes that occur need to
be disruptive ones that lead to political instability. In fact, change- 
inducing pressures can very well be conducted toward greater stability 
of the system. If the initial inflow of pressures is interpreted as
being the forerunner of more intensified future pressure, the system
authorities may take the initiative in effecting the desired changes 
themselves, or they'may counteract by blocking the entrance of the 
pressures into the system and by stifling the originators of pressure 
on the system.
Wealth and Welfare Distribution (Pressures)
Inflation. The political system in the "urban Litoral" is
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pressured intensely from the inflationary character of the national eco­
nomy. This inflation is in response to a stagnated and chaotic economy 
in which per capita production has been declining ever since the end of 
World War II. Greatly accentuating the inflationary pressure and slow­
down in productivity is the ever increasing consumption at home and the 
somewhat variable and decreasing exportation abroad.
Devaluation. The system is pressured also from its short-run 
inflationary measure of devaluation of its currency. Devaluation serves 
to heighten the effects of the already rapidly moving inflation and the 
rising cost of living and to contradict the professed principal goal of 
the new government, viz.. to eliminate inflation. Opposition forces are 
able to say that it is strange for a government that is so determined 
to revitalize the economy to start off with a measure so clearly in­
flationary.
Rising expectations. An awareness on the part of the lower and 
middle classes of a seeming unequal distribution of wealth and the revo­
lution of rising expectations underpin a destabilizing flow of pressures 
and demands into the system. This flow of pressures and demands takes 
recognition of the very real decrease in salaries and standard of living 
for the lower and middle classes. The remuneration of salaried employes,
as a percentage of total production or income, has been declining more
2or less steadily since 1950. As was pointed out in chapter IV, both the 
lower and middle classes, but especially the latter, have been affected 
by the rising cost of living, with which salaries have not kept abreast.
2Ferrara, op. cit.. p. 122, shows salaried employes receiving 
43.1 per cent of total national income in 1961 as compared to 50.5 per 
cent in 1952.
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Population and services. The continued migration of persons from 
Bolivia, Paraguay, and Chile to urban centers in Argentina highlight the
3
pressing problems of inadequate housing, and the increasing difficulties 
of providing all urban residents with the necessary health, medical, 
police, fire, and other public services, such as urban transportation 
and the utilities (gas, running water, electricity, etc.).^
Retirement funds. The presence of some 4 1/2-million persons 
dependent on pensions and retirement checks which are being irregularly 
received and whose value is being eroded away by the rising cost of 
living represents yet another form of pressure on the system. The sys­
tem is forced to meet the pension payments, which it cannot afford 
financially, and to handle the rising dissatisfactions which proceed 
from the group of pensioners and retired persons.^
Modernization. Pressure is further derived from the agrarian 
and industrial sectors which want the government to introduce technological
2
The current housing deficit, as noted, is made more critical by
pernicious inflation which erodes away savings. In a recent survey by
the Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo (CONADE) it was discovered that lower 
class families with average incomes and needs can only save 3.4 per cent 
of their gross income for housing and middle class families 12.8 per 
cent. Under continued inflation and the rising costs of building materials 
the savings figures are rapidly dissolved. In actuality there are 4,570,000 
dwellings for 5,920,000 families, representing a deficit of 1,350,000 
units dispersed irregularly throughout the different economic regions.
See "Con inflacion no habrâ viviendas," Analisis. loc. cit.; Direccion 
Nacional de Estadîsticas y Censos, Secretaria de Estado de Hacienda,
"Indice del costo de la construccion en la Capital Federal," Edificacion,
Informe E. 16 (June, 1960), pp. 8-22.
4See pages 100-102 and Ferrara, op. cit.. pp. 151-291.
^Interviews with a number of pensioners and retired employes 
elicited that the government during the period of this study was paying 
just once every four months, and that payment was for just two months 
at a time. Thus pensioners were collecting only half of what was due 
them.
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reforms so that productivity will increase. The exporting interests are 
acutely aware that Argentina has been losing its relative share of the 
world agricultural market for some time^ and also that the,absolute 
foreign exchange earnings from exports have been diminishing for some 
time.^
Neglected sectors. Pressures are coming from yet another aspect
of deficient economic development, viz.., from not exploiting certain
industries or economic opportunities to their fullest potential. In
neglecting to develop fully all the indigenous economic possibilities,
the Litoral region and the Argentine nation are losing valuable exchange
earnings, as well as inviting non-nationals to come in and exploit the
8economic areas being neglected by national interests.
^For example, comparing Argentina with the United States in 
Fuchs, op. cit.. p. 522, it is seen that in the 1930-1934 period Ar­
gentine wheat exports accounted for 30 per cent of the world wheat 
market to 6.7 per cent for United States wheat exports; in 1960, how­
ever, the United States gained 51 per cent of the wheat market and Ar­
gentina dropped to just 8 per cent. In corn exports in the first period, 
Argentina had 66.3 per cent of the world market to 1.3 per cent for the 
United States; in 1960 it was 16.5 per cent for Argentina and 52.8 per 
cent for the United States. In flax exports, Argentina fell from having 
60 per cent of the world market in 1935-1938 to 31 per cent in 1960 as 
compared with the 47 per cent of the market achieved by the United States 
in 1960. The United States had no flax exports in the 1935-1938 period.
^Ferrara, op. cit.. p. 110, shows that as a relative percentage 
of GNP export earnings have fallen from 27.1 per cent in the 1900-1904 
period to 21.9 per cent in the 1930-1934 period to 7.4 per cent in the 
1950-1954 period to 6.8 per cent in 1955, etc., giving indication of a 
steady diminution.
®The most striking example of a neglected Argentine industry that 
invites foreign interposition occurred when no fewer than 22 Russian 
fishing ships were observed on November 17, 1966, to be operating in or 
close to Argentine territorial waters, according to naval authorities.
See Clarin. November 25, 1966, p. 44. The problem is related to the 
slowness of Argentine fishing organizations in putting into effect their 
own plans for greater exploitation of the national fishing industry and 
to the great lack of ships.
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Provincial development. Demands of the outlying provinces and 
outlying provincial-based industries to receive greater shares of the 
national wealth and to achieve greater productivity in terms of Buenos 
Aires and the Federal Capital are being made with increasing success, 
particularly in light of the new revolutionary government's commitment 
to regional and provincial development.
Liberal economic policy. Not only are the provinces and certain 
provincial economic interests pressuring for a reformed economic policy 
but the entire spectrum of economic strategists and owners of the means 
of production seem to be pushing for a return to economic principles of 
the "capitalist" era: a free rate of exchangej modernization of business,
industry, and agriculture; closer ties with the various international 
trade organisms; more private ownership of state businesses; greater 
efficiency in state enterprises; and, greater productivity in agriculture.
Rapid development. It is quite evident from increasing expressions 
of dissatisfaction that the system authorities will have to satisfy the 
demands from all sectors of society and the economy for reducing national
Concerning the need for more Argentine ships, recent data show 
that Empresas Lineas Maritimas Argentinas (ELMA), the government ship­
ping firm, has a total of 48 ships which carry a 428,000 ton total load, 
or 6 per cent of the total foreign transportation. Private Argentine 
shipping enterprises account for 12 per cent of foreign shipping, leaving 
a total of 82 per cent of all foreign transportation being performed by 
non-Argentine ships. See "Urgente necesidad de bodegas argentinas," El 
Economists. XVII (September 24, 1966), p. 1.
Another case of the same problem is publicized by the nationalist 
periodical, Azul y Blanco. I (November 10, 1966), p. 10, in which it 
attacks "El tercer vuelo semanal de Braniff." The article charges that 
Braniff International, a North American based airlines company, is ceded 
a third weekly flight by the Direccion Nacional de Aviacion Civil (Nat­
ional Civil Aviation Agency), benefitting a foreign enterprise "to the 
detriment of Aerolineas Argentinas."
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deficits and promoting rapid economic growth. Failure to accomplish 
either or both of these tasks may well spell the end of the June 28,
1966, government.
Power and Political Participation (Pressures)
The strongest pressures on the government during this study 
originated in the following spheres of power: the dissident government
officials and officers in the armed forces; the university students, 
particularly the extremist groups; the middle and lower classes general­
ly; the middle class bureaucracy and the urban workers in the CGT; the 
provincial governments and officials; the leaders of the dissolved 
political parties and movements; the large economic organizations: ACIEL
and CGE, and certain international organisms: LAFTA, IMF, the World
Bank, GATT, etc.^
The dissident officials and officers. Much in evidence at the 
time this study was in progress, in the latter quarter of 1966, was the 
lack of agreement among leading figures in the national government and 
armed forces which resulted in several key resignations.^® It was 
noted that President Ongania and the other officers in the government 
had erected a communications barrier between other officers of the armed
9The reader is cautioned against equating pressure activity with 
opposition activity. The fact that all these preceding groups are sources 
of demands and pressures upon the political system does not mean that all 
these groups opposed the regime or national government. It was observed 
in chapter VIII that the majority of the members of the strongest of all 
pressure groups, the labor or working class, said that they initially 
supported the government, according to a magazine survey.
^®Cr6nica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, p. 1. Besides Dr. Felipe 
S. Tami, president of the Banco Central, there were two other members of 
the economic cabinet: Dr. Hector Salduendo, vice president of the same.
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forces and themselves, which was regarded as a potentially explosive 
condition.
The university. It has been noted that the universities were 
among the first to oppose the new government and continued to be a 
source of continuous pressure on the government throughout the period 
of this study. Nearly all student groups acted and demonstrated on 
behalf of their autonomy and political freedom within the university. 
The new regime admittedly erred badly in attempting to resolve the 
crisis. While it felt it needed to suppress university opposition, 
its intervention and proposed reorganization schemes brought it wide 
criticism not only from within Argentina but from abroad as well.
The middle and lower classes. The rising cost of living and 
prices, plus the multitude of unpleasantries of urban life which con­
tribute to alienation, created personal demands among the middle and 
lower classes for the government to correct all the grief-causing 
miseries of life. Individuals tended to believe that all the problems 
of life are ones which might be resolved politically and to expect the 
government to take the initiative to put into effect the kinds of 
developmental programs deemed necessary.
and Dr. Allieta Guadagni, arbitrator in the Consejo Federal de Inversiones, 
who resigned. See also "Primera crisis del gobierno," Analisis. VI 
(October 3, 1966), pp. 8-1,0, and the exposition in the next chapter with 
respect to the reactions to government policy on pages
l^This condition is described quite fully in "Ejercito y gobierno; 
ihay plazos?" Primera Plana. IV (October 24, 1966), pp. 12-14. One 
result of such condition, as this article points out, is the possibility 
of the rise in popularity of other high military officials, e.g.. General 
Osiris Villegas, who achieves more rapport with the public and who can 
well displace the present power leaders if they remain aloof from and 
ignore him. See also "El gobierno y las fuerzas armadas," Inedito. I 
(October 12, 1966), pp. 4-5.
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The middle class bureaucrats (CGT). Working through their unions 
under the banner of the CGT, middle-class workers and white-collar bureau­
crats expressed opposition to all the government-announced programs of 
restructuring state enterprises. It was feared with reason that the 
public administration might be overhauled too drastically and that public 
employes would be dismissed en masse. The white collar, lower-level 
civil employes pressured the government to reconsider and to make careful 
studies before attempting any such renovation of state-operated businesses.
The organized workers (CGT). Solidly aligned against any form 
of government or political group in which it does not have meaningful ex­
pression and authority, the worker organizations of the urban working 
class appeared to oppose most government policy. Any measure or policy 
passed after November 7, 1966, which did not produce immediate benefits 
to the workers, incurred the opposition of the labor organizations. The 
workers themselves represented a constant pressure on the system not to 
put any measure or policy into effect that might further compromise the 
already low standard of living which they were suffering. In opposing 
government policies, the workers had also come to demand greater political 
participation.
The provinces. Added pressure was put on the federal government 
by the provinces to obtain beneficial public works, a greater proportion 
of the national budget, and more political power in terms of the vested 
interests of Buenos Aires.
The politicians and parties. Because the instigators of the 
June 28, 1966, revolution were coming under increasing criticism and
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their public support was beginning to weaken, the former political-party 
leaders took heart and began to pressure for a return to power and for
12the restoration of the national constitutional and electoral machinery.
ACIEL and CGE. It was concluded in the previous chapter on 
political-interest groups that the industrialists and landowners had 
considerable influence on the economic policies that were adopted by 
the revolutionary government and were urging more action on the inter-
13national front in opening new markets and liberalizing trade policies.
International organisms. With the devaluation of the peso and 
the projected plans for rapid economic expansion and modernization, 
Argentine authorities became highly dependent upon international mone­
tary organizations and agencies. In order to obtain funds from abroad, 
the government had to comply with the demands of the international 
monetary organisms and to show positive signs of being a good credit 
risk. In this regard, the national authorities were restricted as to 
how far they could yield to nationalists and yet fulfill the stipulations 
laid down by their international creditors.
12"Politicos; las alegres divagaciones," Confirmado. II (Novem­
ber 3, 1966), pp. 25-26, cites ex-president Pedro Eugenio Aramburu as 
saying that it is indispensable to seek a constitutional solution to the 
current crisis by way of elections and necessary to create two or three 
strong parties that could encompass the chief tendencies in political 
activity. Also "Politicos: sonar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc.
cit.. and "Expropriaciones: el martes de ceniza," Primera Plana. V
(November 22, 1966), pp. 19-21.
13An example of the pressure from this group exerted on the fed­
eral government to use political channels to further its economic inter­
ests was seen in the appointment of the capable Adalberto Krieger Vasana 
as Argentine ambassador to GATT to pressure for more favorable trade 
agreements with the European Economic Community countries.
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Status! Occupation and Education (Pressures)
Rural worker deficit. The relative and absolute decline in the 
number of workers occupied in the,agrarian sector^^ presented a serious 
problem to the system authorities in their efforts to increase agri­
cultural production.
Underemployment. In inverse relationship to the lack of workers 
in the agricultural sector there existed an apparent surplus of white- 
collar employes in the state enterprises and services and of laborers in 
the manufacturing sector. Moreover, this problem of surplus labor was 
compounded by an already high figure of unemployment and by a decreasing 
number of persons considered to be economically active.
Railroad employes. The most concrete occupational pressure
derived from the possibility of dismissal of 40,000 railroad employes and
the assertion by private industry that it was not in condition to absorb
15additional employes released from the railroad service.
University extremism. The operation of extremist student poli­
tical groupë within the universities precipitated a government inter­
vention which raised the question of how much university autonomy in
^^Ferrara, op. cit.. p. 126, shows that rural workers have de­
creased from 2,211,100, or 29 per cent of the economically active popu­
lation, in 1950 to 1,515,000, or 19.1 per cent, in 1963.
^^While it was widely publicized that the government would dis­
miss some 40,000 to 50,000 railroad employes at the time it would announce 
its railway reorganization plan, it was made public that annually about 
17,000 railroad employes retire or otherwise leave their jobs. Thus, 
the government needed only to freeze replacement vacancies and. redis­
tribute the personnel to achieve its goal. See Buenos Aires Herald. 
November 27, 1966, p. 10; "La batalla del riel," Primera Plana. V (Dec­
ember 12, 1966), p. 15. On December 1, 1966, the Federation Economica 
issued the statement that "private enterprise is not in condition to 
absorb a large working force from state enterprises." See Cronica 
(Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 5.
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terns of how much government control. To what extent should the govern­
ment intervene in the educational system, and how much freedom should 
the universities be allowed? On the answer to these questions would
depend the orientation and intensity of opposition from the university 
16community. The government announced to the press that it would issue
new university laws and guidelines prepared by the Consejo Asesor Especial
(Special Consulting Council) on January 6, 1967, in which the universities
would be placed under the jurisdiction of the Executive Power. Under the
new laws, the administration and government of the universities would be
vested in the professors, administrators, and their associates. "The
students would retain a voice in university government, but would have
no vote; that is, they would be heard from but would not rule."^^
Migrations. Another aspect of the occupational and educational
problems confronted by the political system was the exodus of Argentine
technicians, professionals, skilled workers, and university professors.
Nearly all the key personnel in the exact sciences of the University of
Buenos Aires was. reported to have resigned, and it is frequently reported
18that Argentina has lost 5000 engineers to other countries, pointing up 
the need to generate an economic and political atmosphere more conducive 
to intellectual achievement.
^^"Universidad, 76 dias despues: icual es la salida?" Confirmado.
II (October 13, 1966), pp. 34-37. The government attempted to resolve 
the issue with Law 16,912, announced on July 29, 1966, to which there 
was immediate negative reaction: resignations and physical violence.
17Cronica (Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 5.
18"Universidad, 76 dias despues: icual es la salida?" Confirm­
ado. ibid., p. 34; Morris A. Horowitz, loc. cit.
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Foreign students. It was observed that many foreign students, 
especially from Peru, were enrolled in the Argentine universities. The 
majority of the Peruvian students were located at La Plata and the
19Litoral universities and nearly all were involved in extremist politics.
Mobility and Prestige (Pressures)
Ineptitude. It is believed, because of the spoils system and 
normal administrative corruption, that individuals who are less capable 
to perform the assigned functions of their jobs have come to hold key 
positions in the government administration, in state enterprises, and 
in the universities. This is highly conjectural; but, it is conceivable 
that if the spoils system has played a major part in office holding and 
that a significant number of office holders are incompetent and inept, 
then this would represent a source of pressure on the stability of the 
political system in the "urban Litoral." But it is hypothesized that 
ineptitude is not a major pressure on the system right now.
19Interviews with key faculty members and native student leaders 
revealed a quite bitter antagonism toward the Peruvian students, parti­
cularly, who enjoyed all the benefits accorded an Argentine student 
(free tuition and low-cost subsidized board and room) and yet rewarded 
the Argentine government by engaging in disruptive political activity.
"You try not to be prejudiced," the researcher was told by a senior 
medical student, "but these Peruvians come here exclusively to make 
trouble. Many of them receive regular pay checks from Moscow and Peking,
I know for a fact. Besides we don't communicate with them. I listened 
to oae of them speak for half an hour the other day. Oh, I understood 
all the words, but the way he put them together, it just didn't make 
any sense. Very few of them ever finish school. The ones who do 
finish school stay here instead of going where they are most needed, 
namely, back to their own country."
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Insufficient social mobility and political participation. Both
these related sources of pressure— insufficient mobility and participation-
appear significant in the Argentine political context. Professor Puigbo
pictures the perfectly mobile society as being one in which "all social
functions are adequately distributed among the most capable persons so
20that the functions are taken care of in the most efficient manner." 
Twisting the same theory to fit political participation, it can be said 
that the ideal political situation is one in which all important groups 
and ideologies are proportionately represented according to their impor­
tance to and capabilities in national politics. Again, this is conjec­
tural and even.tauntalogical; but it can be theorized that to the extent 
that Argentine society is insufficiently mobile, according to the defin­
ition given, and certain major groups and ideologies are not represented 
in national politics, the political system of Argentina's "urban Litoral" 
will be pressured.
Stabilizers
While "pressures" are chiefly oriented toward instability, 
although sometimes pressures will induce a political system to become 
more stable, "stabilizers" have quite the opposite orientation. There 
will be instances wherein stabilizing inputs into a system (such as 
that type of stabilizers often exploited by dictatorial regimes, viz.. 
appeal to nationalism, to obtain public support) serve only to perpe­
tuate the ancien regime. At other times, stabilizing inputs do nothing 
more than to make possible the smoother and less violent transition of
Of)Puigbo, op. cit.. p. 83.
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a political system. Too, stabilizers can be of such character as to 
make future rapid political change highly possible, merely by their 
presence in the political system. For example, the mass citizenry of 
a country is alienated from the inability of the civilian government 
to act under conditions of runaway inflation, so that a vast public 
opinion may develop favoring a strong military dictatorship that will 
act forcibly in the economy. This public opinion favoring a more 
forcible government will provide an element of initial stability to a 
political system that is headed up by a more forcible kind of govern­
ment, such as occurred in Argentina on July 28, 1966.
Wealth and Welfare Distribution (Stabilizers)
Developments and trends in agriculture. The distribution between
agriculture and industry as percentages of GNP and the distribution of
economically active workers in both these sectors have more than reversed
21during this century. However unfavorable these two trends may appear 
so far as agriculture is presently concerned, there are yet several 
favorable long-run trends for agriculture.
More specifically, the demand for agricultural products is 
expected to increase during the remainder of this century. Already the
21Ferrara, op. cit.. p. 47. Data based on figures elaborated by 
CONADE (Consejo Nacional de Desarrollo). In the 1900-1904 period, agri­
culture accounted for 33 per cent of GNP and industry 13.8 per cent; 
in 1930-1934, agriculture 25.1 per cent and industry 18.4 per cent; in 
1950-1954, 16.6 per cent and 22.7 per cent; in 1960, 15.1 per cent and 
34.8 per cent; in 1969 an estimated 13.9 per cent and 39.1 per cent.
The economically active population distributed between the two sectors 
was 39.2 per cent in agriculture in 1900-1904 and 19.8 per cent in in-
during the same period. In 1950-1954, it was 26.7 per cent and 22.6
per cent respectively; in 1960, 18.6 per cent and 26.9 per cent; in
1969, an estimated 16.3 per cent and 29.1 per cent.
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elasticity of demand for primary products is beginning to shift and
22demand for agricultural products is becoming elastic. Whereas Argen­
tina has received decreasing prices for its primary exports in the 
post-war years and has paid increasing prices for capital equipment 
and finished goods this unfavorable relationship in changing. There are 
few regions of the world that can relatively easily achieve a surplus in 
wheat and other agricultural products: Argentina, Australia, Canada,
New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and the United States. None of the pre­
ceding countries have a region comparable in fertility and ideal climatic 
conditions to the Argentine humid pampa. During the period that data 
was being gathered for this study (fall, 1966), there was abundant evi­
dence that Argentina is rapidly moving toward technological modernization
23 24in agriculture and in the areas of transportation and shipping.
22As noted by Dr. Pedro Garcia Oliver, "Exposicion demografica, 
necesidad de alimentes y produccion agraria," El Cronista Comercial 
(July 30, 1966), p. 1.
23 ^The work of the Institute Nacional de Tecnplogia Agropecuaria
(National Institute of Agricultural Technology) and such diverse private 
organizations as the Consorcios Régionales de Experimentacion Agricole 
(Regional Union of Agricultural Experimentation) has stepped up consid­
erably. Whereas INTA had 2,343 employes in 1958 this figure increased 
to 3,991 in 1963. Of these totals, there were 954 technical specialists 
in 1963 to 528 in 1958, 341 assistants to specialists in 1963 to 225 in 
1958, 420 administrative personnel in 1963 to 278 in 1958, 2,085 workers 
in 1,183 in 1958, and 160 service personnel in 1963 to 105 in 1958.
Some 96 per cent of the total 1963 personnel were functioning in the
interior of the country in 40 experimental stations, 10 institutes, and
148 extension agencies. See INTA, Caracteristicas mâs importantes de la 
organizacion del INTA. No. 17 (Buenos Aires: Secretarîa de Estado de
Agriculture y Ganaderia de la Naciôn, 1964), pp. 2, 16.
24Garcia Oliver, op. cit.. pp. 4, 14; Raggio, loc. cit. There 
is as of late a gradual but constant expansion of the demand for Argentine 
agricultural production. The EEC may well change its excessive protection­
ist policies. The Argentine government has announced that it will modernize
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Total national development. The "new federalism," discussed in 
the preceding chapter, is placing the emphasis on total national deve­
lopment and drawing up over-all plans that include a number of public
works and developmental projects that benefit regions and provinces
25other than the Federal Capital and Buenos Aires.
Economic growth of the provinces. The two massive hydro-electric
plants to be developed in the outlying sites of Salto Grande and Chocon-
Cerros Colorados; the future exploitation of the iron ore and mineral
reserves at Sierra Grande; the underground tunnel connecting Entre Rios
and the north with Santa Fe and central Argentina; the renovation of the
ports of Rosario, Santa Fe, and Bahia Blanca; the construction of new
highways; the federal aid money to be distributed to the provinces for
their development— all these developments point toward greater national
26integration and economic growth.
The most spectacular public work which is destined to produce 
far-reaching change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina is the Parana- 
Santa Fe underground tunnel now under construction. For the purpose 
of ending the long-existing isolation of the northeastern from the
and reorganize its transportation and port facilities, which will help 
to handle the harvests more efficiently; and the cultivation of crops 
is expected to be adjusted to the demands of advanced technology.
25"Un nuevo federalismo," Confirmado. loc. cit.
26Government Secretary Diaz Colodrero said of the Santa Fe- 
Parana underground tunnel, one of the several big projects in outlying 
provinces, that it was "something more than a vital instrument of commu­
nication between two provinces; it has an inestimable value as a tool 
for the development of the Northeast." Ibid.. p. 25.
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southwestern Litoral and of deriving greater economic advantage from
tapping the wealth of the northeast provinces, an underground tunnel
and connecting highway are being constructed. The work was begun on
February 3, 1962, to build a tunnel which would cross the Parana river
27and link the cities of Santa Fe and Parana.
To complement the Parana-Santa Fe Underground Tunnel, 146 kilo­
meters of new highway is being constructed to connect Rosario, Arroyo 
del Medio, Santa Fe, and Parana. Cost of the project is about 7,300,000,000 
pesos. After its completion, it is expected that traffic between Santa Fe 
and Entre Rios provinces will increase from 25,000 vehicles per week to
some 150,000. Passengers will also increase from 100,000 to 300,000 per 
28week. Like the tunnel project, this one also is to be amortized by
29the collection of fees.
27 ■The project is scheduled to take five years to complete, but 
in late 1966 it was estimated that two years of construction work yet 
remained. Total cost of the operation is set at 5 billion pesos, which 
sum is to be repaid from toll fees within five years. One national and 
two international firms are contracted and are completing their respective 
assigned tasks: Hochtief of Essen, Germany; Vianini of Rome, Italy; and
Sailav of Buenos Aires. In its length the tunnel will measure 2,397 
meters (containing 36 tubes of about 65 meters each) and 7.5 meters in 
width with a free height of 4.4 meters. Interview with Abelardo Mario 
Garcia Sarubbi, director of the Office of the Parana-Santa Fe Tunnel 
Commission, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 9, 1966; "Tunnel sub-fluvial 
Parana-Santa Fe." Puertos Argentines. VII (Nov. 15, 1963), pp. 26-28.
28Garcia Sarubbi, ibid.; interview with Engineer Nardelli, 
provincial de Vialidad, Santa Fe, Argentina, October 8, 1966; Santa Fe, 
Direccion Provincial de Vialidad, Autopista: Santa Fe-Rosario. Arroyo
del Medio (March, 1965), entire work.
O Q For a discussion of the legal aspects of toll roads and the 
collection of fees, see J. Magdalena Derenzi de Vigliano, Tasa de peaje 
(Rosario, Argentina: Institute de Derecho Publico y Ciencas Sociales
of the Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 1966.
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Demographic-economic potential. Not only does Argentina have
a low birth rate, comparable to that of the United States, but the
distribution of its population is economically favorable. The wide-
based population pyramid, common to other Latin American countries, is
not at all pertinent to Argentina. As was pointed out in chapter III,
Argentina has lower percentages of its people between 0 and 4 and 5 and
14 years of age, meaning a less parasitic and potentially more economi-
30cally active population.
International negotiations. In the international sphere, the
favorable outcome of current negotiations could decisively affect for
the better the internal economy and distribution of wealth in Argentina.
On the one hand, there are the direct negotiations being conducted by
Argentine representatives with international economic agencies, such as
the World Bank, the Export-Import Bank, etc., to obtain loans and grants.
Then, there are Argentine representatives who are pressuring for more
favorable concessions in the meetings of such organisms as LAFTA, the
IMF (which is considering the possible reform of the international
monetary system), and the EEC countries. Italy has been contacted
31formally by Argentina to reduce its tariffs on Argentine exports.
^^Nores, op. cit.. pp. 75-120, 102. Also see Table 9 on page 61 
of this study.
31"Si todos los ricos del mundo" and "Crisis en serie" Confirmado, 
II (October 13, 1966), pp. 64-65, 67; "La batalla del intercambio," Con- 
firmado. II (December 8, 1966), p. 29; "Un dulce sabor a ministerio," 
Primera Plana. IV (October 13, 1966), p. 26; "Si llegan las lluvias," 
Confirmado. II (October 6, 1966), pp. 64-65; "Polîticas para negociar," 
Confirmado. II (November 24, 1966), pp. 30-32; "ALALC: para conocer a
Pepe." Priàera Plana. IV (November 15, 1966), pp. 58-60.
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Power and Political Participation (Stabilizers)
Consolidation of power. Perhaps one of the most notable conse­
quences of the 1966 Argentine revolution is the new consolidation of
national political forces that is taking place among Christian Demo-
32crats (the Radicales), socialists, and peronists. Although it may 
seem a paradox, the consolidation of political forces is seen as a 
stabilizing situation in Argentine politics. This is because in the 
past Argentine politics has been characterized by a wide diffusion 
of political ideologies and movements which have inhibited the deve­
lopment of any political consensus. But in mid-December of 1966 
various political groups combined in opposition to the government.
This consolidation of opposition, however, is somewhat matched by the 
consolidation of supporting forces, viz.. the large economic interests
(ACIEL and CGE), which have aligned behind many of the government 
33policies. Thus, two main political tendencies (those in opposition 
to or support of the current government) are beginning to form. Both 
tendencies profess the same ends in wishing to see Argentina develop and 
achieve greatness. But the means by which these ends are to be achieved 
are quite different from each tendency. Nonetheless, the polarization
32"Las indefiniciones alientan al crisis," Analisis. VI (Octo­
ber 31, 1966), pp. 8-9; "Expropriaciones; el martes de ceniza,"
Primera Plana, loc. cit.; "Sonar no cuesta nada," Primera Plana, loc. 
cit.; "Las alegres divagaciones," Confirmado. loc. cit.
33"Gobierno: despues de la devaluacion," Primera Plana. IV
(November 15, 1966), pp. 12-13; "Industrie: ide vuelta al campo?"
Confirmado. II (December 1, 1966), pp. 28-29; "Paso decisivo de los 
empreaarios." Analisis. VI (November 7, 1966), pp. 14-15.
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of interests is viewed optimistically as a step toward a more firmly 
based political consensus, which appears to lend more stability on 
the political system than formerly.
Institutionalization. Facilitating the consolidation of power 
and expression of interests is the high degree of organization and in­
stitutionalization which national life has achieved in business, govern­
ment, labor, trade, and politics. With the presence of large power 
blocs and groups of influence (labor, employes’ organizations, co­
operatives, managerial and professional associations, etc.), more ef­
fective confrontation and negotiation is p o s s i b l e , e v e n  despite 
efforts on the part of the government "to muzzle" all opposition activ­
ity. Labor and business are more bureaucratized and better organized 
than ever. The consumer is well organized in certain areas of consump­
tion, particularly in housing and public services. That is, because 
of the increasing institutionalization of national life, there are an 
increasing number of centralized structures developing. With the in­
creasing development of centralized structures, an increasing number 
of top-level officials, representing the major sectors of national life, 
are able to come together and confront one another in a more direct and 
efficient manner.
^^"Gremios: el tamano de una rebelion," Primera Plana. V
(November 22, 1966), p. 14; Cronica (Rosario), October 15, 1966, p. 1; 
Revista del Institute de Derecho Publico y Ciencias Sociales, Nos. 12/
13 (II semester, 1963; I semester, 1964), entire issue, especially 
Jose C. Rolt, "Cooperatives de consume," pp. 19-28; Gabriel Perren, 
"Cooperatives agropecuarias," pp. 29-32; Enrique Conora Martinez, 
"Cooperatives de servicios publicos," pp. 33-42; Aurelio Flores, 
"Cooperatives de crédite," pp. 43-50; etc.
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Political.maturity. Through the pre- and post-Peron years, 
Argentines have been increasing in political maturity, as was evidenced 
after the June 28, 1966, coup. Neither the Church, the entrepreneurs, 
nor the labor syndicates were willing to assume the responsibility of 
managing a government installed and sustained by force. The hierarchy 
of the Catholic Church in Argentina went out of its way to avoid being 
cast in the role of either supporter or instigator of the new government. 
It was the regime that was currying the favor of the Church and not vice 
versa. Although big business praised the measures which the government 
later adopted, its initial reaction was aloof, as it adopted an attitude 
of "let's wait and see." And, in evaluating the reaction of labor to 
the new government, it is noteworthy that labor kept its distance for 
four months, waiting for the government to define its position and deve­
lop its programs. In fact, the first significant opposition to the 
government by labor did not occur until November 9, 1966, more than 
■ four months after the advent of the government and two days after the 
government adoption of a pro-capitalist program of development. In 
short, none of these major blocs of power and influence would accept 
any paternalism in exchange for unconditional support of the government. 
The new government was judged chiefly on the basis of its performance 
in resolving national problems. It was neither blindly supported nor 
blindly opposed by the majority of the citizens, and support of or op­
position to the government did not come until after it had clearly
35defined its ̂ position.
p. 8.
35"primgra crisis del gobierno," Analisis. VI (October 3, 1966),
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The finality of the revolution. It was commented by nearly all
participants in Argentine politics that the long cycle of indecisive and
chaotic politics had come to an end. The revolution of 1966 definitely
and absolutely placed the country at a new directional point from which
it could not return. For the future, it would be impossible to turn
back to old and discredited solutions and to follow old and discredited
leaders. No matter what changes of government might occur, or whatever
new government might assume power, no regime nor any series of national
programs would be able to deny the platform of the new government:
modernization and development; structural and ideological change.
The control of the CGT. In effecting the proposed changes and
controlling the opposition, the government realized that the key to its
37success was the CGT. With respect to controlling the CGT, the govern­
ment did quite well in achieving its objective. It was able to hold out 
against and put down the port strike and international boycott; to weather
the several other major strikes; and attempt to wield influence, but
38with no success, in the election of certain CGT officials.
Status: Occupation and Education (Stabilizers)
New job opportunities. With the inauguration of new federally 
and locally sponsored projects and national development programs, a 
number of new jobs were being created which would provide greater employ-
3&Ibid., p. 9.
3?Ibid.
38"&La revolucion clausurada?" Confirmado„ II (October 13, 1966), 
pp. 18-19; "Portuarios," Confirmado, II (December 1, 1966), p. 17; "Uni- 
dad interna y boicot internaciona^" Analisis. VI (November 7, 1966), pp. 
16-17; "El extrano silencio de la CGT," Inedito. loc. cit.
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39ment opportunities. Not in every case, however, was indigenous man- 
40power.utilized. When new projects were begun or new factories and
other economic stimuli were introduced in the upper Litoral region in
the vicinity of Parana and Santa Fe cities, it was noticed that the
exodus of persons to Rosario and Buenos Aires was effectively stopped.
New stress on agriculture. The realization was widely shared
that Argentina should increase its agricultural production and exports
42of agricultural products and that by increasing agricultural production 
Argentina can bring in additional earnings of foreign exchange and in­
dustry can then be expanded further by investing the exchange earnings 
from agricultural exports into capital equipment.
High literacy rate and increasing level of education. That 
Argentina has a high rate of literacy and that its general population 
is achieving a progressively higher level of education, do not necessarily 
mean that the country will be any more stable or will change any more 
rapidly. Nonetheless, it is believed that the high literacy rate and
on iLa revolucion clausurada?" Confirmado. ibid., p. 18.
40Interviews with planning and construction personnel revealed 
to the researcher that many of the manual laborers on the underground 
Santa Fe-Parana tunnel project are Bolivians, not Argentines.
p. 109.
^^Instituto de Planeamiento Regional y Urbano, op. cit.. II,
^^Dr. Lorenzo A. Raggio argues in "El pensamiento institucional 
y el oficial en la exposicion del centenario de la Sociedad Rural Argen­
tina," Revista de la Bolsa de Cereales. LIII (August 4, 1966), pp. 5^7, 
that "Argentina is not an underdeveloped country but is slowed down by 
factors that it can well overcome" and that "with a strong agrarian 
base, the country can progress economically." Martin Bloque urges a 
greater wheat production in "Necesidad y conveniencia de una mayor 
produccion de trigo," El Economiste. July 20, 1966, p. 5. Dr. Pedro 
Garcia Oliver, loc. cit.. calls for applying "the most advanced tech­
nologies" to increase agricultural production.
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the increasing education of the population represent "stabilizers" for 
the political system of Argentina's "urban Litoral." This is because 
a more educated and literate population will be more economically and 
intellectually active than a population not quite so educated and 
literate. With greater levels of education and literacy, a greater 
economic output and greater political maturity are achieved.
While Argentine elementary schools show a desertion rate of 
56 per cent before the end of the seventh grade, this rate is lower 
than it is for other Latin American countries. The number of secondary- 
school graduates in Argentina has nearly quadrupled in the past 20 
years, with university enrollment showing an even higher rate of in­
crease over the same period. In fact, the level of education for the 
population as a whole has been steadily increasing every year. For some 
time, too, the literacy rate has been above 90 per cent.^^
Prestige and Mobility (Stabilizers)
Institutions of vertical mobility. For achieving prestige and 
mobility in Argentina the following institutions have proved effective:
the armed forces, the clergy, educational institutions, political parties,
! 44professional organizations, managerial organizations, and marriage.
Membership in any of the preceding definitely confers some degree of
prestige and mobility, and persons of low social status have been known
43Centro de Investigaciones Economicas, Institute Torcuato Di 
Telia, Los recursos humanos de nivel universitario v tecnico en la 
republica Argentina, op. cit.. Parte I, pp. 60-73, 81, 290-291;
Ferrara, op. cit.. pp. 242-246.
44Puigbo, op. cit.. pp. 87-90.
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to surpass considerably an initially low social status by having entered 
or excelled in one of the institutions, as did Hipolito Yrigoyen in the
Union Civica Radical, Juan Domingo Peron in the armed forces, Risiera
45Frondizi in the university, etc.
Vehicles of social transformation. As was pointed out in chapter 
III,^^ mass-communication media and mass forms of public participation 
and education are providing the modus operandi whereby Argentine society 
is developing and becoming increasingly mobile. Ideas and emotions are 
freely expressed and exchanged and the demarcation is progressively less 
rigid between classes. It is maintained that the high development of 
mass-communication systems, public-entertainment facilities, and educa­
tional opportunities results in considerable support for the political 
system in allowing for the more rapid dissemination of new ideas and the 
more rapid acceptance of innovations. Furthermore, the population as a 
whole tends to be more productive and more mobile than it would be if 
these factors were otherwise not so fully developed.
^^Imaz, Los que mandan. op. cit.. pp. 192, 134, 128, 58-60.
In the Imaz study on the ruling elite in Argentina, it was reported 
that 36 per cent of the Socialist party leadership and 10 per cent 
of the Radical party leaders came from lower and lower middle class 
backgrounds; that 17 per cent of the leaders in the Union Industrial,
47 per cent of the Camara Argentina de Comercio, and 37 per cent of 
the Confederation General Economica were "self-made men" rising from 
the lower social strata; that 26 per cent of all the industrialists 
and businessmen had begun their careers "at the bottom" of the socio­
economic ladder; and that 73 per cent of the brigadiers and generals 
in the armed forces originated from the wealthy bourgeoisie, 25 per 
cent from the dependent middle class, and only 2 per cent from the 
working class.
^^See the discussion concerning mass communication, public 
entertainment, and education, pages 71-74.
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Pressures and Stabilizers: A Balance Sheet
In retrospect, the chief pressures that are applied against the 
Argentine political system are those of a more immediate urgency (op­
position strength, inflation, economic stagnation, rising expectations, 
unequal development, depopulation of rural areas, etc.), needing the 
substantive attention of the governing authorities. On the other hand, 
the chief stabilizers upholding the Argentine system are of a future 
fulfillment and by their nature much less real and concrete. Conse­
quently, whether the Argentine political system can retain its identity 
and authority over the country, depends largely upon the strength and 
rate of development of each stabilizing tendency. In short, it is the 
speculative opinion of the researcher that to the degree that the various 
trends toward greater economic development, political consolidation, and 
social mobility continue at a rapid rate, the Argentine system will have 
sufficient incoming support to absorb and withstand the disequilibriating 
effects of the incoming system pressures.
CHAPTER X 
THE RESPONDING POLITICAL SYSTEM
The culmination of the process of sociopolitical change in which 
this entire work has been pointed takes place in "the responding political 
system." It is here that the system authorities interpret the incoming 
flow of pressures and stabilizers. On their ability to withstand the 
inputs of destabilizing pressures and to order supports in their behalf, 
depends in part the stability of the political system and the amount of 
sociopolitical change that occurs. The other half of this process 
reposes in the interaction between the policies and acts of the governing 
authorities and the reactions and feedback responses coming from the 
total environment and the political system. This chapter will examine 
the executive policies that were formulated in the latter quarter of 
1966 and the overt opinions, responses, and reactions of the different 
sectors of national life to these policies.
Decisions; Content. Method, and Responses
While the announced objective of the June 28, 1966, coup was 
the modernization and development of the Argentine economy,^ qfficial 
efforts to realize this objective proceeded without the inclusion and
l"Primera crisis del gobierno," Anâlisis. loc. cit.
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participation of the working masses. The socioeconomic structure did not 
visibly change, and the owner-worker relationship failed to vary signi­
ficantly. And, most importantly, there was no mobilization of the 
masses for a collective effort in support of the revolution. The masses 
(and here is meant both white-collar and blue-collar workers) desired 
a more comprehensive revolution that would erect a "new" revolutionary
ideology and not an ideology that smacked of the liberal capitalism 
2of yesterday.
General Content of Decisions 
All official policy issued during the latter quarter of 19.66 
reflects a common general content, viz.. a rejection of the tried and 
discredited actions of the political parties and a return to the tried
3and more successful policies of the previous liberal-economic era.
Stated more concisely, the elimination of inflation was the standard 
on which most government policies were based.^
2Rodolfo Puiggros, lecture given at Teatro de Independencia, 
Buenos Aires, December 19, 1966. The reader is also referred to the 
documented opinions of the workers organizations, as recorded in 
chapter VIII, pages 221-223.
3Enrique Martinez Paz, the minister of interior, synthesized 
quite cogently this concept in a speech delivered in Salta, Argentina, 
on November 26, 1966, in which he stated that the old politics have 
definitely ended. "Let this be well understood. They have ended 
because they are the expression of particular interests that do not 
coincide with those of the nation." Clarin, November 27, 1966, p. 18.
^President Juan Carlos Ongania, official speech to the nation, 
November 7, 1966.
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General Implementation of Policies 
On the one hand, the revolutionary government was willing to 
implement its policies "without resort to oppression, despotism, or 
tyranny."^ On the other hand, as expressed by General Julio Alsogaray, 
"Nobody or anything will make us depart from the course we've charted.
We are prepared to destroy without consideration every enemy within or 
without who may stand in the way of the revolution."^ That is, the 
government was determined that the revolution should succeed and was 
willing to use force to make it succeed. But force could be used only 
when other measures had failed to achieve the desired results.
Decisions: Specific Content and Reactions
The major decisions made during the period of this study were 
announced in the form of official speeches and decrees, the most im­
portant one being the Presidential Address of November 7, 1966.
The Presidential Address of November 7, 1966 
The major pronouncement of policy by the revolutionary government 
during the time period of this study (June 28, 1966 - December 14, 1966) 
was the message to the country delivered by President Lieutenant General 
Juan Carlos Ongania at the Salon Blanco (White Room) in the House of 
Government on November 7, 1966.
^Ibid.
^Cited in Clarin. December 14, 1966, p. 8.
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Background to the Address
Since the governing authorities came into power following the 
ousting of President Arturo Illia from office on June 28, 1966, they 
had not specified in detail nor with clarity the policies by which 
they intended to govern the country. But pressures for positive action 
on the part of the new government and for the government to produce a 
declaration of principles and guidelines continued to increase. Too, 
the government itself was anxious to conclude its studies of national 
problems and to take firm measures. Through late October the national 
decisionmakers met and worked on the details of the forthcoming presi­
dential message that would define more clearly the position of the 
government. The President conferred with members of his cabinet about 
the forthcoming message for three hours on October 28, 1966, to obtain 
their reaction.^ The speech was then reworked and presented on November 
7, 1966, the President himself making the final changes and corrections 
in his speech.
O
Content of the Address
At the beginning of his speech. President Ongania affirmed that 
"the revolution, inspired by a collective will, does not recognize 
enemies in any particular sector of the population." The true adversaries
^Clarin. October 29, 1066, p. 1. There were thirty in attendance 
including President Ongania and such problems as prices and salaries, 
foreign trade, energy projects, capital for housing and the Tucuman 
problem were discussed.
g
The following report on the contents of the Presidential 
message of November 7, 1966, was extracted from the verbatim text, which 
was reproduced in the daily newspaper Cronica (Rosario), November 8,
1966, pp. 1-3.
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of the government and the entire nation, he pointed out, "are inefficiency, 
dated structures, vested interests, laziness, and disorientation, and 
all that which has these many years paralyzed the country and compromised 
the Argentine citizen." Stating that the theme of the new policy should 
be structural modernization, the President then went on to formulate the 
broad bases of policy and proceed into specific action programs.
Sacrifice from all. The government urged the citizenry to 
exert efforts in behalf of the general welfare of all members of the 
community. "The sacrifice of today will be the measurement of Argentina 
tomorrow, and in no wise the benefit of another sector or social group."
Inflation and the peso. "The revolution states its intention 
of putting an end to inflation." It is not enough that intentions be 
sincere; they must be backed up with drastic and even painful action.
In putting an end to inflation, the government could have simply cut 
back its expenses; but, instead, it has determined to contain public 
expenses while expanding private activity. "The fundamental measure of 
economic character now consists of freeing the exchange market," being 
careful to avoid any abuses or misuses that could arise.
Excessive public emploves. "Transferring some state enterprises 
to private enterprise and reorganizing the remainder would eliminate the 
principal causes of the present deficit," but a large part of this defi­
cit is the surplus of public servants, "which will have to be stopped 
at all administrative levels." To the degree that private industry can 
grow, the public sector can give up increasing percentages of its 
workers.
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Taxes. The payment of taxes is a responsibility which the 
government will enforce by law. Persons will be taxed progressively 
according to their ability to pay. The government will reorganize the 
tax-collecting organisms with a view toward improving their operation 
and increasing their contribution to the national revenue.
Savings against inflation. "As an additional measure of con­
taining inflation and the underemployment of manpower, the Banco Hipo- 
tecario Nacional will at once launch a new public subscription to its 
savings and loan plans to the sum of 14,400,000,000 pesos.” In addition, 
7,600,000,000 pesos will be used to take care of rising sums of sub­
scribed contracts. The free exchange rate will have repercussions on 
prices, especially the prises of Argentine exports. "This will represent 
a smaller internal consumption of goods that will in turn mean income 
to the country." Furthermore, the official policy of stabilizing salaries 
will go hand in hand with the policy of returning to a hard currency.
Speculation; a repressive measure. Laws and norms will be 
established to prevent speculation with the vital necessities of the 
population. The country cannot undertake to develop industrially with­
out consolidating the base of its economy, which is agriculture. 
"Agriculture provides the country with foodstuffs and exportable pro­
ducts."
Adverse factors to agricultural production. A number of factors 
(differences in the exchange rate to the detriment of exports, holding 
back certain quantities of exports, unjust regulations concerning trans­
portation of the harvested crops, etc.) have impeded investments in the
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technological development of agriculture. The government has totally 
lifted all restrictions on meat and grain exports and has sought to 
facilitate greater movement of foodstuffs in the internal market.
It will also be the policy to promote the shipping of live cattle to 
countries which lack refrigeration facilities. The new emphasis on 
agriculture will be supported by renovations in transportation media, 
especially the railroads and the ports. "But let it be clearly under­
stood that the government intends that this rural development be the 
impetus in effecting complete industrial transformation."
Support to the farmer; technology. "The farmer can have the 
economic security to invest in technology and modernization of agri­
cultural productivity." The government will support farmers with 
technical assistance, with national and international credit, and with 
all the resources at its disposal to resolve the problems of infra­
structure, of rural electrical development, of trucks, ports, and rail­
roads. In helping to promote agricultural development, the state will 
insist on increases in production. All land will be put to intensive 
use. The activities of INTA (Institute Nacional de Tecnologia Agro- 
pecuaria) will be expanded and more widely dispersed, and all private 
agricultural organizations, such as CREA (Consorcios Régionales de 
Experimentacion Agricola) will be supported and encouraged. "In the 
past the policy was to export the excess once the necessities of in­
ternal consumption were met. The cure now will consist in exporting all 
that it is possible to export and consume the remainder."
QINTA and CREA are described in chapter IX, pages 244-245.
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Commitments in foreign trade. Argentina has affirmed its willing­
ness to comply with all its commitments in foreign trade and to increase 
its contribution to international commerce. But the trade relations of 
the country should be reciprocal. "The LAFTA countries deserve preference 
within the plans to expand foreign trade."
The national ports. "The first government measure to remove the 
obstacles to exportation and importation consisted of firmly directing 
the reorganization of customs in benefit of Argentine businessmen, as 
well as foreign business interests." Similarly, the government has pro­
ceeded to reorganize the national ports, which have been considered "the 
most expensive in the world." To correct this situation, the government 
now envisions not only physical renovation but worker and administrative 
renovations as well.
Investment; foreign and domestic. "Financial stability and the 
monetary policy of the government will induce national savings to be 
invested into national industry." The country neither fears nor dis­
trusts other countries. "The confidence of foreign investors will reside 
in the conviction that Argentina keeps its word and is as mindful of its 
rights as it is of its obligations." But faith in the industrial future 
of Argentina will be substantially reflected by national investment, 
foreign capital representing but a small part of the over-all total 
investment.
Industrialization. The actual deficient economic growth of 
the country has restricted the exploitation and consumption of iron, 
steel, and energy, but measures will be adopted to increase production 
of these to meet consumption needs. It is projected to produce 4,000,000
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tons of steel for 1970-1972. Priority has been given to the expansion 
of SOMISA (Sociedad Mixta Siderurgia Argentina) to reach a productivity 
of 2,000,000 tons by 1970. Altos Hornos Zapla of Frabricaciones Mili- 
tares will plan on increasing its production to 190,000 tons in the 
first months of 1970. It is also planned to increase the production 
of particular steel plants and the exploration for and extraction of 
iron ore.
Electrical energy and expansion. To fill the new accelerating 
demand for energy created by the promotion and growth of industry, con­
crete projects will be undertaken; El Chocon-Cerros Colorados and 
Salto Grande. "Before the end of the year, the government will have 
made the decision that is presently under study to assure the realization 
of both projects, while continuing its study of installing, in addition, 
a nuclear-electrical center."
Exploitation of oil. It is admitted that oil production has 
stagnated since the annulment of foreign-oil contracts, supply not having 
kept pace with increasing demand. The government will continue nego­
tiating with the affected firms with the object of fulfilling its orig­
inal contract obligations toward them. "But we are more concerned about 
the future than the past." The government will seek to reorganize YPF 
(Yacimientos Petrolîferos Fiscales), the state oil monopoly, and encourage 
the colaboration of private enterprise in the exploration, refining, and 
sales of petroleum products.
Reorganization of the railroads. The railroads will soon be 
reorganized according to conclusions drawn from exhaustive studies. The
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new railroad policy, which will be presented in the near future, will 
call for the reorganization of the central organism of the railroad 
enterprise and the workshops, for the establishment of adequate labor 
regulations, for elimination of the greater deficit which is being 
borne by all Argentines, etc. "In confronting the railroad problems 
the government complies with one of the postulates of the revolution."
Road construction. "Along with the reorganization of the rail­
roads, the government will also undertake the building of highways and 
routes that will begin with the integral reconstruction of 3,000 kilo­
meters of poor roads and the completion of 3,000 kilometers of new 
roads. Provinces and municipalities will receive federal assistance in 
their road-construction programs. In further development of its trans­
portation facilities, the government contemplates the investment of one 
billion pesos in improving its airport facilities. "Both projects are 
closely linked to the concept of regional development, which the Argen­
tine revolution is promoting."
Regional development. It is proposed to include the provinces 
within the scope of national development, without violating their 
identity and secular tradition. In this emphasis on regional develop­
ment, "mineral extraction will acquire a particular importance." The 
publicized Tucuman problem will be attacked forcibly. The economy of 
Tucuman will be developed and diversified," and all residents there 
"can be assured that the entire country will share in the task of lifting 
up its prostrated economy. A starting fund of one billion pesos has 
been deposited in the provincial bank, and another two billion pesos 
will follow."
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Comments on the Address
As can be supposed, the larger business, industrial, and farming 
interests of the country were laudatory in their comments on the presi­
dential address; the labor unions and small independent working interests 
were cautious to praise the address but quick to criticize and condemn 
its content. A mixture of opinions characterized the remainder of the 
Argentine community.
The Economic Interests
The ACIEL. The president of ACIEL (Co-ordinating Association 
for Free Industrial Institutions) Dr. Manuel Fontecha Morales, replied: 
"My opinion is favorable. It is a seriously pronounced speech. The 
President of the Nation has contemplated in his speech nearly all the 
points that the country has to resolve immediately. Above all, it is 
appropriate to praise the measure of adopting a free rate of exchange.
The Sociedad Rural Argentina. The second vice president of the 
Argentine Rural Society, Luis J. Firpo Miro, said that the speech was 
"very good in that which respects economic measures in general and with 
relation to agriculture in particular." He said that now new hope 
existed for rural development and that improvement in exports could be 
expected. His remarks were prefaced: "The esteemed President has
directed a message to the Nation that was anticipated and which the 
country needed.
^^La Razon. November 8, 1966, p. I. 
l^La Prensa. November 9, 1966, p. 7.
26É
Boisa de Comercio. Dr. Luis M. Baudizzone of the Boisa de
Comercio (Commercial Exchange Center) noted that following the presidential
message there occurred a sharp increase in the volume of operations and
an improvement in the level of prices— all of which were sufficient indi-
1 9cators of the value of the speech.
Asociacion de Bancos. The president of the Asociacion de Bancos
(Bankers' Association), Francisco Dellepiane, said that the address was,
in his judgment, "realistic, firm, and valient" insofar as it focuses on
economic measures and general orientation. "The decision to devaluate
13the peso is the most important item in the speech."
Confederaciones Rurales Argentina. Dr. Juan A. Piran of the 
Confederaciones Rurales Argentines (Argentine Rural Confederations) con­
firmed that the speech "caused a very good impression in rural circles 
and coincided with the principles supported by the agricultural entities.
Camara de Exportadores. Juan B. Martin of the Camara de Exporta- 
dores (Chamber of Exporters) acknowledged that freeing the exchange rate 
would encourage greater exports. If the government program for stimu­
lating exports were carried out as planned, the export industry would 
be in good condition by 1970.^^
Corporacion Argentina de Productores de Carnes. CAP (Argentine 
Corporation of Meat Producers) vice president, Humberto Volando, declared 
the message to be "valient in implanting a reality and deciding important 
things.
IZlbid. 13lbid. ^̂ Ibid.
^^La Nacion. November 9, 1966, p. 8. 
l*Ibid.
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Comision Coordinadora de Entidades Agropecuarias. Secretary of 
this Commission (the Co-ordinating Commission of Agricultural Entities), 
Jorge Zorregieta, reported that "the message was very well received in 
all the agricultural community" and praised the government for its 
"special promotion of agrarian production.
La Bolsa de Cereales. This organism (the Grain Exchange) 
declared that the freeing of the exchange rate and the removing of other 
obstacles to exports, announced in the speech, were good measures to
have taken.
La Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario. Eduardo Luis Lopez of the
Bolsa de Comercio de Rosario (Rosario Commercial Exchange Center) stated:
"I accord an exceptional value to this exposition of President Ongania.
19It is quite a contrast to the past twenty years."
Sociedad Rural de Rosario. Federico S. Garrone, vice president 
of the Sociedad Rural de Rosario (Rosario Rural Society) said that "the 
freedom of the exchange market is the barometer that measures the eco­
nomic and financial wealth of the country" and "the only way to recoup
the hardness of our national currency, which was one of the most highly
20valued in all the world at the end of the war."
The Working Interests
Union Ferroviaria. President of the Union Ferroviaria (Railroaders’ 
Union), Antonio Scipione, was quite explicit in his objections concerning
l?Ibid.
l^La Prensa. November 9, 1966, p. 7. 
l̂ ibid. 2°Ibid.
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the address. To him, the speech "clearly evidenced the purpose of re­
instating political schemes that the times and progress surpassed 
some decades ago."
. . . Those who pretend to govern are on the wrong path 
in excluding the popular sectors. The policy of the govern­
ment is a cereal and pastoral policy that will close down 
factories and plants, will hurt the acquisitive power of the 
salaried worker, and will annul the social legislation attained 
by the workers. I have not the slightest doubt that right now 
the Sociedad Rural and ACIEL and other entities . . . are glee­
fully editing their declarations of unconditional support of 
the presidential message.21
CGT. The ex-secretary general of the CGT (General Labor Con­
federation) and leader of the "62 standing organizations," established 
entities within or components of the CGT, Jose Alonso, made it clear 
that he regarded the new policy as a reversion to the old liberal line.
"It erects a blockade to national consumption in its policies" through 
its proposed firings of workers and privitization of state enterprises. 
"This signifies the paralyzation of industry" in making Argentina the 
exporter of primary products but the consumer of manufacturing products. 
In short, the policy requires the least effort on the part of the 
government and the greatest sacrifice on the part of the popular class.^2
The Socialist party. Socialist party leader. Professor Americo 
Ghioldi, replied that the important thing to realize with respect to 
the monetary devaluation is that definite and particular sectors will 
be concretely benefitted and other sectors concretely harmed. It will 
also be of interest, said Professor Ghioldi, to note precisely who
^^La Razon. November 8, 1966, p. I.
Ẑ Ibid.
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delivered or prepared the speech and who will be responsible.for its 
execution.23
Other Responses by the Political System 
The presidential message to the country laid the framework to 
which future federal measures, decrees, and programs were attached.
The following represents more or less a chronological review of these 
federal measures, decrees, and programs.
Devaluation of the peso. The Argentine peso had its value fixed 
at 215 pesos to the dollar for purchasing and 218 for selling on August 
9, 1966. Under the free-market rate, which went into effect on November 
9, 1966, the value of the peso settled at 245 for buying and 255 for 
selling. The purpose of the devaluation move, apart from stimulating 
exports, was to facilitate the inflow and outflow of capital; and, as 
the economics minister. Dr. Jorge Nestor Salimei, said, the measure 
was not a devaluation but the fitting of the currency to its true value.
Foodstuffs and supermarkets. The passage of Law 17,017, announced 
in La Nacion on November 19, 1966, had as its objectives to achieve 
greater control over prices and to take effective action against any
infractions in the pricing of f o o d s t u f f s . T h e  past abuses in the pricing
25of foodstuffs were well noted, and the government was attempting not only
ooLa Prensa. November 9, 1966, p. 1.
^^La Nacion. November 19, 1966, p. 1.
25Salvador Nielsen, "Los intocables," Panorama. No. 42 (November, 
1966), pp. 36-42, describes the pricing of foodstuffs whereby the pro­
ducer sells cheaply and the buyer pays dearly as the daily drama of the 
Argentine economy. One result of pricing disequilibrium is the contra­
band of foodstuffs which enter the market illegally and which represent
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to prevent any excessive rise in prices but to encourage a more regular
flow of food products into urban markets through the stabilizing of
prices. In this same vein, the Law of Supermarkets was subsequently
passed, establishing new norms to ensure that supermarkets would provide
26certain minimum services and kinds and amounts of foodstuffs.
General price fixing. It was reported on November 22, 1966,
that the government would seek control over prices in general and would
27fix the levels of prices.
New rental laws. It was anticipated on November 22, 1966, that 
the government would produce a new law on renting apartments, homes, and
other housing space, "for the existing rental laws have lost their rele-
28vancy to present-day realities."
Renovation of the ports. On November 29, 1966, it was announced
that an investment exceeding one billion pesos would be made to improve
Argentine ports and to provide new facilities for more efficient service.
29Ships were henceforth expected to operate 24 hours a day. Previous to 
this announcement the government had reorganized the working schedule
30for dock workers, from which plan notable positive results were obtained.
a contamination threat or health danger. See Ramon Nodaro and Rolando 
Hanglin,"Los evenenadores," Panorama, No. 34 (March, 1966), pp. 52-61.
^^La Razon. November 22, 1966, p. 16.
^^El Mundo. November 20, 1966, p. 5.
28La Razon. November 22, 1966, p. 1.
^^Clarin. November 29, 1966, p. 18.
30"Impacto de la reforma portuaria," El Economieta. XVII (October 
29, 1966), p. 2 Decree No. 2729-66 divided the working day of dock 
workers into two labor periods. In a comparative study of one cargo
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The reorganization of the railroads. The railroads, having been
31for some time a kind of national cancer and their reform having been 
imminent ever since the presidential address, were reorganized in com­
plete detail on November 28, 1966. All parties to the disputed action
had been anticipating the move. As early as November 16, 1966, President
>. 32Ongania held discussions with La Fraternidad and Union Ferroviaria.
The government studied the position of the railroad workers in 
terms of its reorganization plans and then made its decisions on Novem­
ber 25, 1966.33 On that occasion President Ongania commented: The rail­
roads that we now have are not those which correspond to the future of 
the c o u n t r y . "34 xhe two major postulates of the reorganization plan were
anticipated in La Nacion (November 28, 1966): private enterprise would
35be allowed to participate and various workshops would be closed.
ship operating before and after the port reform, it was observed that 
the cost per day under the new system decreased from 799,380 pesos to 
582,920 pesos. Engineer Antonio R. Lanusse, transportation secretary, 
in speaking before the Camara Argentina on December 6, 1966, affirmed 
that the new regulations for dock workers had already obtained an 
average economic savings of 30 per cent and had reduced the time in 
which ships were docked for loading and unloading 50 per cent. La 
Nacion. December 7, 1966, p. 1, plus.
31See Lozada, op. cit.. p. 439; "El desastre ferroviario," 
Azul v Blanco, loc. cit.; Santa Cruz, op. cit.. entire publication.
^^El Mundo. November 16, 1966, p. 8.
33La Prensa. November 25, 1966, p. 1.
^^Clarin. November 25, 1966, p. 15.
^^La Nacion. November 28, 1966, p. 1.
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The program in full was an extensive document of 500 items which was
36synthesized to 84 items for publicity purposes. Transportation Secre­
tary Lanusse affirmed that long-distance fares would be raised 50 to 60
per cent from December 24.on, and of the 25 workshops presently operating
37six would be gradually eliminated.
The housing problem. The government program to eliminate the
housing deficit moved rapidly forward. On November 8, 1966, it was
publicized that the Inter-American Developmental Bank had extended credit
of $19,200,000 (U.S. dollars) to Argentine housing authorities for the
38construction of 6,800 homes in Buenos Aires. Ernesto Garcia Olano, 
secretary of housing, stated that 130,000 dwelling units would be con­
structed during 1967 with a capital of 200 billion pesos financed through
39the Banco Hipotecario Nacional. The secretary and undersecretary of 
housing, the minister of welfare, and the secretary of government all 
met on December 5, 1966, to further the projection of housing plans.
36&eproduced in Clarin. December 3, 1966, pp. 12-13, the document 
contained the following chapters: Administrative Order, Operative Moder­
nization, Commercial Exploitation, Contracts, Working Regulations and 
Labor Agreements, Workshops, Replacement and Repairs, Scope of the Enter­
prise, Need of the Plan, Specific Regulations of Law 11,594 for Railroad 
Personnel under National Jurisdiction, etc.
37La Nacion. December 7, 1966, p. 1, plus; Buenos Aires Herald. 
December 7, 1966, p. 9.
38Cronica (Rosario), November 8, 1966, p. 1.
39Clarin. December 3, 1966, p. 16; Buenos Aires Herald. December 
4, 1966, pp. 10-11. Of the total dwellings to be built, 40,000 were to
be built and financed by labor unions, 63,000 were destined for middle
income families, and 70,000 for the lower-income sector. Loans would be 
furnished to the middle-income sector payable in 8 to 12 years at interest 
rates of 9 to 15 per cent and to the lower-income sector payable in 20 to
30 years and from 5 to 15 per cent interest.
40La Prensa. December 6, 1966, p. 1.
275
On December 8, it was announced that the welfare ministry had accepted
$17,000,000 (U.S. dollars) from the AFL-CIO center in the United States
to be distributed among four Argentine unions for the construction of
d w e l l i n g s . O n  January 17, 1967, the housing secretary declared that
6,020 housing units were being constructed by the Banco Hipotecario
Nacional and would be ready to inhabit sometime in the first four months
of 1967, and in March another 1,784 units would be started. Later on in
the year there would be another 2,034 houses begun under credit from the
42Inter-American Bank for Development.
Educational reform. A comprehensive reform of the national 
education system, entitled "operative decentralization" came into effect. 
This meant that the responsibility for educational planning would be in 
the hands of the provinces, except for certain normative aspects.
Reaction to Government Policies
Categorization of Reactions
In categorizing the reactions to the preceding government policies 
on the part of various interests and sectors of national life, it was 
noted that ACIEL (the big industrialists in UIA and the big hacendados 
in the Sociedad Rural) applauded the policies presented by the government
^^Clarin. December 8, 1966, p. 15. The Argentine unions were: 
the Union Ferroviaria, Sindicato de Luz y Fuerza, Federacion de Empleados 
y Obreros de Correos y Telecomunicaciones, and Union Obreros y Empleados 
Municipales.
^^La Prensa. January 17, 1967, p. 1.
^^El Mundo. December 13, 1966, p. 5.
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and in every respect responded favorably. The CGE (the smaller indus­
trialists and businessmen and importers) was "more conservative in its 
applause" and responded more cautiously. The CGT, in further contrast 
showed its disconformity with nearly every measure taken, noting that 
the currency devaluation would transfer some 200 billion pesos of income
from the working sector and would cause the cost of living to rise some 
4425 per cent.
Examination of Opposition Activity
Four aspects of the position and activity of the opposition to 
government policies will be looked into: strikes, demonstrations, de­
clarations, and resignations.
Strikes
The transportation strike of November 9. 1966. Inspired by 
Eustaquio Tolosa, secretary general of the Confederacion Argentina de 
Trabajadores and of SUPA (Sindicatos Unidos Portuarios Argentinos), as 
a show of opposition to the proposed changes and policies of the govern­
ment, the strike of November 9, 1966, under the auspices of the Confed­
eracion Argentina de Trabajadores del Transporte (CATT), was only partial, 
limited to railroads and s h i p s . T h e  strike met with strong opposition 
within CATT itself— from UTA, Federacion de Camineros, Asociacion del 
Personal Aeronautico, and Asociacion Argentina de Aeronavegantes— which
44gee "Nueva politica economica: comienza la suba de precios,"
Esquiu (November 20, 1966), pp. 9, 20.
^^La Razon. November 8, 1966, p. 16; La Prensa. November 9, 1966,
p. 1.
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did not support the strike, because of the understanding that "the 
existing bases for negotiating a settlement were sufficiently hopeful 
to proceed with them."^^ But labor leader Tolosa and his workers 
struck anyway. Then the government seized SUPA, put a Navy captain 
in charge as interventor, hired strike breakers, and forced general 
secretary Tolosa to flee to Montevideo, Uruguay. From there, supported 
by the International Transport Workers Federation, Tolosa continued to 
direct the dock strike, which was eventually broken when the several 
countries applying international sanctions decided not to continue ad­
herence to the sanctions.
The CGT strike of December 14, 1966. As an act of protest to 
the dispositions of the government to solve the problems of the ports, 
the sugar industry, and the railroads, the CGT called a full 24-hour 
strike for December 14, 1966.^^ The physical effectiveness of the 
strike, however, was minimal in the estimation of the researcher, who 
experienced no transportation difficulties from the strike (most of the 
private bus lines were running that day).
^^"Complicadas situaciones enfrenta la CGT," Esquiu. (November 
20, 1966), p. 10.
^^The Chilean government found out very quickly that the country 
was losing too much trade income in supporting the cause of the Argentine 
dock workers and discontinued its support. The Uruguayan government, too, 
became disenchanted with the high price it was paying to support the 
politically overtoned strike and began urging that Eustaquio Tolosa leave 
the country. Buenos Aires Herald. December 7, 1966, pp. 8-9; "Las espadas 
de Damocles," Primera Plana, op. cit.. p. 13.
^^La Razon. December 13, 1966, p. 1. The ACIEL stated that it 
rejected "as false the arguments of the worker center"; and the strike 
was purely political; and that strikers seemed to ignore that "Argentine 
ports were declared the most expensive in the world" and should be cleaned 
up.
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The university student strikes. Strikes of students and demon­
strations of protest by students during the period of this study were 
quite effective in dramatizing the very thing which the regime tried 
most "to play down," viz.. its military characteristics and mentality.
The physical intervention of the armed forces and the use of force in 
the University of Buenos Aires and the University of Cordoba, particu­
larly, were out of character with the patriotic fervor, the strict ad­
herence to the Constitution, and the free exercise of all civil liberties 
that depicted the civilian role being played by the military government. 
Student strikes and other demonstrations accomplished little by way of 
making or influencing any specific changes, but they did tend to publi­
cize the most undesirable aspect of the current regime; its quick resort 
to force in order to quell or suppress its opposition.
Demonstrations
In comparison to previous worker-government history, worker
demonstrations were less violent and more controlled during the period
of this study. However as the port strike entered its seventh week,
minor demonstrations were noted.
Bomb explosions. After the sweeping indictment issued by
leftist and rightist labor groups that Argentine leaders are following
anti-nationalistic policies contrary to popular interests, five bombs
were exploded between 1 p.m. on December 8 and 1:20 a.m. on December 9,
491966, according to the Buenos Aires Herald.
49Buenos Aires Herald. December 9, 1966, p. 8.
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Mass demonstrations. Apart from student demonstrations and 
marches, there are those demonstrations that are inspired in behalf of 
some particular political cuase. For example, some 500 workers demon­
strated outside the CGT headquarters in behalf of SUPA labor leader 
Eustaquio Tolosa, calling for him by name in an impressive show of 
support.
Declarations
The following are more or less typical of official opposition 
declarations.
CGT. The official policy of the revolutionary government was 
attacked in a declaration published the day of the worker strike by the 
Central Committee of the CGT. The declaration contained five points:
1) December 14, 1966, was designated as the day on which to realize a 
24-hour strike of all the labor activity falling within CGT jurisdiction;
2) a brief exposition censuring the economic and social policies of the 
government was to be published by the Central Committee of the CGT;
3) the working class was to be mobilized through calling a number of 
public meetings and assemblies; 4) an analysis was to be made of the 
results of the strike; and 5) a special committee was to be named to 
publish the official CGT document the following Monday.
Railroad unions. The Union Ferroviaria and La Fraternidad 
formally rejected the new working regulations issued by the government,
^^Cronica (Buenos Aires), December 1, 1966, p. 3.
^^Cronica (Buenos Aires), December 14, 1966, p. 2.
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noting that the first time they had been exposed to the new railroad
52regulations was at the time they appeared in newsprint.
Federacion Obreros v Empleados Telefonicos de la Republics 
Argentina. The workers and employes of the telephone union also issued 
an official statement condemning government policy. The following points 
were made: 1) the government has demonstrated no actions to back up its
words; 2) the revolution enjoys no popular participation; 3) the govern­
ment policies have caused new worker sacrifices, thus weakening the in­
come of the workers and hence the amount of income derived from internal 
consumption; 4) the government has only stabilized wages, not prices; 
and 5) the policy to turn state businesses over to private enterprise
has placed the former into the hands of foreign interests and thus has
53threatened the economic independence of the country.
FANDEP. The Federacion de Agrupaciones Nacionales de Estudiantes
Peronistas (Federation of National Groupings of Peronist Students) issued
a declaration the evening previous to the December 14, 1966, strike in
condemnation of government policy and in support of the worker strike,
stating that "the policy of the present military dictatorship is one of
concentrating power and dividends in the hands of a native and foreign
exploiting minority at the price of increasing unemployment, misery,
54hunger, and loss of national patrimony."
52El Mundo. December 12, 1966, p. 13; Buenos Aires Herald. Dec­
ember 7, 1966, pp. 8-9.
^^El Mundo. ibid.
^^FANDEP, "Los pe 
mimeographed leaflet, Buenos Aires, December 13, 1966.
ronistas universitarios y el paro del 14-12-66,"
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Resignations
Key resignations occurred during the period of this study in 
financial, municipal, and military circles. These resignations served 
to dramatize the disconformity and confusion that reigned among the 
national power holders with respect to decisions and policies.
Felipe Tami and his colaborators. Dr. Felipe Tami, president 
of the Banco Central (Central Bank) and his colaborators— Eduardo 
Zalduendo, second vice president of the Bank; the financial advisers 
Alberto Petrecolla and Gustavo Miranda Gallino; Francisco Valsecchi, 
trustee of the Bank; and Alieto Guadagni, comptroller of the Consejo 
Federal de Inversiones— resigned in protest against the financial 
orientation of the government economic policy. The Tami school op­
posed the proposed government measures on the grounds that they had 
a regressive rather than a progressive focus. They are of the opinion 
that the only consequences of freezing salaries and reducing government 
expenditures will be economic contraction, increased unemployment, "a 
sharp increase in the level of prices, and a spectacular drainage of 
monetary reserves with the prospect of an immediate foreign debt."^^
Enrique H. Green Urien. Naval captain Enrique H. Green Urien, 
secretary of food supply and of the municipal police of Buenos Aires, 
presented his resignation and had it accepted by the municipal intendant 
Colonel Eugenio F. Schettini. Along with Captain Green Urien, the
55"Despues de la caida," Primera Plana. V (November 22, 1966), 
pp. 23-25; "Escandolo en la familia," Primera Plana. IV (November 1, 
1966), pp. 13-14, precipitated a number of forthcoming resignations if 
official policy did not alter its position in different cases; "&Con 
mûsica de future retornamos al pasado?" Azul y Blanco, loc. cit.
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general directors and advisers in his department resigned also, among 
them being Luis Margaride, the inspector general for the municipal 
police. The resignations exemplified differences in viewing the approach 
to communal problems and were directed against the official policies to 
turn street cleaning over to private enterprise and to establish new 
norms to control the sale of meat in municipal markets.
General Pascual Pistarini. On December 5, 1966, Lieutenant 
General Pascual Pistarini, commander-in-chief of the Army and the leading 
force behind the most recent military coup, after failing to agree with
President Ongania on certain military assignments and promotions, pre­
sented his resignation. That same day General Julio Rodolfo Alsogaray, 
head of the First Division of the Army, was offered and accepted the 
new post. General Pistarini retired amid speculation that something
more than a disputation over military assignments was involved and that
57other resignations and even conspiracies might follow.
5&La Nacion. November 24, 1966, p. 1; Cronica (Buenos Aires), 
November 24, 1966, p. 8; El Mundo. November 24, 1966, p. 6.
^^"La Nacion: 360 dias antes," Confirmado. II (December 8,
1966), pp. 16-17; "Ejercito: algo mas que traslados," Primera Plana.
V (December 13, 1966), pp. 12-14; Clarin. December 8, 1966, p. 22.
CHAPTER XI
THE CHANGING SOCIETY AND POLITICAL SYSTEM (CONCLUSION)
This has been an empirical and descriptive study of socio­
political change in the "urban Litoral" region of Argentina. While 
the overfall approach in the study is comprehensive in purporting to 
view every aspect of sociopolitical change, the major focus has been 
on the urban community. The purpose of this chapter will be to 
review some of the major findings in this study, to evaluate the 
approach that was used to study the problem, and to report the con­
clusions of the researcher concerning sociopolitical change in the 
"urban Litoral" of Argentina.
Discussion of the Findings 
At the time this study was begun, it was hypothesized that the 
key variables in understanding sociopolitical change among members of 
the urban community in Argentina's "urban Litoral" were: socioeconomic
status, anomie, political alienation, and social participation. To 
these was added the measurement of political attitudes, applying the 
Semantic Differential to several foreign governments and to certain 
national groups, movements, and parties which are considered to be
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politically significant by George I. Blanksten, A. Curtis Wilgus, and 
the researcher.^
The theory concerning these variables holds that a low socio­
economic status is likely to produce or to condition states of anomie 
and political alienation, both of which are considered to be inter­
vening variables between low socioeconomic status and low social 
participation. All three of these variables (socioeconomic status, 
anomie, and political alienation), then, are linked to social and 
political participation. The conditions of low socioeconomic status, 
high anomie, and high political alienation almost ensure that a person 
does not participate much socially or politically. In the event that 
a person who is anomic, alienated, and isolated participates poli­
tically, his behavior will most likely be negative.
The test results. Three distinctive patterns or sets of poli­
tical attitudes, which are closely related to socioeconomic status 
levels and social participation indicies, emerge from the findings in 
this study. Special terms have been employed ("elite," "mass," and 
"marginal" societies) in order to denote each of these response pat­
terns or sets. The meaning and use of these terms is given in the 
first part of Chapter IV, "The Funnel of Social-Group Interests." There, 
it is found that persons who are in the upper socioeconomic level reflect 
three distinctive characteristics: 100 per cent of them are not anomic,
78 per cent are not politically alienated, and 100 per cent are social
^Wilgus, loc. cit.; Blanksten, "Political Groups in Latin 
America," loc. cit.
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participants. Of the persons who are in the intermediary socioeconomic 
position, 77 per cent are not anomic, 43 per cent are not politically 
alienated, and 81 per cent are social participants. In the lower socio­
economic level, 23 per cent of the subjects are not anomic, "0" per cent 
are not politically alienated (or, that is, 100 per cent of them are 
politically alienated), and 18 per cent are social participants.
Apart from the very definite response differences on the measures 
of anomie, political alienation, and social participation for each socio­
economic group, there are yet noticeable differences which characterize 
them in their responses to foreign governments and national politically 
significant groups. The findings show that the lower class tends to rate 
the different foreign governments and national groups more positively 
(stronger, more active, and more virtuous) than do the lower middle and the 
upper middle classes. These findings contradict one aspect of the ori­
ginal hypothesis. It has been proposed that the existence of low socio­
economic status, high anomie, high political alienation, and low social 
participation implies that there will be either no political participation 
or negative political participation. But, the lower class, which exem­
plifies the patterns of low socioeconomic status, high anomie, high poli­
tical alienation, and low social participation, generally rates foreign 
governments, its own country and different political groups within its 
country more favorably in terms of force, activity, and evaluation than 
do the two other classes.
It will be recalled that in the ratings of foreign governments 
given by the three classes, the present government of France is seen as
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being the strongest, the most active, and the most virtuous. All three 
classes consider the government of Red China to be quite strong, quite 
active, and "bad," while the Soviet Union is seen as being rather strong 
and active by all three classes, and lower middle and lower classes rate 
it as being "good" at the same time that the upper middle class rates it 
as being "not very good." Finally, the lower class rates the govern­
ments of Cuba and Argentina more favorably than do the other two classes 
and the United States is rated more favorably by the lower class and 
less favorably by the two other classes.
It is quite significant that almost all the national political 
parties and movements in Argentina are judged to be "weak," "passive," 
and "bad." The only two exceptions are the Socialist and Peronist 
parties, which are rated in the middle position on the force, activity, 
and evaluation scales. The university students and the General Labor 
Confederation are rated as being "strong," "active," and "good" by all 
three classes. But the Roman Catholic Church and the armed forces are 
rated as being stronger, more active, and more virtuous by the lower 
class and much less so by the upper middle class. The bureaucracy is 
seen as a negative element in the national political context by all 
three classes, being rated as "weak," "passive," arid "not so good."
The lower class rates the industrial working class as being stronger, 
more active, and more virtuous than do the two higher socioeconomic 
classes. The upper middle class judges the professionals less favor­
ably than do the other two classes. None of the classes rate the 
peasantry as being strong or active in politics, but all three classes
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esteem it to be quite good. Finally, it is notable that the lower class 
rates the local trade unions, the large landowners, and the industrialists 
and financiers more positively on all factors than do the other two 
classes. On the above three items, there is a progressive gradation from 
more negative to more positive ratings in moving from the highest to the 
lowest class.
Implications. These reported results suggest that the key vari­
ables of socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomie, and social 
participation only condition and help to influence but apparently do not 
entirely determine political attitudes and action. Because an individual 
is negatively predisposed toward life in general and toward the local 
public administration in particular, does not mean that he holds negative 
attitudes concerning other national groups and foreign governments. In 
fact, the results of this study reveal that the great class antagonisms 
and alienation from the capitalist class which is supposed to propel the 
lower class toward the classic revolution are almost non-existent.
Furthermore, these variables, more than just conditioning or 
preparing an individual to be negatively predisposed, are vital concepts 
in explaining the extent to which an individual may be politically 
effective. The terms for describing each of the response patterns— the 
"elite" society, the "mass" society, and the "marginal" society— are 
quite graphic for this purpose. The marginal-society member is so 
estranged and isolated from society and so completely anomic and alienated 
from life and the political system that he may probably never act or want 
to act in his society in any meaningful political way. The mass-society
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member, however, is nearly as politically alienated but far less anomic 
and much more of a social participant than is the marginal-society per­
son. He may also be more politically effective in bringing about 
sociopolitical change than is the elite-society individual who is too 
little alienated and too little anomic even to desire to promote any 
kind of change in society or the political system. The mass-society 
member is sufficiently alienated to want to achieve some kind of change 
but not to the point that he will refrain from expressing himself poli­
tically. And, unlike the marginal-society person, who has only a few 
or probably no social contacts, the mass-society persons enjoys member­
ship in several formal associations and has an impressive inner circle 
of friends, relatives, co-workers, and neighbors whom he can influence 
politically or who will influence him politically. Therefore, more 
than being a series of variables which explain and are related to one 
another, socioeconomic status, political alienation, anomic, and social 
participation are variables which may be used more effectively to pre­
dict the capacity of the society at large to effect sociopolitical 
change.
Now, since marginal-society persons are so anomic, politically 
alienated, and socially isolated that they do not participate politically 
in their society, they probably do not participate in many other aspects 
of national life, not the least of which are politics and education.
And in this observation lies the possible explanation concerning the 
response set on political attitudes of the lower class. It is noted 
that members of the upper middle class, who are more informed and who
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participate more in public life than the lower class, rate both the 
government of the United States and the government of Argentine quite 
a bit more negatively than does the lower class. The ratings by upper- 
class subjects are no doubt based on a greater depth of experience and 
knowledge than are the ratings of the lower class.
Consider, now, the fact that the upper middle and the lower 
middle classes react more negatively toward or rate less favorably 
foreign governments and different national political groups. The im­
plication is that the lower class, which is not likely to act politically 
because of its alienation and isolation, is the class which is the most 
favorably predisposed to accept and to support other groups. But the 
two higher socioeconomic levels, which act politically in society, do 
not view as positively or as favorably the various internal and external 
forces and groups.
Of the six foreign governments, France alone is viewed favorably 
by all three classes. Italy and Spain were not rated by subjects, but 
it is hypothesized that Spain and Italy, especially, would be rated 
quite positively by Argentine subjects. The United States is not thought 
too highly of by the two higher socioeconomic classes on the evaluative 
factor, but neither is it thought of as being at all "bad." Cuba, Russia, 
and Red China are rated as being rather strong and active by all three
2This can be largely explained by the cultural heritage received 
from France, by the close cultural ties which Argentines maintain with 
France, and by the personal magnetism of President Charles De Gaulle 
who incarnates the caudillo or heroic leader in the minds of Argentines.
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classes, but on the evaluative factor Red China is regarded as "bad,"
Cuba is "bad" to the upper middle and lower middle classes, and Russia 
is "bad" to the upper middle class. All of this implies that the 
government of Argentina can have much closer relations with Southern 
Europe but it should move cautiously in being identified with the 
United States and the Soviet Union and should avoid any political 
identification or sympathy with Castro's Cuba or Mao Tse Tung's Red 
China.
In viewing ratings by subjects of the national politically 
significant groups, it would seem that all the political parties and 
movements in Argentina are in deep trouble in not having popular 
acceptance. The two post-Peron divisions, the UCRP and the UCRI, of 
the Union Civica Radical of Leandro Alem and Hipolito Yrigoyen and 
Pedro Aramburu's UDELPA are conceived of in only negative terms: 
weak, passive, and bad. The Radical party has failed to bring stab­
ility and development to its country and, as was noted in Chapter VIII, 
"Attitudes and Belief Systems," its loss of political control to the 
armed forces on June 28, 1966, and the subsequent suppression and con­
fiscation of the property and goods of the Radical party by the military 
regime have not been lamented by the Argentine classes, outside of the 
individual Radicales themselves. Under these circumstances, the only 
logical course for Argentine political parties and movements in gaining 
public acceptance and support is to reorganize and to create new political
3alignments. It is imperative for all the political parties and splinter
3One such new alignment could be headed up by UDELPA leader 
Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, and could attract some of the estranged UCRP 
followers. In addition, this group could hope to evolve into an 
eventual coalition with the Peronists. See "Sonar no cuesta nada,"
Primera Plana, loc. cit.
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groups to consolidate into "new" political bodies that will more 
fully represent the actual political tendencies existent in the "urban 
Litoral" of Argentina if the politicians ever hope to gain an accep­
tance on the part of the public.
The social classes seem to be favorably impressed by the poli­
tical strength, activity, and worth of university students and labor 
organizations. Both of these political groups apparently have a vast 
public sentiment supporting their political positions and activities. 
This great political acceptance or popularity of the Argentine labor 
forces and student groups should not be underestimated. Finally, the 
fact that almost every major national political group, with the excep­
tion of the political parties, has an acceptance with and is highly 
esteemed by the lower class would suggest that any of these major 
political groups could work more closely and profitably with lower- 
class persons.
Conclusions Concerning the Approach 
The basic approach in this study of sociopolitical change in the 
"urban Litoral" of Argentina may be summarized in "the model of socio­
political change" and its complementary methodology.
The Model of Sociopolitical Change 
As stated in chapter II, "the so-called model of sociopolitical 
change combines five conceptions in its structural appearance."^ Each 
one of these conceptions is derived from the work of well-respected
^See pages 16 and 17 of this study.
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academicians and researchers: TorcuaCo S. Di Telia, David Easton,
Irving Louis Horowitz, Samuel H. Beer, and various Argentine scholars: 
Albert Miester, Susana Petruzzi, Elda Sonzogni, Ana Rosa Centeno,
Jose Luis de Imaz, Delbert C. Miller, Eva Chamorro Greca, Juan Carlos 
Agulla, Alejandro Rofman, Clara E. Badler, Nestor J. Castagnola, 
Arnoldo R. Rosenfeld, and others.^
Now, as to whether these diverse conceptions can be ordered 
into a diagrammatic model after the manner in which they have been 
ordered for this study is subject to question. The most important 
single conception to the model is the identification of the political 
variables by Samuel H. Beer. Are the only significant variables in 
politics the ones that Professor Beer describes: political culture,
the pattern of power, the pattern of interests, and the pattern of 
policy? Can all political phenomena be categorized under these four 
variables? The researcher responds affirmatively to both these inter­
rogations and maintains that this study is a confirmation of the com­
pleteness and relevancy of these four variables in evaluating a poli­
tical system or, as in this use, the processes of social and political 
change.
The other conceptions represent clear and logical theory:
"the need to describe what it is that lies outside a system"; "the 
view of political life as a system of activity which is maintained 
by inputs of demands and support that are converted into outputs by 
the political system"; the conceptualization of the different types
^See footnotes "5" through "10" on pages 16-19.
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of sociological structures that are possible at various stages of 
industrialization; and the importance of viewing 'changes in class, 
power, occupation, and prestige" when studying the structures and 
processes of sociopolitical change.
The evaluative criteria of the model all conform to substantive 
realities. It is not logical to study sociopolitical change from within 
structural society or the political system and to ignore the vast range 
of factors which comprise "the total environment." This study has 
looked at the various components of the total environment and has 
identified some of the more politically relevant developments. The 
model separates the social classes, the political-group interests, and 
the governing interests into different "funnels" through which flow 
"pressures" and "stabilizers" into "the political system." The evalua­
tive criteria say that "in viewing social-group interests, it is rele­
vant to know the percentages of individuals who show marginal, mass, or 
elite patterns"; "in viewing political-group interests, it is relevant 
to know the numbers and kinds of influence groups that are * interest 
groups,' 'pressure groups,' and 'tension groups'"; "in viewing governing 
interests, it is relevant to know the relative command of each governing 
force: national, provincial, and municipal."
It is concluded that the evaluative criteria, like the model 
itself, represent actual realities and are useful in predicting roughly 
the rates and intensity at which a political system will be pressured 
or relieved of pressure. However, these criteria are very general in 
their nature and refer solely to structures and not to processes. It
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is recognized that it would be well to develop the structural parts of 
the model more fully and specifically and to distinguish different types 
of groups within each of the groups already noted. With more careful 
classification this can be done. Perhaps, it is even possible to desig­
nate mathematical values for the six parts of the visual model and to 
come up with an equation that will summarize all the past historical 
developments in each of the variables of a political system and its 
related environment. The summairy equation of the historical develop­
ments can then be put over the present or predicted developments in the 
same basic six variables and the resulting value will yield the socio­
political change that will occur in the region for which data is being 
manipulated.^ But this step of quantifying the elements in the model 
of sociopolitical change needs considerable study in order to identify 
and classify all the important variables.
The Complementary Methodology 
The complementary measures that were employed in this study are 
explained rather fully in Chapter II, pages 23-33. It would now be well 
to review each of these measures as tested in practice with a view toward 
improving them for future use.
Socioeconomic Status
In practice only four criteria were used to measure the socio­
economic status of respondents: occupation and education of subject,
^In simplest form this equation is change (C) is derived from 
taking the sum of the relevant political factors through historical 
time (W) over the recent developments in the total environment and 
political system (n-1); that is, C - _IL_
n-1
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or husband of the subject, in the case of female interviewees, and 
occupation and education of the father of the subject. The typology 
and indicators for each of these criteria is given in pages 24 and 25. 
While these four indicators have proved quite satisfactory in measuring 
socioeconomic status, they are nonetheless objective ones. It is pro­
posed that a second dimension be added to the measurement of socioeconomic 
status, namely, a subjective dimension. The subjective indicators are 
ones that have been used by Kalman H. Silvert and are elaborated by 
Gino Germani.^
It is suggested, then, that after the subject has responded on 
the previous indicators of occupation and education of himself and his 
father, he be requested to view nine situations to which a person may 
belong. He will mark just one of them. The first set of three choices 
are oriented toward an economic conceptualizations: the wealthy, the
medium, and the humble; the second set toward a scale of "prestige": 
upper class, middle class, and popular class; and the third set toward 
certain ideological connotations: grand bourgeoisie or aristocracy,
bourgeoisie, and proletariat. The preference of the subject for one or 
another of the nine alternatives provides the possibility of measuring 
for different aspects of self-affiliation and for comparison and corre­
lation with the objective factors of socioeconomic status.
^Gino Germani, Clase social subjetiva e indicadores objetivos 
de estratificacion ("Investigaciones y Trabajos del Institute de Socio­
logie, Coleccion Datos: No. 3"; Buenos Aires: Institute de Sociologie,
Universidad de Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 5.
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Anomie
The translated revision of Mizruchi's version of Srole's "anomia"
g
scale has proved to be particularly well adapted to Argentina and no 
doubt would be to other Latin American countries. Subjects from all 
levels of society appear to have understood clearly all the items on the 
scale and to have given valid responses to each of the items. Items 4 
(there can never be any solution to the economic difficulties which en­
gulf this country) and 5 (man does not wish for there to be so much 
misery in the world, but God allows it in order to punish man), which 
are innovations of the researcher, are ones which attract affirmative 
responses almost exclusively from lower class subjects and lower middle 
class subjects who are of a similar attitude set. Not only then is 
this adapted version of the "anomia" scale applicable to Argentine social 
classes in general, but to the lower classes of Argentina in particular. 
And the scale seems to measure in fact what it claims to measure: a
person's sense of powerlessness, normlessness, and isolation.
Political Alienation
The scale developed by Basil G. Zimmer for measuring local 
political alienation in Nashville, Tennessee, was adapted for use in this 
study.9 Items, 1, 2, and 3 are more or less understood by subjects, and 
the subjects in this study appear to have responded fairly well to these 
three items. But, items 4 (the political parties interfere too much in 
the affairs of the public administration of this and other cities) and
g
See pages 26-27 and Appendix B, pages 325-326.
9
See pages 27-28 and Appendix B, pages 323-325.
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5 (only the national government is capable of finishing projects for 
the people of a particular neighborhood) have been poorly understood 
and do not seem relevant at all for use in Argentina. Most of the 
subjects, particularly from the lower class, are so negatively condi­
tioned, so far as political parties are concerned, that it seems to 
have caused some distortion in their responses. It was not too infre­
quently that a subject, upon hearing item 4, would reply: "Yes, that's
righti The political parties interfere too much in everything."
On item 5, it seemed that in many instances the subjects failed 
to understand the intent of the statement. "Yes," would be the reply,
"the national government is capable of completing its projects." To 
get around this obvious misunderstanding, the researcher would draw a 
hypothetical mental picture for the subjects. Thus, he would say:
"Now, let's suppose you want to have a bridge built in this neighborhood. 
Which government would best be able to build this bridge for you, the 
national government, the provincial government, or the local municipal 
government?" Most of the respondents, even after this attempted simpli­
fication, failed to understand the problem and some of the responses 
were quite interesting. For example: "But we've already got.a bridge."
"I don't know which government. I'll have to wait and see which one gets 
here first. The one that gets here first will be the one that builds it." 
"It would take all three governments and a lot of prayers— and about ten 
years to build the bridge."
Alienation from work. Apart from being misunderstood on its last 
two items, the Zimmer political alienation scale focuses the entire blame
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on the local public administration (as well it should, since that is 
its purpose). Even with five other nonrelated items interspersed 
between the Zimmer items, it is felt that the respondent acquires a 
fixed disposition or response pattern and that all his alienation from 
life in general and from government in particular tends to group around 
a scapegoat; the local municipality and public officials. This effect 
has suggested a new approach in the measurement of political attitudes 
in which subjects can choose among several specified scapegoats. In 
summation, it is suggested that the Zimmer scale be condensed into one 
item on the new measure of political attitudes and that a different 
scale, covering another aspect of alienation, be adopted.
An acceptable and relevant measure for such purpose, it is 
theorized, is the Leonard I. Pearlin alienation-from-work scale, as 
used by Louis A. Zurcher et. a l . This particular scale, which is a 
four-item one, should "involve more than powerlessness that people 
experience"; it should "also capture an overtone of resentment at being 
deprived by outside forces of greater control over one’s own work."^^
1. How often do you do things in your work that you 
wouldn’t do if it were up to you (never, once in 
a while, fairly often, very often)?
2. Around here it's not important how much you know,
it’s who you know that really counts (agree, disagree)?
^^Louis A. Zurcher, Jr.; Arnold Meadows; and Susan Lee Zurcher, 
"Value Orientation, Role Conflict and Alienation from Work: A Cross-
Cultural Study," American Sociological Review. XXX (August, 1965), 
pp. 539-548.
^^Leonard I. Pearlin, "Alienation from Work: A Study of Nursing
Personnel," American Sociological Review. XXIX (June, 1962), pp. 314- 
326, especially 315.
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3. How much influence do people like you have on the 
way the hospital is run (a lot, some, very little, 
none)?
4. How often do you tell your superior your own ideas 
about things you might do in your work (never, once 
in a while, fairly often, very often)?
12The translated revision of these items is as follows:
1. àCon cuanta frecuencia desempena usted deberes en
su trabajo que no harîa si fuera usted su propio jefe 
(nunca, de vez en cuando, algo frecuentemente, muy 
frequentemente)?
2. No importa que yo sea muy habil en mi trabajo, lo 
que vale mas es ser muy amigo de todos mis jefes 
(estoy de acuerdo, no concuerdo).
3. &Cuanta influencia tiene un (obrero) (empleado) como 
usted sobre como se hacen las cosas en el trabajo 
(mucha, alguna, poca, ninguna)?
4. &Con cuanta frecuencia divulga usted a su jefe sus 
propias ideas sobre c5mo se debe hacer las cosas en
su trabajo (nunca, de vez en cuando, algo frecuentemente, 
muy frecuentemente)?
Two additional items will follow the Pearlin scale, measuring
the degree of satisfaction of a worker with his present position and
his plans to continue. The items were used and validated in a cross-
1cultural study which also employed the Pearlin scale. In this study, 
the items were:
12Translated more or less literally: 1) How often do you per­
form tasks in your work that you wouldn't do if you were your own boss 
(never, once in a while, fairly often, very often)? 2) If doesn't 
matter that I may be skillful in my job, it is of greater value to be 
very friendly with all my superiors (agree, disagree); 3) How much 
influence does a (worker) (employe) have upon the way things are done 
at work (much, some, little, none)?; 4) How often do you divulge to 
your boss your own ideas about how things should be done at work (never, 
once in a while, fairly often, very often)?
13Zurcher, Jr.; Meadows; and Zurcher, op. cit.. p. 543.
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1. Do you plan to continue your present job for the rest 
of your working career (yes, no)?
2. Is your satisfaction with the present position you 
hold above average, average, or below average?
These two items are translated and revised^^ as follow:
1. àPiensa usted seguir en su empleo u oficio actual 
hasta que se jubile (si o no)?
2. &Hasta que grado esta satisfecho con su empleo u 
oficio actual (satisfecho, indiferente, o insatis- 
fecho)?
Social Participation
The constructed measures of the frequency of participation in 
certain informal groups, formal group membership, and formal group 
attendance^^ have proved quite satisfactory in measuring the social 
participation of the inhabitants of Argentina's "urban Litoral" region. 
In future interviews to measure social participation, however, it is 
recommended that not only should the measures of social participation 
used in this study be retained but that other measures should be added 
to lend more precision to the measurement of social participation.
The proposed additions are of the types elaborated by Albert 
Meister, Susana Petruzzi, and Elda Sonzogni in their sociological study 
in the Santa Maria Valley of Argentina and by Theodore Caplow, Sheldon 
Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace in their sociological study in San Juan, 
Puerto Rico. Relevant parts of the interview schedules used in both
^^Translated: 1) Do you intend to continue in your present job
or position (yes or no)?; 2) To what extent are you satisfied with your 
present job or position (satisfied, indifferent, or dissatisfied)7
^^See pages 28 to 31 and Appendix B, pages 322-323.
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these studies are now presented in English. The original Spanish 
version used in the study of Caplow, Stryker, and Wallace does not 
appear in their book.
Social Participation and Recreation^^
1. Are parties held in the neighborhood?
2. What kind of parties are they?
3. Where are they held?
4. Who organizes them?
5. Do you attend them?
a. If "yes," who else attends?
b. If "no," why don't you attend?
6. Do you have parties and meetings in your home?
a. If "yes," who do you invite (name, occupation,
address)?
7. When do you hold these parties and meetings?
8. And if you were to hold a big party in your home,
who would you like to invite?
9. Do any of these persons you'd invite to your party 
throw parties also?
10. Do you attend them?
11. Who are your three best friends (name, occupation, 
address)?
12. Are your neighbors also counted among your friends?
13. When would you say that a person is a good neighbor?
14. And, do you go to parties in other neighborhoods?
a. If "yes," why?
b. Where are these parties held?
c. For what purposes are they held?
^^From Miester, Petruzzi, and Sonzogni, op. cit.. pp. 102-103.
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15. Do you visit the Church or go to Church meetings?
16. To what associations do you belong (organization, 
attendance, and positions)?
1 7Questions Related to Social Participation
1. Who are your three best friends among your neighbors?
a. b. c. ___
2. Which three of your relatives have you seen most 
frequently during the last month? What is your 
relation to each person? How frequently have you 





3. Do you work outside your home? (If yes, continue;
if no, go on to the following series) Yes_______
No_________
4. Who are your three closest associates at work? How 
frequently do you lunch together with each of these 
persons? Do you drink coffee or go to any work 
related activities together? What position does that 





5. Of those persons with whom you go out and visit, etc., 
who are the three you have seen most frequently during 
the last month? Aside from being yout friends, do you 
have any other relationship with them? (Relatives, work 
associates, etc.) How frequently have you visited them 
during the last month?
^^From Theodore Caplow, Sheldon Stryker, and Samuel E. Wallace, 
The Urban Ambience: A Study of San Juan. Puerto Rico (Totowa, New






6 . Do you have any relatives or neighbors working in the 
same place where you work? Yes__________ No___________
7. Now I would like to ask you about your relationship to 
your husband's relatives, work associates, and recrea­
tional friends. Of your husband's relatives which three 
has he seen most often during the last month? What 






8. Would you be able to tell me which three persons are 
your husband's closest work associates? What positions 
do these persons have at his place of employment? How 





9. Are your husband's three closest recreational friends
the same ones as yours? Yes________ No______  Some________
(If "no" or "some" continue to next question.)
10. Of your husband's recreational friends, which three has 





11. Do you believe that this neighborhood is a good place to 
live? Why or why not? __________________________________
12. Do you intend to stay here permanently? Yes_______




The Semantic Differential measurement, based on the format 
developed by Kenneth F. Johnson, proved to be highly applicable to the 
Argentine socioeconomic groups on whom it was tested. That is, the 
subjects who responded to the questionnaire appeared to understand 
nearly all the items and the factors on which their ratings were based.
J n  light of the experience of the researcher in administering this 
test to Argentine subjects, several changes in the original format are 
proposed.
First, it is recommended that the force, activity, and evaluation 
scales each have five instead of four positions. Subjects of very low 
socioeconomic status and very little formal schooling not only understood 
quite clearly this test and what it requires but they objected to having 
just four positions (for example: very strong, somewhat strong, not very
strong, weak) and told the researcher that they wanted to rate particular 
items at a position which they called termine intermedia (middle point). 
Thus, a fifth position was added, which was the midway point between the 
extremes of each factor.
Second, while three of the original Johnson items (the aprismo 
of Perû, the FALN of Venezuela, and the National Front of Colombia) were 
undoubtedly well known by conservative Guatemalan subjects, most Argen­
tine subjects were totally unfamiliar with these political movements. 
Thus, it is suggested that these particular international items, as 
with the various national groups and movements, can be changed to suit 
the locality and the political knowledge of the native inhabitants.
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In the case of Argentine socioeconomic groups, it is proposed that three 
foreign governments be substituted for the more unfamiliar Latin American 
political movements. The three governments are Italy, Spain, and Great 
Britain. It would be particularly interesting to obtain ratings on 
these three governments. Also, other governments and entities could be 
added to the list: the European Economic Community, the government of
West Germany, the government of Japan, the government of Israel, the 
government of the United Arab Republic, the government of Brazil, the 
government of Chile, the government of Uruguay, the government of Para­
guay, and the government of Bolivia.
Conclusions Concerning Sociopolitical Change 
It is the purpose of this final part of the chapter to note the 
elements of persistence and change in the society and political spheres 
of the "urban Litoral" of Argentina.
Elements of Persistence 
It is predicted that the following elements will not change 
appreciably within the next decade, thereby continuing to support or 
to pressure Argentine society and politics as they have done during 
the period of this study.
High level of social development, communications development. 
and educational development. Argentines will continue to be avid readers, 
viewers, sports fans, and movie goers. Despite the resignations of 
many key university professors, Argentine universities and all national 
public schools should continue to provide the inhabitants of the "urban
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Litoral" with an educational opportunity superior to other Latin American 
countries. Argentine society will also continue as a highly pluralistic
one, characterized by numerous roles and by a large and varied number of
. 18 organizations.
Concentration of population in the "urban Litoral." The Litoral 
provinces contain 61.8 per cent of the total population of Argentina and 
have the highest numbers of inhabitants per square kilometer. It is 
predicted that this percentage and ratio will stay about the same during 
the next decade, being aided somewhat by the increasing numbers of Para­
guayans, Bolivians, and Argentines from rural regions who migrate to the
IQfour urban centers selected in this study.
Unrealized productive potential. The "urban Litoral" has a vast
productive potential in both industry and agriculture which is not being
realized. That industrial and agricultural productivity in this region
is stagnated, is one economic reality that specially affects the future
of Argentina. Presently, the agrarian sector is pressuring for and
obtaining long-needed improvements and technological developments,
although it is argued by many "nationalists'' that by improving its
agricultural production Argentina will become the world's food supplier
and its industrial growth will be retarded. While the productive potential
of Argentina is admittedly great, the obstacles to achieving this potential
remain so difficult to overcome immediately that Argentina will probably
20not realize its fullest productive potential for some time yet to come.
18Support for this contention can be found on pages 72-75, 187-194. 
l*See pages 56-61, 64-65, 100-102, 233, 248.
ZOgee pages 43-47, 49-50, 54-56, 79-82, 165-168, 220-222, 227-229,
244-245.
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Pressing urban problems. The strides that are being made by
the national and municipal governments in Argentina in eliminating the
housing deficit and other urban problems will continue to be offset by
migrations of generally less educated, less skilled, and less healthy
persons from the neighboring countries into Argentina. Unemployment
will remain fairly high (between 5 and 8 per cent) as it has in the
past, but should never exceed 10 per cent. Municipal governments will
continue to have difficulty in providing all urban residents with the
necessary health, medical, police, fire, and other public services, such
21as transportation, gas, running water, electricity, etc.
Personalism, individualism, and friendship in politics. The
patterns of personalism and individualism and "the cult of friendship"
are well established in Argentine political culture and should affect
national politics for some time. Personalism will continue to dominate
the institutions, and the Argentine will ever be an individual rather
than a citizen. These cultural peculiarities present a political climate
that is more conducive to caudillismo and personalistic leadership than
22to democracy and democratic institutions.
Low wages and high cost of living. The salary of the workers 
is expected neither to improve nor to worsen during the next decade.
It is predicted that the percentage of the total economic remuneration 
received by dependent workers will stay at about 41 per cent because 
of competition from skilled workers and technicians who are more in
21See pages 58-59, 64-65, 100-102, 164-165, 171, 176-177, 233. 
22see pages 67-70, 149-151, 223-226.
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demand. The pressure exerted by organized labor and the social conscience
of government leaders, however, should keep the remuneration to the
workers from falling below its present level. The level of prices will
rise for the next five years at about the same rate as during the past
ten years. Any economic measures that have been or will be taken shortly
should not have much immediate effect in halting the inflationary trend.
But the long-run prospects are favorable. It is proposed that the present
rising cost of living in Argentina will be entirely checked when the
"urban Litoral" becomes the world’s foremost agricultural export center
23at the same time that a thriving native industry exists.
Capitalist orientation of the economy. To the dismay of many 
nationalist elements the economic powers will retain full sway in Argen­
tina for many years yet. The Argentine capitalists and foreign inves­
tors are well organized and own the national productive capability.
The government policies and programs that were inaugurated during this 
study have given additional strength to the economic powers, strength 
which cannot be easily taken away.
The university; a political battleground. No amount of 
government studies and decrees can put an end to political activity with­
in the Argentine universities. Law 16,912 has only served to increase 
student insistence upon university autonomy and to inspire the opposi­
tion of students and student groups to whatever measures threaten their 
autonomy. The national heritage of freedom and individualism is so 
much identified with the right of students to engage in political
23See pages 97-100, 164-168.
2^See pages 110, 123-127, 146-147, 159-160, 166-168, 175, 228,
239, 248, 260-273.
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activity in the universities and to have a respected voice in the ad­
ministration of their universities that no political regime will ever
25eradicate the tradition of student autonomy and control.
On the other hand, the national government and other elements, 
such as the economic powers (ACIEL and CGE) and certain political con­
servatives and professionals, wish to see the universities "cleaned-up" 
and made centers of learning rather than "hot-beds" of political 
action.and violence. The attempt by the new government to straighten 
out the universities and to reduce their political role touched off 
more violence and activity than it was able to suppress or discourage. 
But it appears that the new government, as well as all succeeding ones, 
will try to reform the universities. Such attempts will ensure that 
the universities remain political battlegrounds in which any opposition 
to government policy can be dramatically manifested.
Disaffection of the middle class. The middle class, more than 
any other social class, demonstrates an active disaffection and dissat­
isfaction with national life. Unlike the lower class which is quite 
isolated and void of hope and norms, the middle class feels that its 
efforts can alter the disagreeable aspects of national life and that 
it can achieve a greater share of the national wealth. It is quite 
likely that the middle class will stay disaffected for some time and
will be a continuous pressure on the political regimes to enact policies
01and take measures that will improve its economic and social position.
“ see pages 117-118, 120, 128-133, 174-175, 240-243, 278, 280. 
2*See pages 128-129, 130-133, 174-175, 275, 278-280.
^^See pages 98-100, 155-157, 164-165, 237-238.
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Rising expectations. The revolution of "rising expectations" 
will not be put down in this or the next decade in the "urban Litoral" 
of Argentina. The system authorities will have to satisfy demands that
proceed from all sectors of society and the economy for reducing national
28 —deficits and promoting rapid economic growth.
Resentment toward foreign economic interests. Perhaps the most
persistent element throughout the national history of Argentina is the
national resentment against any and all economic intrusion from abroad.
"Argentina for the Argentines" is the motto which guides Argentine
thinking in its dealings with foreign economic interests. The presence
of Russian fishing vessels off Argentina's southern coast in November
of 1966 was resented just as much as were the foreign oil contracts
which the Frondizi government negotiated in 1958, as is the continued
reign of Great Britain over the Falkland Islands, and as is the ceding
of a third weekly flight to Braniff International airlines in November 
29of 1966.
Unrealism and distorted images concerning the greatness of 
Argentina. Since the psychological state of an individual is quite 
difficult to change, it seems reasonable to assume in this case that 
Argentines will maintain their same vice or virtue of looking at life 
as they would either like it or not like it to be instead of as it 
really is. In light of this same proclivity, it can also be assumed 
that Argentines will go on viewing their country as being one of the 
greatest and richest in all Latin America and in the entire world.
2^See pages 96-98, 232, 235-236.
2^See pages 126-129, 168-170, 173-175, 225, 227-228, 239-280.
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This image of Argentina as a great economic power has persisted through 
twenty years of inflation and deficit budgets and should continue in­
definitely into the future until the time when Argentina may very well
30be every bit as economically great as it is now believed to be.
Deficit government spending and missed retirement payments. The 
government programs for public works and the modernization of trans­
portation and port facilities will practically guarantee that deficit 
budgets continue and retirement checks will persist in being irregularly
received, although their real value is being continuously diminished by
31the rising cost of living.
Elements of Change 
The following elements either have changed significantly within 
the period of this study (June 28-December 14, 1966) or show indication 
of changing within this decade.
More "Indianism" in the national population. With respect to 
the ethnic composition of the population of Argentina, noticeable changes 
are already in progress. With migration from Europe all but stopped, 
with many skilled workers and technicians migrating to the more developed 
countries, and with large numbers of Paraguayans, Bolivians, and Chileans 
entering the country, the national population of Argentina is rapidly 
losing its European character and becoming more "Indian." This ethnic 
transition is indicative of increasing illiteracy, unemployment, and 
qnSee pages 220-222.
^^See pages 114, 129, 143-148.
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other demographic and economic problems of a social nature, since
those persons who migrate from the bordering countries, as already
noted, are generally less educated, less skilled, and less healthy
32than are the Argentines.
New political forces. With the termination of the "old"
politics, it is predicted that the former political parties will not
emerge again as they were before June 28, 1966. The more time that
transpires between the date on which the political parties were deposed
and the earliest date at which the political parties are allowed to
function once more, the more certain is the prediction that the political
parties will not continue in their previous forms. During this study,
many of the national political leaders were contemplating and discussing
33the prospect of forming new fronts and coalitions.
Development of the provinces and outer regions. The construction 
of the hydroelectric complex, Chocon-Cerros Colorados, and the extraction 
of iron ore from the Sierra Grande site were planned at least as early 
as 1958, at the beginning of the Frondizi administration. But the 
greatest impetus given to such projects and developmental schemes was 
during the latter part of 1966. These two projects, plus the proposed 
Salto Grande hydroelectric plant, the highway and tunnel projects in 
Santa Fe province, the renovation of various national ports, and the 
increasing federal support of such projects— all these developments 
point toward greater economic growth in the areas which are affected.
32See pages 64-66, 100-102, 233.
S^See pages 117, 119, 130-131, 360-361, 172-173, 238-239, 249-251.
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The upper "urban Litoral," Santa Fe and Parana, particularly, will en­
joy a higher level of economic activity once the Parana-Santa Fe Under­
ground Tunnel is completed; and then, this increased prosperity, it is 
predicted, will considerably decrease the flow of in-migrants from 
these two cities into Rosario and Buenos Aires. Partly contingent upon
how extensive is the renovation work of its port facilities, Rosario
34should also begin to enjoy a higher rate of economic development.
A new political creed: dedication to development. The revol­
ution of 1966 most definitely put an end to the old politics. In the 
future it will not be possible for the governing authorities to turn 
back to old and discredited solutions or to follow the formulas of old 
and discredited leaders. No matter what changes may occur, or whatever 
new regime may come into power, no government nor any series of national
programs can deny the basic aim of the new government: to modernize
35and promote the development of Argentina.
Increasing political maturity. Argentine citizens are increasing 
in political maturity, as was evidenced after the military coup of June 
28, 1966. None of the major blocs of power or influence would accept 
any paternalism in exchange for unconditionally supporting the govern­
ment. The new government was judged solely on the basis of its perfor­
mance in resolving national problems. It was neither blindly supported
34See pages 135, 141-144, 148-153, 235, 238, 246-248.
^^See pages 144-149, 170-171, 233-236, 260-266, 271-275.
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nor blindly opposed by the majority of the citizens, and the support, 
of or opposition to the government did not come until after it clari­
fied its position. But there were other manifestations of political 
maturity, too: relatively little violence, organized and controlled
opposition, and more consideration of the "national good" or "general 
welfare.
Slow-down in the rural-urban trend. With the urban population
of Argentina at nearly 75 per cent of the total national population,
it is predicted that the rural-urban trend will slow down gradually in
this and the next decade, especially 'f agriculture continues to be
37promoted as it was in the last half of 1966.
. Increasing international ties. While the long-existent, chronic 
resentment toward foreign powers and enterprises still lurks menacingly 
in the background of contemporary events and negotiations, the new 
government is nonetheless courting the international monetary organisms 
to obtain funds for meeting housing needs and for offsetting preliminary 
money losses caused by devaluation of the national currency. The govern­
ment is also seeking to induce more inflow of foreign capital by erecting 
a more favorable climate for investment. The Argentine government is not 
likely to turn its back on foreign investment and development of the
national economy however strongly the nationalists may oppose foreign 
38economic ties.
^^See pages 200-206, 251.
^^See pages 59-61, 70-72.
^®See pages 111, 227-229, 232, 236, 239, 248, 262-265.
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Increasing emphasis on agriculture. Complacency in agricultural
production has lulled Argentina into more than a quarter century of low
productivity and declining per-capita exports. But during the time of
this study official policy pledged government support in modernizing and
improving the facilities and productivity of the agrarian sector. The
official policy was backed up by much private determination to increase
39harvests and reconquer world markets.
Final Statement
By and large the Argentine academicians and scholars appear to 
be well informed on the problems of their own country and it is not 
likely that Latin Americanists from other countries can uncover any 
areas of social science research that have not already been investi­
gated with much sophistication by native researchers. Therefore, this 
study has no illusions of competing with the more exhaustive studies 
performed by Argentine researchers, such as the ones cited in the 
bibliography. In fact, one of the most significant contributions that 
this study makes, in the mind of the researcher, is to publicize the 
existence and content of native material. Because of this basically 
Argentine orientation in researching the problem of sociopolitical 
change in the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, very few of the works on 
Argentina by North Americans appear in the text or bibliography.
While a large number of North American sources are cited in the chapter 
on methodology, these sources could have been supplanted by Argentine 
studies, except in the instance of some of the measurements.
39See pages 244-245, 253, 262-264.
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However, it has been more the purpose of this study to develop 
general methods that can be further perfected not only for use in 
Argentina but in other Latin American countries as well. It is felt 
that in the main the study achieves this objective. A visual structure 
for analysis and a number of measurements have been developed and tested. 
The preceding chapters of this study constitute the application of this 
structure and these measurements.
As for the special focus on the "urban Litoral" of Argentina, 
admittedly too much data exists to be assimilated and condensed into a 
single study. Nevertheless, this study represents an attempt to do 
this very thing. Whether or not it has succeeded in its intent, is 
left to the judgment of its readers and critics. But the results of 
the study are in nowise comprehensive nor conclusive. In the opinion 
of the researcher there still exists the need for additional research 
and experimentation. In future studies of this type it would be well 
to improve the judgment tests that are used, to increase the size of 
the sample, and to give quantitative values to the visual elements in 
the model.
APPENDIX A
A TOPICAL OUTLINE 0? THE COMPONENTS OF 
"THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT"
A. Ecological Components
1. Physical characteristics and natural resources
a. geographical space--size and extent of territory
b. topography; salient geographic features
c . climate
d. supply of basic raw materials
e. nature and accessibility of flora and fauna
2. Use and characteristics of land
3. Physical planning
a. location of markets and business centers
b. residential location and growth
c. transportation and communication networks
d. planning and physical expansion
B. Historical Evolutionary Components











a. light industry growth
b. heavy industry
c. workers
d. . industrial organizations
5. Social development
a. demographic growth
b. emergence and growth of classes
c. activities and organizations
6. Cultural development
a. theaters, parks, and public places
b. organizations









a. recent and expected growth.
2. Distribution of population
a. rural-urban trends
b. economic distribution
3. Composition of population
a. 8ex and age groups
b. ethnie groups and nationalities




5. Characteristics of the population




1. The "Argentine man"
a. heritage of chaos
b. aggressive nature
c. conceptions of sex and love
d. nationalism
e. cult of friendliness
f. quest for liberation
2. The "Argentine woman"
a. types of women
b. types of female activity
c. myths of femininity
d. institutions and roles
e. conceptions of sex and love
3. The Argentine mentalities
a. the paternalistic oligarchy
b . the picaresque porteno
c . the gaucho
d . the gringo
4. The cultural heritages
a. Indianism
b . Europeanism
c. Capitalism and imperialism
5. New currents
a. lunfardo and "la Boca"
b. the viveza criolla




1. Social stratification and relations
2. Mores, norms, and values
3. Dimension and composition of the family
4. Education
a. number of students— ages and grades
b. number and kinds of schools
c. teachers and education of teachers
d. per cent and causes of absenteeism
5. Housing— number and condition of dwellings
6. Cost of living, level of prices and wages
7. Organizations
a. mutual benefit associations
b. business concerns
c. service organizations
d. common weal organizations
8. Mass communications and society
9. Religious institutions and practices
10. The sociology of migrations
11. The phenomenon of urbanization
a. statistical dimensions
b. the "high-primacy" pattern
c. the "push" - "pull" factor
d. provision of services
e. unemployment
f. the villas de emergencia
g . delinquency
12. Health and medical care
F. Political-Legal Components
1. The constitution
a. the May Revolution: antecedents, developments
b. first attempts (1810-1820)
c. the Constitution of 1819
d. " " " 1826
e. " " " 1853
f. reforms of 1866, 1898, and 1957




d. articles 29 and 95
3. The federal organization of Argentina
a. concept and history of federalism
b. the provinces: autonomy and powers
c. federal intervention
d. municipal administration





5. Civil rights and individual freedoms
6. National defense and the armed forces
7. The legislative power
a, the Senate
b. the Chamber of Deputies
8. The judiciary
9. The executive power
a. election of President
b. duties of President
c. scope of executive authority
10. Public administration
a. codification of administrative law
b. the administrative acts
c. the concept of public utility and state enterprises
d. employes and civil servants
e. public services
f . administrative contracts
g. the police power of the state
h. administration and justice
G. Food Supply and Consumption
1. Urban centers and regions of supply
2. Regional production and its value
3. Transportation to and distribution in urban centers
a. truck routes
b . railroad routes
c. water routes
H. Economic Components
1. Basic economic structure
a. the basic system— configurations and parameters
b. communications and transportation
c. sources of employment





a. number and type of establishments
b. domestic and foreign production
c. raw materials
d. working force
e. industrial communications and transportation
3. Commerce and Services
a. markets' value of commercializations
b. wholesale and retail organisms
c. business enterprises
d. costs of production and marketing
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4. Construction sector
a. cost of construction
b. price of building materials
c. building permits granted
d. certificates of completion
5. Finances and investment
a. in the public sector
b . in the private sector
c. evolution of deposits and credits
d. capacity of financing
e. interregional routes and sources
6. Agrarian sector
a. inventory of production




ENCUESTA ENTRE CIUDADANOS EN LA ZONA 
DEL RIO DE LA PLATA
Estimado ciudadano:
Con el objeto de conocer la opinion colectiva de la gente con 
quiên se vinculan para entrevistar, el Sr. Paul Hoopes y sus colaboradores 
efectüan una encuesta académica de indole politico y social entre los 
ciudadanos que viven en la region del rio de la Plata. Séria de nuestro 
agrado que usted participera en este proyecto. Sus contestaciones y 
opiniones serân tratadas en forma completamente confidential.
Parte uno; data personal
1. iEn que lugar nacio usted?
2. iDônde nacieron sus padres?
3. 6Quê clase de trabajo hizo su padre durante la mayor parte 
de su vida? _________________________________________________
4. îTuvo la oportunidad su padre de asistir a alguna escuela? 
îHasta que grado llegô êl? _________________________________
5. iEn que ciudades o regiones ha vivido usted?_______________
6. iDonde nacieron sus hijos y espos(o) (a)? _________________
7. iEn que escuelas se educo usted? 
iHasta que grado cursô? _________
8. iEn que trabaja usted actualmente? ________________________
iQuê ocupacion le gustaria tener si se le facilitaran los 
medios paca lograrla? _____________________________
9. iCuales son las trabas que mas impiden que usted no disfrute 
tanto de la vida econômica y social? ______________________
Parte dos: information social
1. iCuântas veces visita usted a sus pariantes?
_do8 veces por semana como minimo 





2. 6a sus amigos?
 dos veces por semana como minimo
una vez por semana 
jaenos frecuentemente 
nunca
3. ia sus vecinos? sin considerar los encuentros ocasionales 
 dos veces por semana como minimo
juna vez por semana 
jnenos frecuentemente 
nunca
4. ia sus companeros del trabajo? fuera del trabajo 
 dos veces por semana como minimo
juna vez por semana 
jnenos frecuentemente 
nunca
iPertenece usted a algun club, organizacion civica, 
social, profesional u otra clase de organizacion?__







(a) mas de una vez por semana (b) una vez por semana 
(c) dos o tres veces por mes (d) una vez por mes 
(e) algunas veces al ano (f) una vez al ano (g) nunca 
(h) no puedo decir
Parte tres; opiniones sobre la vida urbana
En este parte se ruega que usted nos indique hasta que grado este 
de acuerdo con las siguientes oraciones. Las contestaciones son las 
siguientes:
324
A. Estoy muy de acuerdo_
B. Estoy algo de acuerdo_
C. No tengo opinion_____
D. Estoy en desacuerdo 
E. Estoy completamente en desacuerdo_
A  .____
B .____
C .____  1. Se ha dicho que los padres de caracter debil crian a hijos




C .____  2. La administration de esta municipalidad no se interesa
D  .____  en nuestros barrios.
E .____
A  .____
B  .____  3. Es la gente de los barrios que falla en no comunicarse
C .____  con los funcionarios publicos para ponerles al tanto




C .____  4. El gobierno de esta ciudad tiene la culpa por los




C .____  5. El vicioso se perjudica a sî mismo y nadie tiene la
D  .____  de que los hijos deb borracho caminen descalzos.
E. _____
A  .____
B .____  6. Los funcionarios pûblicos son sordos y no nos hacen caso
C .____  cuando nos dirigimos a ellos con un problems publico,
D  .____ como la falta de pavimentacion de algunas calles.
E. '___ _
A  .____
B  .____  7. Nunca hubo un verdadero partido liberal ni un verdadero
C  .____  partido conservador, sino tres grandes divisiones; los




B  .___   8. Los partidos politicos se meten demasiado en los asuntos
C .____  que corresponden a la administracion publica de esta




C .____  9. Los jefes de fabricas que hacen annamentos fomentan




C .____  10. Unicamente el gobierno nacional es capaz de cumplir
D  .____  con proyectos para la gente de los barrios particularee
E.
Parte cuatro; opiniones sobre la vida en general
A  .____
B  .____
C .____  1. No se debe prohibir de que los maestros de escuela




C  .____  2. La mayorîa de la gente se interesa poco en ayudar a su




C. ____  3. La falta de trabajo en este pais se debe mayormente a




C .____  4. En los tiempos actuales no se cuenta con personas




C  .____  5. Los mayores de edad exageran el grado a que ha llegado




B  .  6. Dadas las condiciones actuales de vida, no es posible
C. ____  que proyectemos para el future; se tiene que vivir




C. 7. Con respecte a la politica, los estudiantes universitarios




C .  8. Nunca habra solucion de las dificultades econômicas de
D  .____  que se ve rodeado este pais.
E  .____
A  .____
B .  9. Aunque la industria extranjera contribuyese a los ingresos
C .____  de este pais, preferiria que el gobierno nuestro la




C ._____ 10. El hombre no quiere que baya tanta miser ia en el mundo,




AVERAGE RATINGS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ON THREE






The United States 
Upper middle class 3.90 3.50 4.67 18
Lower middle class 4.87 2.75 4.33 15
Lower class .  .  . • • 2.50 2.42 2.83 12
Argentina
Upper middle class . a 6.05 4.83 6.17 18
Lower middle class , 4.70 2.87 4.33 13
Lower class • • • • • 2.62 5.00 3.56 8
Cuba
Upper middle class , a 3.72 3.66 5.62 18
Lower middle class . a 2.74 4.06 6.97 15
Lower class • • • • • 2.11 3.88 3.78 9
Soviet Union
Upper middle class a a 3.18 3.56 6.06 18
Lower middle class a a 2.94 3.00 3.40 15
Lower class 2.44 2.44 4.56 9
Red China
Upper middle class a a 2.72 2.90 6.62 18
Lower middle class a a 2.46 2.40 7.61 15
Lower class 2.50 2.75 8.00 4
France
Upper middle class a a 2.20 2.78 3.07 18
Lower middle class a a 2.80 3.27 2.80 15




AVERAGE RATINGS OF POWER BLOCS ON THREE






The Roman Catholic Church 
Upper middle class . . 4.40 5.45 4.22 18
Lower middle class . . 3.40 4.60 4.93 27
Lower class ........ 3.04 2.96 3.59 27
The Armed Forces
Upper middle class . . 3.22 4.72 6.61 18
Lower middle class . . 2.19 2.69 5.35 26
Lower class ........ 2.14 2.92 5.48 28
The General Labor Con­
federation
Upper middle class . . 4.75 3.38 4.25 16
Lower middle class . . 4.26 4.00 4.96 23
Lower class . . . . 2.92 2.96 3.56 25
The University Student 
Groups
Upper middle class . . 4.82 2.67 2.90 18
Lower middle class . . 3.59 3.08 4.96 27




AVERAGE RATINGS OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS







Upper middle class . . 7.12 5.95 6.50 18
Lower middle class . . 6.87 4.85 6.41 27
Lower class . . . . 6.96 6.04 5.81 26
UCRI
Upper middle class . . 6.00 5.50 6.56 18
Lower middle class . . 6.34 4.70 6.30 27
Lower class . . . . • 6.80 6.31 6.96 26
UDELPA
Upper middle class . . 7.08 7.07 4.92 13
Lower middle class . . 6.70 7.75 7.81 16
Lower class . . . . • 7.72 7.06 7.90 18
The Socialist Party
Upper middle class . 7.07 6.75 5.81 18
Lower middle class . . 5.96 6.23 5.85 27
Lower class . . . . • 7.76 6.45 6.89 25
The Peronist Movement
Upper middle class . . 5.05 5.00 5.34 18
Lower middle class . . 5.67 5.60 4.30 27
Lower class . . . . • 5.60 5.28 4.63 29
The Communists
Upper middle class . , 6.45 5.00 6.40 18
Lower middle class . , 5.04 4.31 7.51 26
Lower class . . . . • 4.42 5.71 6.75 24
330
TABLE 48
AVERAGE RATINGS OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPINGS







Upper middle class . . 4.30 5.60 6.65 17
Lower middle class . . 6.19 5.64 4.90 27
Lower class ........ 3.50 4.87 5.20 26
The Industrial Working 
Class
Upper middle class . . 4.75 5.06 4.12 16
Lower middle class . . 4.97 4.11 4.41 27
Lower class ........ 3.18 2.82 3.40 27
The Professionals
Upper middle class . . 4.50 5.50 5.10 18
Lower middle class . . 2.89 3.18 4.26 27
Lower class ........ 2.22 2.89 4.22 28
The Peasantry
Upper middle class . . 7.33 7.40 2.80 15
Lower middle class . . 5.11 4.51 3.42 26
Lower class ........ 5.71 5.84 3.25 28
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TABLE 49
AVERAGE RATINGS OF ECONOMIC INTERESTS ON






The Local Trade Unions
Upper middle class . • 5
Lower middle class . . 5.73 5.77 6.18 22
Lower class . . . . . 4.14 4.14 3.05 21
The Large Landowners
Upper middle class . . 4.18 5.05 4.50 17
Lower middle class . . 3.87 4.08 4.65 23
Lower class . . . . . 3.19 3.27 3.96 26
The Industrialists/
Financiers
Upper middle class . . 4.38 3.18 5.50 17
Lower middle class . . 2.76 2.88 3.40 25
Lower class . . . . . 2.22 2.90 3.59 27
APPENDIX D
TABLE 50
NATIONALITIES REPRESENTED IN THE TOTAL POPULATION 
OF ARGENTINE AND SANTA FE PROVINCE IN 1947*
Nationality Total Republic Total Santa Fe
Total Argentines 13.457.900 1.479.650
Total Americans 329.864" 11.023
Bolivians ........... 47,774 362
Brazilians ......... 47,039 3,961
Canadians . . . . . . 558 23
Mexicans ........... 834 38
Paraguayans ......... 93,248 2,054
Uruguayans ........ 73,639 3,279
Venezuelans ......... 1,842 40
Other Americans . . . 64,930 1,266
Total Europeans 2.018.791 204.952
Germans ............. 51,618 3,012
Austrians ........... 33,248 3,361
Belgians ........... 2,848 278
Britains ........... 11,425 754
Czechoslovakians . . 18,983 1,163
Danish ............. 3,544 89
Spanish ............. 749,392 55,763
French 33,465 2,697
Greeks ............. 7,671 520
Dutch ............... 2,875 194
Hungarians ........ 9,623 387
Italians ........... 786,207 115,993
Norwegians ........ 639 16
Polish ............. 111,024 5,989
Portuguese ......... 25,301 1,113
Rumanians ........... 14,542 987
Russians ........... 89,983 5,767
Swedish ............. 1,269 62
Swiss . . ........... 10,102 1,462
Yugoslavians . . . . 29,164 3,700




Nationality Total Republic Total Santa Fe
Total Asians 81,460 7,002
Armenians . . . . . . 4,224 60
Japanese . . . . . . 5,244 255
Lybians ........ . . 13,505 1,031
Syrians ........ 3,310
Turks ........... . . 18,225 1,240
Other Asians 7,473 1,106
Total Africans 2,459 224
Total Oceanians 1,073 32
Undetermined 2.280
TOTAL 15.893.827 1.702.975
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